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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to analyse the powers of an arbitral tribunal conducting arbitration proceedings
under the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and under the English
Arbitration Act of 1996. The study rests on an accumulation of case law, current and secondary literature.
The Thesis is divided into two parts of four and two chapters respectively. Chapter one lays down the
foundational framework upon which the arbitral tribunal's powers are established and the basic standard of
behaviour expected from a tribunal performing a juridical duty. The chapter identifies an arbitration
agreement as a pillar upon which the process of international commercial arbitration rests. It discusses the
essential attributes of the parties' agreement in detail and shows the effect that these have on the powers of
a tribunal. It also shows how the expected standard of behaviour impacts on a tribunal's work. The study
in essence shows how the parties are able to use their independent controlling power over the arbitration
process to privately design their own dispute resolution mechanism.
Chapter two of the Thesis analyses the powers of an arbitral tribunal during the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings. The study looks at the powers of the tribunal to deal with the issues in dispute between the
parties and the need for it to observe the limits of its jurisdiction. The study also discusses the extent to
which a tribunal is permitted by the parties to exercise procedural powers. It also shows how the parties'
choice of the rules of arbitration and the procedural law influences the parties' choice of the procedure that
may be adopted in an arbitration. The study in essence shows that whilst the tribunal is given the power to
conduct the proceedings and resolve the dispute between the parties, the means by which the dispute is
resolved remains under the control of the parties. Consequently, any procedural powers that a tribunal may
exercise or any procedural assistance that it may need, requires the consent of the parties before it may be
accessed. The study shows how the work of the tribunal is geared towards fulfilling the parties' wishes.
Chapter three of the Thesis looks at the power of an arbitral tribunal to make an arbitral award. The
making of a final award is the ultimate task of a tribunal that also marks the end of its mandate. It is
essential that the final award addresses all the contentious issues arising between the parties in finality and
grants the appropriate remedies. The study also shows how the doctrine of res judicata prevents an arbitral
tribunal from revisiting an aspect of the dispute that it has dealt with in finality. An arbitral tribunal is
obliged to comply with and fulfil the requirements of the lex arbitri when making the final award. The
study shows the need for an arbitral tribunal's final award to be binding on the parties to the arbitration
agreement and enforceable at law
Chapter four examines the nature of objective arbitrability and the power of an arbitral tribunal to define its
own jurisdiction. The study discusses the benchmarks that are used to determine the question of objective
arbitrability and how these act as a controlling feature over arbitrable issues as well as over the extent of an
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. The chapter ends by discussing the extent to which an arbitral tribunal is
permitted to investigate the extent of its jurisdiction.
Chapter five of the Thesis makes an analysis of the extent to which a court may be permitted to intervene in
the arbitration process before the appointment of an arbitral tribunal and whilst the tribunal is conducting
the proceedings. The study shows the two roles that the court performs at this stage of the proceedings. It
firstly ensures that matters that parties have decided should be dealt with using the process of arbitration are
sent to arbitration. Secondly, the court avails itself to rescuing the arbitration process when it is off course.
In supporting the process of arbitration at this stage, the court assumes an ancillary role and therefore only
deals with procedural and jurisdictional matters in a restrictive manner and not as an end in itself.
The final chapter in this study discusses the extent to which a court may intervene in the work of an arbitral
tribunal after the final award. The study identifies the limited role of the court at this stage of the
arbitration process, which may only be accessed by a party under limited grounds. After the award is
made, the court supports the work of the tribunal by ensuring the recognition and enforcement of the award.
It also assumes a supervisory role of reviewing an arbitral tribunal's conduct and exercise of its powers. In
both cases however, the intervention of the court is only accessible on request. Chapters five and six of the
Thesis therefore go to show that court intervention is permitted in the arbitration process by the instruments
under study in a systematic way that ensures that the work of the tribunal and the exercise of its powers are
not disrupted. The Thesis shows that the extent of an arbitral tribunal's powers is determined by the
agreement of the parties subject to the applicable laws and rules of arbitration.
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I The Aims and Objectives of the Thesis
The aim of this Thesis is to discuss the extent of an arbitral tribunal's powers that is
seized with the responsibility of settling an international commercial dispute between
parties that have entered into an arbitration agreement. The Thesis takes the position that
parties to an international commercial contract decide by consent to have any disputes
arising between them resolved using their own method of dispute resolution that is
presided over by their appointed arbitral tribunal. It is thus expected that such an arbitral
tribunal be permitted to be in control of the arbitration proceedings with sufficient power
to enable it resolve the parties' disputes in an independent and juridical manner. This
Thesis therefore shows the extent of the tribunal's powers in the arbitration process.
Having said this, it is important to note that although the Thesis makes occasional,
unavoidable references to the power of the arbitral tribunal to determine the applicable
law, the scope of the Thesis explicitly excludes the tribunal's power to determine the
applicable law in procedural, substantive and regulatory areas.
This discussion has been taken on board in this Thesis in order to analyse the powers of a
tribunal that performs a juridical function and makes a binding award that is capable of
being enforced at law. The first part of the discussion in this Thesis (Chapters One -
Four), discusses the background of the powers of an arbitral tribunal and its fundamental
obligations that it owes the parties to an arbitration agreement. The discussion further
aims to show the power of a tribunal to conduct the arbitration proceedings and make a
final award. The study also shows the extent of an arbitral tribunal's powers over
procedural and jurisdictional issues.
The second part of the Thesis (Chapters Five - Six), shows how and why the court as an
arm of a legal system in a given country becomes involved in a private dispute resolution
between consenting parties. The Thesis looks at the restrictive and limited nature of
court intervention that is permitted in the arbitration process and its relevance. The study
also shows the support that the process of arbitration receives from national legal systems
that ensure that the role of an arbitral tribunal is respected by permitting it to deal with
issues that are arbitrable. The Thesis states how an arbitral tribunal exercises its powers
in accordance with the wishes of the parties pursuant to the governing rules of arbitration,
subject to the lex arbitri.
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II Methodology of the Thesis
This Thesis rests on material that is an accumulation of case law, current and secondary
literature. There are two reasons for this approach:
Firstly, a study of case law in this Thesis assists in forming a conclusion as to why parties
to an international commercial contract that voluntarily opt out of the judicial machinery
in preference to international commercial arbitration should institute court proceedings
relating to a dispute that an arbitral tribunal already has conduct of. Case law helps show
why it is not only the parties that may request for court intervention but the tribunal as
well. It further gives a picture ofhow an arbitral tribunal may have exercised its powers
in a given situation and the extent of those powers. The study also shows the court's
reaction to such applications, the extent to which they are entertained and the effect that
the court intervention has on an arbitral tribunal's work. A study of case law establishes
the role that the courts play in international commercial arbitration. It finally clears the
air as to who actually settles the disputes in international commercial arbitration. There
is then a clarification as to whether the work is done solely by an appointed arbitral
tribunal, or in conjunction with the court.
Secondly, current and secondary literature assists this Thesis in analysing, recognizing
and appreciating the research that has already gone into this area of the law. It is on this
foundation that this Thesis is built. It is important to note that the issues that are being
raised in this Thesis arise after a study of the work that has already been carried out by
eminent scholars of international commercial arbitration. The question arising here is
whether the parties in an international commercial contract that choose arbitration as their
set method of resolving issues arising between them permit a tribunal to exercise power
and resolve the disputes between them independently and exclusively in a final and
binding manner.
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This Thesis takes cognisance of the fact that international commercial arbitration by its
nature permits parties involved in an international commercial dispute to choose a seat of
arbitration, which may be in either a Model Law jurisdiction or in a non-Model Law
jurisdiction. An arbitral tribunal's conduct of the arbitration proceedings may therefore
be governed by a law that is dependent on the choices that the parties to the arbitration
agreement make. Further, the parties to an arbitration agreement may have an option of
having their arbitration proceedings administered by an arbitral institution with its own
set of arbitration rules or a non-institutional set of arbitration rules if at all.
With this scenario in mind, this study has based its discussion on four instruments. These
are: the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985
(hereinafter referred to as 'Model Law'), the English Arbitration Act of 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the English Act'), the International Chamber ofCommerce Arbitration
Rules of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as 'the ICC Rules'), and the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules of 1976 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the UNCITRAL Rules').
This study analyses the powers of an arbitral tribunal under the Model Law and the
English Arbitration Act for the following reasons: The Model Law is an instrument
enacted by the United Nations that has now been adopted (with modifications in some
instances), in approximately fifty countries,3 thus making it the second4 most widely
adopted international commercial arbitration instrument.5 It thus gives a clear
1 Article 1(3) of the Model Law: "An arbitration is international if: (a) the parties to an arbitration
agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places ofbusiness in different States;
or (b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their places of
business: (i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement: (ii) any
place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed or the
place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or (c) the parties have
expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country."
2
UN Doc. A/CN.9/264: pages 10-11: "In the early 1980s, the UNCITRAL Model Law was drafted with
the aim of, inter alia, encouraging the adoption of a broad interpretation of the term 'commercial'..."
3 Binder, (2005: v): "The Model Law has been enacted in a good number of states from different
geographical areas, of all major legal traditions and at different stages of economic development. In fact
the Model Law states today cover approximately one quarter of the world's territory. Several more
countries are considering adopting the Model Law,..."
4 The first being the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1958
5 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitraFen/uncitral texts/arbitration/1985Model arbitration s - Page 1:
"Legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration has been
enacted in: Australia, Austria (2005), Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia
(2005), Canada, Chile, in China: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macau Special Administrative
Region; Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark (2005), Egypt, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran
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perspective of the powers of an arbitral tribunal that have received recognition globally.6
The English Act being an instrument emanating from a non-Model Law jurisdiction is
used as a reference point in this study in order to highlight a distinction between an
arbitral tribunal's exercise ofpower under the Model Law and under the English Act.
This distinction is necessary in assessing the effect of the lex arbitri on an arbitral
tribunal's powers.
This study takes cognisance of the fact that parties to an arbitration agreement have, by
virtue of their independent controlling power over the arbitration, a choice of subjecting
the arbitration proceedings to rules of arbitration. As such, this study will use the ICC
Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules as the main reference sets of rules when discussing the
powers of an arbitral tribunal that conducts an arbitration that is governed by a set of
arbitration rules. The reason for focusing on these two sets of arbitration rules in this
study is because the ICC Rules are governed by the ICC Court that has the longest
arbitration history having been established in 1923.7 The Court also has a wide global
representation with members from almost every continent. Further, the Court plays a
crucial administrative role in the arbitration process that includes the scrutiny of the
arbitral award thus providing a double protection for the parties as to the award's
compliance of the law8 amongst other things. The arbitration rules of the ICC are
therefore able to provide a perspective of the generally accepted international arbitration
practice. The UNCITRAL Rules is a set of non-institutional rules that sometimes
governs ad hoc arbitrations.
(Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand,
Nicaragua (2005), Nigeria, Norway (2004), Oman, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland (2005),
Republic ofKorea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey (2001),
Ukraine, within the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland: Scotland; in Bermuda, overseas
territory of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland; within the United States of
America: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon and Texas; Zambia and Zimbabwe."
6 http://www.uncitral.Org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/m/-arb/06-54671 Ebook.pdf-: paragraph 2: "The
Model Law constitutes a sound and promising basis for the desired harmonization and improvement of
national laws. It covers all stages of the arbitral process from the arbitration agreement to the recognition
and enforcement of the arbitral award and reflects a worldwide consensus on the principles and important
issues of international arbitration practice. It is acceptable to States of all regions and the different legal or
economic systems of the world."
7 The Secretariat of the ICC International Court ofArbitration, (The ICC International Court of Arbitration
- The World Business Organisation), June 1994, page 1
8 Article 6 of Appendix II of the ICC Rules
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Ill Statement of the Thesis
This Thesis takes the position that an arbitral tribunal is appointed in the way that the
parties to an international commercial contract choose. This is a private process that is
based on the consensus of the parties. Party autonomy is therefore the focal point of the
arbitration process. The mandate of the arbitral tribunal is essentially to fulfil the parties'
wishes. Whilst the study recognizes the supremacy of the parties' autonomy it is alive to
the need for the arbitration agreement to succumb to its regulatory laws in order for its
ensuing arbitral award to be enforceable at law. The arbitral tribunal takes on a very
exclusive role whereby it is called to act in a juridical manner in relation to the parties
who may have played a major role in its appointment. By virtue of the parties' deliberate
choice ofhow their dispute is to be resolved and by whom, the arbitral tribunal is able to
assume the strings ofpower in the arbitration process. The tribunal therefore conducts
the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the roadmap set by the parties to the
arbitration agreement. Having conducted the arbitration proceedings, the arbitral tribunal
is authorized by the parties to make an award that is final and binding on the parties. As
a final and legally binding document, that is capable of being enforced at law, the arbitral
award gives remedies to each party as prayed. This is as far as the arbitral tribunal may
g°.
Almost all countries that support international commercial arbitration are signatories to
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Award of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the New York Convention'). By virtue of this
treaty, member countries are obliged to recognize an arbitration agreement in writing9
and refer parties to arbitration in honour of their agreement.10 This is aimed at ensuring
that parties are not hindered from utilizing their chosen method of dispute resolution even
across borders. Apart from that their arbitral award is able to receive recognition and
9 Article 11(1) of the New York Convention: "Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration."
10 ibid, Article 11(3): "The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article shall, at the request of one of
the parties refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable ofbeing performed."
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may therefore be enforced in all the member countries of the New York Convention,"
thus making it an internationally recognized dispute resolution mechanism.
An arbitral tribunal that makes a final and legally binding award that is capable ofbeing
enforced at law is expected to conduct its work subject to a law chosen by the parties.
The validity of the arbitral award is gauged against the law that the arbitral tribunal may
have applied to its arbitration proceedings. Consequently, whilst an arbitral tribunal may
act in accordance with the wishes of the parties, it has a responsibility of ensuring that the
said wishes conform to the laws at the seat of the arbitration and the rules of arbitration
under whose auspices it is to conduct the arbitration.
Further, an arbitral tribunal must ascertain the validity of the arbitration agreement
against the law chosen to govern it. An arbitral tribunal must establish and remedy the
parties' rights and obligations in the contract in accordance with the law chosen by the
parties to regulate those rights and obligations. In short, an arbitral tribunal must take
into consideration the law chosen by the parties to govern every aspect of the arbitration.
Party autonomy must therefore be interpreted in accordance with the governing laws and
rules of arbitration. Where the governing laws and rules of arbitration are in conflict, the
governing laws take precedence over the arbitration rules, as it is the governing laws that
give the work of the tribunal its legality and efficacy.
Apart from giving the arbitral tribunal's work its efficacy, the lex arbitri also makes
available the court machinery to a party that requests for a judicial review of an arbitral
tribunal's juridical functions. A party is therefore at liberty to request a court to look into
an arbitral tribunal's exercise of its jurisdictional or procedural powers. Further, a party
may request a court at the seat of the arbitration to set aside the arbitral award that has not
been conducted in accordance with the agreement of the parties and the governing law or
rules ofprocedure. A party in whose favour an arbitral award is made may request a
court in any country where the losing party has assets to recognize and enforce an award
in instances where the losing party does not do so willingly. Whilst a court cannot
resolve a dispute in an international commercial arbitration, it has got the power to check
11 ibid, Article 1(1): "This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards
are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are
sought."
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when requested to do so by a party that the arbitral tribunal is working or has worked in
accordance with the roadmap that the parties will have mapped out for it. This Thesis
will conclude by showing that national systems of law stand on the sidelines to rally
behind the arbitral tribunal as it conducts the arbitration proceedings in fulfilment of its
mandate. The systems of law may through their court machinery, raise a flag where an
arbitral tribunal acts off-limits in relation to its jurisdiction.
PART ONE
THE BASIS OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL'S POWERS: ITS POWER TO
CONDUCT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS AND MAKE AN AWARD
CHAPTER ONE
AN EXAMINATION OF THE BACKGROUND OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL'S
POWERS AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD OF CONDUCT
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the arbitration agreement and the arbitral tribunal's
standard of behaviour that is accepted as the norm by the instruments under discussion in
this study. The study takes the position that an arbitration agreement is an essential
instrument that establishes the parties' obligation to arbitrate their disputes and further
defines a tribunal's powers and jurisdiction and the extent to which they are applicable.
The agreement of the parties to arbitrate is the reference point by which an arbitral
tribunal's powers and jurisdiction are interpreted subject to the applicable laws.1 An
arbitral tribunal is expected to assume and uphold the standard ofbehaviour befitting a
tribunal whose function is juridical in nature. The Model Law places a mandatory
obligation on the tribunal to uphold a set standard by which it may conduct itself. The
English Act also requires a tribunal to maintain set moral standards during the period of
its mandate. These moral principles are also demanded of the tribunal by the rules of
arbitration under discussion. It is for this reason that this study takes these standards of
behaviour as the acceptable norm.
This chapter begins by analyzing the nature of an arbitration agreement and its essential
attributes. It goes on to focus specifically at a Bilateral Investment Treaty and how a
foreign investor who is a national of a country that is a party to a treaty, is able to
exercise autonomy when considering an offer to arbitrate made by the country in which
1 Redfern (2004: 233): "...the powers, duties and jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal arise from a complex
mixture of the will of the parties, the law governing the arbitration agreement, the law of the place of
arbitration, and the law of the place where recognition or enforcement of the award may be sought."
1
he has invested. By accepting the standing offer, the foreign investor is deemed to have
consented to the terms of arbitration provided by the treaty. It is only when the foreign
investor accepts the offer that an arbitration agreement is made between the foreign
investor and the country he has invested in. The study will also show how the parties'
choice of the rules of arbitration to govern the arbitration proceedings further extends the
tribunal's powers. A reference to the chosen rules of arbitration by a tribunal enables it
inter alia to know the procedure to follow in the event of the parties failing to agree on an
aspect of the arbitration.
I THE NATURE OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
1.1 The Essential Attributes of an Arbitration Agreement
The autonomy of the parties to privately select the mechanism by which the disputes that
arise in their international commercial contracts may be resolved is the main attractive
feature to the process of international commercial arbitration. It is now common practice
for business entities internationally to add an arbitration agreement to their contracts.
The way in which an arbitration agreement is defined is a basis by which one is able to
ascertain the wishes of the parties and the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. These
wishes are condensed into an arbitration agreement. The term 'arbitration agreement,' is
defined by the Model Law2 as follows:
(1) "Arbitration agreement" is an agreement by theparties to submit to arbitration all or
certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect ofa
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.... "3
The definition of the term 'arbitration agreement' as stated by the Model Law above
shows the existence of four essential attributes in an arbitration agreement. These are:
• The consent of the parties to arbitrate;
• The emergence of a dispute4 between the parties;5
2 A/CN.9/592: Article 7(1) of the Model Law
3 A/CN.508, paragraph 19
4 Greece v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 30 August 1924 (Merits), 1924 P.C.I.J (ser, A), No. 2, page 11:
The term dispute had been... defined as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views
2
• The existence of a defined legal relationship between the parties and;
• The separate nature of an arbitration agreement from the parties' relationship
whether it is contractual or not.
The Dervaird Scottish Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law recognized the need for
legal systems adopting the Model Law to refrain from departing from its language unless
such a departure was essential to enable the Model Law to fit into that country's legal
structure.6 This position by the Committee set in motion the enactment of the LR(MP)(S)
Act7 in the year that followed. When adopting the Model Law, Scotland chose not to
depart from the Model Law's definition of the term 'arbitration agreement' by adopting it
verbatim.8 This is the position that has been assumed by most countries that have
adopted the Model Law. An example here is Austria that adopted the Model Law in
2006.9 Most countries that support international commercial arbitration have in place
legislation that permits parties to arbitrate if they so wish.10 The ingredients of the
arbitration agreement must be satisfied in accordance with how each legal system
chooses to define the term.
For all intents and purposes, the definition of the term arbitration agreement established
under the English Act supports the definition in the Model Law to a great extent.1' It
states that:
"
...an 'arbitration agreement' means an agreement to submit to arbitration present or
future disputes (whether they are contractual or not) "I2
or interests between two persons," or "as a situation in which two sides hold clearly opposite views
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of a legal obligation."
5 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/1985Model arbitration s. page 18,
paragraph 18: "Article 7(1) recognizes the validity and effect of a commitment by the parties to submit to
arbitration an existing dispute...or a future dispute..."
6 Lord Dervaird, (1989: paragraph 1.11): "...the main object of the Model Law is to provide a framework
for arbitration which is readily understandable by people of very different legal cultures. Accordingly, the
Committee recommends that any legislation to give effect to its proposal s should depart from the language
of the Model Law only where essential..."
7 Section 66 of Schedule 7 of the LR(MP)(S) Act of 1990
8 ibid, Article 7(1)
9 Article 58(1) of the New Austrian Arbitration Act
10 Rivkin (2006: 399)
11 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981] A.C.
356 (HL)
12 Section 6(1) of the English Act
3
Lord Mustill identifies the characteristics of an arbitration agreement as follows:
1. "The results are binding on the parties.
2. The substantive rights are to be determined by the person to whom disputes are
referred.
3. The tribunal's jurisdiction is determinedfrom what the parties have agreed.
4. The parties must intend that the awardwill be enforceable.
5. Theparties must agree on the appointment ofthe arbitrator or the means ofhis
appointment. "13
These characteristics advocate for an agreement that is binding and enforceable and is
presided over by a tribunal whose jurisdiction is determined by the agreement itself.
They focus on the consequences of the parties' choice to arbitrate. By agreeing to
arbitrate the parties agree to appoint their own tribunal or decide how it is to be
appointed. It is the tribunal that resolves their disputes whilst working within the
jurisdiction defined by the arbitration agreement.
Dr Berger defines the term arbitration as follows:
"Arbitration may be defined as aprivate mechanismfor the resolution ofdisputes which
takes place in privatepursuant to an agreement between two parties, under which the
parties agree to be bound by the decision to be given by the arbitrator according to law
after a fair hearing, such decision being enforceable at law. "I4
This definition recognizes the following attributes as constituting the term 'arbitration':
• The private nature of the process of arbitration;
• The autonomy of the parties to agree to resolve their disputes using the process of
arbitration;
• The recognition of the fundamental obligation of fair play that an arbitral tribunal
owes the parties throughout its mandate;
• The binding nature of an arbitral award on the parties to the arbitration agreement;
• The recognition at law of the parties' private dispute resolution mechanism which
recognition enables the ensuing award to be enforceable at law.




The definition further recognizes the need for an arbitral tribunal to abide by a set
standard of behaviour. This study takes the position that the term 'arbitration agreement'
should amongst other things encompass the following elements:
• The consent of the parties to honour the terms of the agreement that they freely
agree to;
• The appointment of an arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute;
• The existence of a definitive international commercial15 contract that gives each
party defined legal rights and obligations that the parties may wish an arbitral
tribunal to ascertain in the event of a dispute arising;
• The identification of the subject-matter in dispute that the parties have agreed to
submit to a particular arbitration;
• The separate nature of an arbitration agreement
It is the position of this study that the establishment of these five elements in an
arbitration agreement in turn assists in defining the scope of the agreement and the
jurisdiction within which an arbitral tribunal is to function and exercise its powers. In
order to be enforceable, an arbitration agreement has to satisfy its defining characteristics
that are contained in its definition.16 From the definitions of the term 'arbitration
agreement' referred to above, it is clear that party autonomy17 plays a fundamental role in
arbitration as the parties have to be in agreement to all the terms relating to their
arbitration. Their agreement extends to the steps that may be adopted in the event of the
parties failing to agree. This study analyzes hereunder the main attributes of an
arbitration agreement in detail.
15 Article 1 (Footnote No. 2) of the Model Law: "The term "commercial" should be given a wide
interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether
contractual or not...
16 Mustill (2001: 5 & 95)
17
Taylor Woodrow Holdings and another v. Barnes & Elliott Ltd [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 735 at page
747: "Party autonomy is one of the founding principles ofmodern arbitration law..."
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1.1 (i) The Consent of the Parties to Arbitrate
The English Act18 like the Model Law, draws attention to the importance of the
arbitration agreement as being an instrument by which the parties' intentions are
expressed.19 An agreement that is governed by the Model Law must be drawn so as to
satisfy its essential elements. The need for the consent of the parties highlights the
private nature of arbitration. By consenting to arbitration, the parties become bound to
the terms of an arbitration agreement that they freely make. The parties further expressly
consent to be bound by the award that is made by the arbitral tribunal, which award is
capable of being enforced at law in the country where the losing party has got assets. The
enforcement of an award in an enforcing State marks the recognition in the public arena
of a private dispute resolution mechanism. Once the parties to an arbitration agreement
give their consent to arbitrate the consent may not be unilaterally withdrawn. It must be
noted that the consent of the parties is only applicable up to an arbitral tribunal making
the award. Thereafter, issues pertaining to the award are unilateral decisions of each
party.
There is a general consensus in arbitration that requires an arbitration agreement to be in
writing although oral agreements are also used in practice. The English Act recognizes
oral agreements whose terms are in writing.20 The Model Law has also recently been
revised21 to be in conformity with this position.22 The revised version ofArticle 7 has
widened the written requirement to include an agreement concluded orally so long as the
terms of the agreement are reduced to a written form. It now also includes electronic data
interchange.23 The revision ofArticle 11(2) of the New York Convention may assist
18 Arbitration Bill of the DAC on Arbitration Law, paragraph 108(3)
19 Kershaw Mechanical Services Ltd v. Kendrick Construction Ltd [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 81 at page 82:
"..party autonomy was one of the three general principles upon which Part I of the 1996 Act was
founded...."
20 Section 5.5 of the English Act
21 A/6/17 - Article 7(3) of the Model Law
22 A/CN.9/592, paragraph 57: "... paragraph (2) of the revised draft Article 7 sought to deal with different
issues, namely; To state the principle that an arbitration agreement shall be in writing; To determine
whether the purpose of the writing requirement was to provide certainty as to the consent of the parties to
arbitrate or as to the contents of the arbitration agreement; and To clarify how the writing requirement
could be fulfilled."
23 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/1985Model arbitration s ... Page 18,
paragraph 19: "While oral arbitration agreements are found in practice and are recognized by some national
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parties whose arbitration proceedings are governed by the English Act or the Model Law
to satisfy the requirements of Article IV(l)(b) of the Convention. In determining the
interpretation of the extent of the writing requirement Christopher Clark J. decided in the
case ofBernuth Lines Ltd v. High Seas Shipping Ltd24 that the commencement of
arbitration proceedings by email was valid. Parties may therefore execute contracts
containing arbitration clauses via e-mail as was the case in Ibeto Petrochemical
Lndustries Ltd v. M/T "Beffen " andBryggen Shipping and Trading A/S.25
1.1 (ii) The Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal
The appointment of an arbitral tribunal is one of the essential elements of an arbitration
agreement. By submitting to the process of arbitration, the parties must be understood to
have put in place a mechanism for the appointment of an arbitral tribunal to resolve their
disputes and determine their rights and obligations. The parties to an arbitration
agreement have got the exclusive prerogative to appoint an arbitral tribunal and agree on
its composition. The parties therefore have to decide and be agreed on three issues being:
• The number of arbitrators and;
• The procedure by which they are appointed
• The procedure to be adopted when the parties fail to agree
The tribunal that is formed is given the sole responsibility of steering the arbitration to its
conclusion. It determines the parties' bone of contention, deals with the issues in dispute,
collects evidence, and makes an arbitral award that is in essence final and binding.
laws, article 7(2) follows the 1958 New York Convention in requiring written form. It widens and clarifies
the definition of written form of article 11(2) of that Convention by adding "telex or other means of
telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement"
24
[2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 359
25 Case No 05 Civ. 2590 (SAS), US District Court for the Southern District ofNew York
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1.1 (ii)(a) The Number of Arbitrators
Under the Model Law26 and the English Act,27 the parties to an arbitration agreement
have got the freedom to select any number of arbitrators to form the tribunal. Where
there is no consensus between the parties on the number of arbitrators that is to be
appointed, the Model Law provides for three arbitrators28 whilst the English Act provides
for one arbitrator.29 Whilst an arbitration agreement under the English Act may provide
for a sole arbitrator when the parties fail to agree on the number of arbitrators, an
arbitration agreement that is governed by the Model Law may not provide for a sole
arbitrator in such circumstances.
Under the default procedure for the appointment of an arbitral tribunal the ICC Rules
provide for a sole arbitrator to be appointed by the Court.30 The rules further provide for
the parties to nominate an arbitrator each and for the Court to appoint the third arbitrator
in a three-man tribunal.31 A complicated dispute may require to be resolved by three
arbitrators whereas a less complicated one may only require the appointment of one
arbitrator.32 All arbitrators are however confirmed by the Court.33 The UNCITRAL
Rules makes provision for three arbitrators where the parties fail to agree on the number
of arbitrators to be appointed.34 In practice, it is more often than not for a tribunal to be
made up of an uneven number of either one or three.35
1.1 (ii)(b) The Procedure for Appointing an Arbitral Tribunal
Parties to an arbitration agreement are free to determine the procedure that they may use
to appoint an arbitral tribunal under the Model Law36 and the English Act.37 Where the
26 Article 10(1) of the Model Law
27 Section 15(1) of the English Act
28
op cit, Article 10(2)
29
op cit, Section 15(3)
30 Article 8(2) of the ICC Rules
31 ibid
32 ibid
33 ibid, Article 8(4)
34 Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Rules
35 Section 15(2) of the English Act
36 Article 11(2) of the Model Law
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parties to an arbitration agreement fail to agree on the procedure for appointing an arbitral
tribunal, this may be determined in accordance with the provisions of the governing law.
In default of agreement, the procedure provided by the Model Law38 and the English
Act39 is dependent upon the number of arbitrators that the parties have agreed should be
appointed.
Where the arbitration has provided for a sole arbitrator under the Model Law, and the
parties fail to agree on one, the decision may be made by a court.40 Where the parties
agree on three arbitrators or do not agree on a number of arbitrators at all, each party may
appoint one arbitrator under the Model Law and the two appointed arbitrators select the
third arbitrator. If the parties each fail to appoint an arbitrator, a court may make the
appointment. This procedure is also followed when the two arbitrators appointed fail to
agree on the third arbitrator.41 A decision of the court under such circumstances may not
be subject to appeal 42 This is aimed at promoting the finality of issues and ensuring that
the arbitration is not stalled, thus affecting the speed of the arbitration.
Under the English Act the parties are free to agree on a default procedure to be adopted to
appoint a tribunal in the event of the failure of the agreed procedure.43 Where each party
is supposed to appoint an arbitrator and one party fails to do so, the other party's
appointed arbitrator may be proposed as the sole arbitrator to the other party.44 But if
both parties fail to appoint an arbitrator, a court may appoint a sole arbitrator.45 Such an
appointment that is made by the court cannot be altered unilaterally.46 Unlike the default
procedure under the Model Law that may not be appealed against when made by a court,
the English Act permits appeals with the leave of the court.47 The fact that the Model
37
op cit, Section 16(1)
38
op cit, Article 11(3)
39
op cit, Section 16(2), (3), (4) & (5)
40
op cit, Article 1 l(3)(b)
41
ibid, Article 1 l(3)(a)
42 ibid, Article 11(5)
43 Section 18(1) of the English Act
44 ibid, Section 17(1)
45 ibid, Section 18(3)(d)
46 ibid, Section 18(4)
47 ibid, Section 18(5)
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Law does not provide for an appeal of a decision of a court prevents undue delay in the
arbitration. The English Act also promotes this notion by placing restrictions on undue
court intervention in the form of the leave to appeal from the court.
It is evident from the discussion that the involvement of arbitrators in the appointment of
other arbitrators is very minimal under both the Model Law and the English Act as the
selection of the team that is to resolve the dispute must lie in the hands of the parties
themselves ifparty autonomy is to be established. Consequently, under both instruments
under discussion, the involvement of arbitrators is only permissible when appointing a
48third arbitrator in a three-man tribunal. In both cases however, the tribunal may only
exercise this power with the consent of the parties which consent is exhibited by each
party appointing an arbitrator.49
The ICC Institute almost wholly administers arbitrations that are conducted under the
auspices of its Rules. As such, the appointment and confirmation of an arbitral tribunal
falls under the control of the Court.50 The Rules make provision for an arbitral tribunal to
be involved in the appointment process of other members of the tribunal if the parties
agree, which is often the case in practice.51 The UNCITRAL Rules permit an arbitral
tribunal to appoint a third arbitrator in a three-man tribunal.52 The practice ofpermitting
an arbitral tribunal to participate in the appointment of other arbitrators at a minimal level
enables the parties to be certain of having their dispute determined by an arbitral tribunal
of their own choice. Further the need for confirmation of an arbitral tribunal by the Court
gives an assurance to the parties of an arbitrator's independence53 and his ability to
function under the chosen rules.54
The Model Law and the English Act as well as the mles of arbitration referred to above
all provide for an arbitral tribunal composed of an uneven number where parties fail to
48 Footnote No. 41
49 Section 16(5)(a) of the English Act
50 Article 9(2) of the ICC Rules
51 ibid, Article 8(4)
52 Article 7(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
53 Article 7(1) of the ICC Rules
54 ibid, Article 7(5)
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agree.55 The fact that the arbitrators are given the power to select the third arbitrator who
then becomes the chairman shows the confidence that the parties have in their appointed
56 * 57
arbitrators. Under the Model Law and the English Act, the third arbitrator that is
appointed by the other two arbitrators has power to address and make decisions
pertaining to procedural questions if he is authorized to do by the parties or the other
members of the tribunal. This promotes speed in the arbitration proceedings, as the
presiding arbitrator is able to make instant procedural decisions, whilst ensuring that the
proceedings get underway. Any decisions in the form of an arbitral award or an order
must however be made by a majority of the members of the tribunal.58 It is only fair that
the final decision of the arbitration is made by a majority of the members of the tribunal.
Where the votes are tied, the presiding arbitrator has got the casting vote thus creating a
majority.
1.1 (iii) The Existence of a Defined Legal Relationship between the Parties
In an international commercial transaction where the parties choose to be legally bound
by the terms and conditions of their transaction, the transaction gives each party certain
rights and obligations that they are bound to honour. A party that fails to perform his part
of the bargain may face legal consequences if he does not willingly rectify the breach and
the claimant may receive legal protection under the parties' chosen system of law.59 The
claimant may institute arbitration proceedings before an arbitral tribunal in order for it to
remedy any issues in contention. As the tribunal's job is to establish legal rights and
obligations, its actions and decision may be regulated by a system of law. The parties
may state in their arbitration agreement the systems of law by which their arbitration
agreement may be regulated. They may further state the system of law that may regulate
other aspect of their arbitration agreement.60 It is these systems of law that hold the
55 Article 10 of the Model Law & Section 15 of the English Act
56 Article 29 of the Model Law
57 Section 20 of the English Act
58
op cit
59 Tweeddale (2005: 255-256): "Party autonomy permits the parties to choose the laws and make the rules
which govern the arbitral proceedings. It is not however absolute.."
60 XL Insurance v. Owens Corning [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 500: "Parties' freedom of choice includes
freedom to choose different systems of law to govern different aspects of their relationship."
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arbitration in place and give it its legality and efficacy.61 Without the backing of a law,
the decision of an arbitral tribunal may not be enforceable at law.
In order for an arbitration agreement to qualify as a source ofpower for the arbitral
tribunal it must be recognized as valid by the law of the country in which its recognition
and enforcement is required. In the same vein where the parties choose general
principles of law to govern the recognition and enforcement of the arbitration agreement,
it is by those standards that the arbitration agreement will be legally recognized. The
validity of the arbitration agreement is measured in relation to the law that is chosen to
regulate it. Therefore, the fact that an agreement is valid in a Model Law country does
not imply that the same agreement may be considered as valid when subjected to a non-
Model Law system. The existence of a valid agreement implies that the characteristics in
the definition of arbitration agreement are satisfied in accordance with the regulatory law.
An arbitration agreement requires that the parties' decision to arbitrate their disputes
conforms to the laws that they choose to regulate their agreement as well as to the public
policy considerations that are considered as essential at the seat of the arbitration.
Oguntade JCA in BakerMarina v. Danos62 stated among other things that:
"When parties make a submission (to arbitration) they do so for a number ofreasons.
These include simplicity ofthe arbitralprocess, the speed, and sometimes an
understanding or technical knowledge of the subject matter. It is usually not because it
ft ?
was believed the arbitrator could not make an error of law. "
Therefore as the parties agree by consent to the terms of their agreement, they may only
alter their terms by consent. As much as most countries may encourage parties to
arbitrate,64 their arbitration agreement must conform to the public policy considerations
that the parties are not permitted to derogate from. In the case ofMitsubishi Motors
61 Channel Tunnel Group Limited v. Balfour Beatty Construction Limited [1993] A.C 334 at page 357-358:
"It is by now firmly established that more than one national system of law may bear upon an international
arbitration..."
62 (2001) 7 NWLR 337 at page 355
63 Quoted in the case of IPCO (Nigeria) v. Nigerian National Petroleum (2005) 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 326
at page 331
64 Rivkin (2006: 399)
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Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,65 the court held that issues pertaining to anti-trust
regulations were arbitrable when they involved international transactions. Apart from the
public policy consideration, the arbitration agreement may not derogate or be in conflict
with the social, political or economic interests at the seat of the arbitration. The English
Act66 states in its Section 1(b) as follows:
"The provisions ofthis Part are founded on thefollowingprinciples, and shall be
construed accordingly- theparties should befree to agree how their disputes are
resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in thepublic interest; "61
The requirement of the agreement of the parties to arbitrate being subject to public
interest safeguards in a given legal system, shows that the parties' autonomy to arbitrate
is subject to their chosen regulatory laws. The law to which the arbitration agreement is
to be subjected to must recognize the arbitration agreement as an enforceable instrument.
Therefore, having agreed on certain disputes to be referred to arbitration, the question
that the parties should be asking themselves is, whether the law to which they wish to
subject that arbitration permits such a process. The House of Lords stated in the case of
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA and others68 that the powers
of an arbitral tribunal are found in the arbitration agreement as read together with the
curial law and not in the underlying contract between the parties.
I.1(iv) The Emergence of a Dispute between the Parties
An international business transaction contains terms and conditions that each party agrees
to abide by and perform. The offer and acceptance of those terms seals the transaction
and determines the role that each party may perform. The transaction therefore has to be
performed in accordance with the agreed terms. There may however be minor changes to
the terms of the contract that the parties may agree to take on board. For example, a
foreign company may be contracted by a local electrical company to replace the
underground cables with overhead ones. The parties may require the project to be
65
[1985] 474 U.S614
66 Footnote No. 19, at page 82
67 Section 1(b) of the English Act
68
[2005] 2 All ER 265 at page 276
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completed within a period of six months at an agreed price. However, say for instance
that due to a delay in procuring raw materials, the project requires more time and is
therefore not completed within the prescribed time frame. If the foreign company
anticipates the delay and brings it to the attention of the electric company within
reasonable time the parties may agree by consent to any changes in the terms of the
contract in terms of time. Such an amicable agreement may however only be agreed to if
the foreign company agrees to absorb any extra costs arising from the extended time.
Where however, the cost of the raw materials increases whilst the work is still in
progress, and the foreign company refuses to bear the cost of the increase in costs, then
the change in circumstances is material as it in effect alters the terms and conditions of
the contract. This may lead to the commencement of arbitration proceedings as a result
of a dispute in the cost of the project. In the Channel Tunnel69 case, the parties' failure to
agree on the amount payable for work done on the cooling system resulted in the dispute
being referred for arbitration in Bmssels. The Channel Tunnel project related to one of
the major international construction contracts of the 20th century.
The parties in that case did not foresee the immediate need of a cooling system at the
signing of the contract. It however became apparent that the system was immediately
required and in the meantime no provision had been agreed upon as to the cost of the
work to install the cooling system. The contract was varied accordingly, but the parties
still failed to agree on the cost hence the suspension of works pending agreement of costs
and the eventual institution of arbitration proceedings. Parties that are involved in an
international commercial transaction that contains an arbitration agreement may resort to
arbitration when they are unable to agree on an issue. The existence of a difference
therefore marks the emergence of a dispute and consequently the arbitration proceedings.
The parties' choice of a tribunal to deal with a dispute arising, may be influenced by the
subject matter of the dispute in the sense that the parties may prefer a tribunal that has got
the expertise or experience that relate to the issues in dispute. For instance, a difference
69 Footnote No. 61
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relating to the cost of the project as in the example given above may benefit from an
arbitrator with a legal or accountancy background. On the tribunal's part, the
discernment of the subject matter in the dispute that the parties wish it to resolve is
fundamental to its work. An arbitral tribunal must ensure that the subject matter it is
dealing with is within the scope of the arbitration agreement and relates to the parties to
the agreement.
Under the Model Law, an arbitral tribunal is able to discern the subject matter in the
dispute from the statement of claim, defence and counter claims that the claimants and
respondent submit.70 An arbitral tribunal operating under the auspices of the ICC Rules
has got the opportunity of drawing the Terms of Reference which encompass "a
summary oftheparties' respective claims and the reliefsought by each party with an
indication to the extentpossible of the amounts claimed or counterclaimed"'.71 The claim
and remedy sought, the defence, as well as the counterclaims, puts the tribunal in a clear
picture of the subject matter in dispute that it is called to resolve.
There is need for an arbitral tribunal to examine the kind of disputes that the parties in a
contract may have indicated should be referred to arbitration. The parties may either give
the disputes a broad or narrow meaning. Disputes that are 'all inclusive' may relate to a
broad subject matter such as a breach of contract. Alternatively, the parties may
specifically spell out the kind of dispute in narrow terms such as a dispute only relating to
a difference in the payments due or to the question of interest. As to whether a dispute is
defined narrowly or broadly is dependent on how the arbitration agreement is framed. It
must in essence impart the wishes of the parties.72
An example is the case ofNisshin Shipping Co. Ltd v. Cleaves & Company Ltd &
Others.75 The brief facts of the case were that the respondent negotiated on behalfof the
applicant, nine charters each ofwhich contained its own arbitration clause. Each charter
70 Article 23(1) of the Model Law
71 Article 18(l)(c) of the ICC Rules
72 This reasoning was also followed in the case ofHarbour Assurance Co. (UK) Ltd. V. Kansa General
Insurance Co. Ltd., (1993) Q.B. 701.
73 [2004] 1 All ER 481
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party was to pay commission to the respondent, and in the event of a dispute relating to
non-payment of commission, the respondent was at liberty to use the arbitration clauses
to exercise its right of enforcement of the commission. The court held that the
respondent was entitled to invoke its rights through the process of arbitration as the
dispute was within the scope of all the nine arbitration clauses and the team of arbitrators
had jurisdiction to hear the case.
It was possible for this to happen even though the respondent was not a party to any of
the nine agreements because there was legislation in place and all the arbitration clauses
were worded in a wide enough manner to cover such disputes. But the arbitrators had to
join the respondent to the application as an interested party. This case places emphasis
on the need for an arbitral tribunal to appreciate the terms and reasoning of the contract as
well as the arbitration agreement in order to avoid fatal errors ofjudgment. This case
may be contrasted with the case ofEsso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Texaco Ltd74 wherein the
court found that the arbitrator had made fatal errors ofjudgment. The errors that the
arbitrator made in this case may have been avoided if the arbitrator had engaged the
services of an expert in company law for instance.75
The subject matter of the disputes that an arbitral tribunal may be assigned to handle may
relate to contract or may only cover a remedy of interest. The test is whether the subject
matter of the dispute falls within the matters that the parties have agreed should be
referred to arbitration. The subject matter must not only be clear and precise, but the
arbitration clause itselfmust be sufficiently wide to cover all aspects in order for one
arbitral tribunal to hear the dispute if the parties so wish. The disadvantage of a narrow
arbitration clause is that it allows for contrary decisions to be arrived at by two sets of
arbitral tribunals appointed to deal with separate segments of a dispute. This would result
from the wording of an arbitration clause which does not give authority to one arbitral
tribunal to deal with the whole dispute, thus resulting in the appointment of another set of
74
[1999] QBD (Commercial Court), (WL 1556576)
75 ibid
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arbitrators to deal with the part of the dispute that is not allotted to the arbitral tribunal to
resolve. However, this is the prerogative of the parties.
The disputes that the parties wish to be resolved in a particular arbitration, guide an
arbitral tribunal in terms of the subject matters that it is permitted to resolve. This
ensures the accurate settlement of the dispute between the parties by the tribunal. The
resolution of the dispute is the fundamental duty of the arbitral tribunal and the basis
upon which it is appointed. The dispute may result as a result of a difference on a
question of law or fact or both. In either case however, the kind of dispute that the parties
wish to be resolved using the process of arbitration must fall within the scope of the
arbitration agreement in order for the appointed arbitral tribunal therein to have the power
to resolve it.
1.1 (v) The Separate Nature of an Arbitration Agreement from the Parties'
Relationship whether Contractual or not
The separability76 principle enables the validity of an arbitration agreement to be
identified independently of the parties' international commercial contract. As such the
fact that the instrument containing the arbitration agreement is declared invalid by its
governing law does not imply that the arbitration agreement is also invalid by the same
terms, as the validity of the arbitration agreement may be measured by bench marks that
are different from those used to gauge the validity of the parties' contract. The
separability principle was expressed by the Court ofAppeal in the case ofHarbour
Assurance Co. (UK) Ltd v. Kansa General International Insurance Co. Ltd and others.11
70
In the case ofHeyman v. Darwins, the House of Lord observed that an arbitration
agreement survives repudiation of the substantive bargain. Section 7 of the English Act
states that:
76 Article 16(1) of the Model Law: "...an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract...."
77
[1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 455
78 [1942] A.C.356 (HL)
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"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was
intended to formpart ofanother agreement (whether or not in writing) shall not be
regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid,
or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shallfor thatpurpose be
treated as a distinct agreement. "79
1.1 (vi) An Arbitration Agreement Governed by Rules of Arbitration
Where parties to an arbitration agreement wish to have their arbitration proceedings
governed by a set of arbitration rules, the agreement must make provision for such an
arrangement. If the parties intend that the arbitration agreement be subjected to the
administration of an arbitral institution or be governed by a set of arbitration rules, this
position must be explicitly provided in the parties' agreement. If the parties select the
ICC Rules for example as their governing rules, then the administrative system of the
institute steers the arbitration proceedings in the direction set by the institute. An
arbitration agreement may therefore be formulated in the following terms: 'All disputes
arising from this contract shall be finally settled by arbitration in Geneva under the ICC
Rules.'
This arbitration agreement may be interpreted in the following ways:
1. There is consent between the parties to an identified contract to arbitrate;
2. All subject matters in dispute between the parties arising from the said contract
shall be resolved by arbitration;
3. The seat of arbitration is Geneva;
4. The lex arbitri shall be the Swiss Law;
5. The arbitration proceedings shall be governed by the ICC Rules;
6. The arbitral tribunal shall be appointed by the ICC Court;
7. The award shall be made in Geneva and;
8. The validity of the arbitral award shall be determined by Swiss Law.
The framework that encompasses the powers of an arbitral tribunal is easily discernable
under an arbitration that is governed by rules of arbitration as the rules spell out in their
79 Section 7 of the English Act
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provisions the 'do's' and 'don'ts' of a tribunal. The rules of arbitration are available to
parties to an arbitration agreement as an extension of the means by which an arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction and powers may be determined. Since parties to an arbitration
agreement have got the prerogative to choose any set of arbitration rules to govern their
arbitration this flexible approach enables the parties to choose those rules that suit a
specific arbitration process. Through the governing arbitration rules an arbitral tribunal
may in essence be able to source additional powers to enable it perform its work
effectively.
Rules of arbitration may be institutional or non-institutional. Institutional and non-
institutional rules of arbitration are both able to determine an arbitral tribunal's powers.
80The ICC Court for instance, appoints the arbitral tribunal where parties fail to reach an
agreement. In whichever case however, all members of an arbitral tribunal operating
under the auspices of the ICC Rules require to be confirmed81 by the Court. The ICC
Court directs an arbitral tribunal's conduct of the arbitration process to ensure compliance
with the rules of arbitration.82 It monitors the progress of the arbitration proceedings and
is therefore able to extend time frames where such extensions are justified.83 It fixes the
fees84 of the arbitral tribunal and scrutinizes awards.85 To state that the Court administers
the arbitration process almost in whole would therefore not be far fetched.
The ICC Rules establish an arbitral tribunal's authority and regulate the course of the
arbitration process86 from receipt of the request to arbitrate87, to the approval of the
arbitral award as to its form.88 This is however not the case with the non-institutional
arbitration rules89 such as the UNCITRAL Rules.90 The UNCITRAL Rules are party
80 Article 8 of the ICC Rules
81 ibid, Article 9
82
op cit, Article 5(2), Appendix II
83 Article 32(2) of the ICC Rules
84
ibid, Article 30








Joseph (2005: 101): "An arbitration which is not an institutional arbitration is often referred to as an ad
hoc arbitration."
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driven with the arbitral tribunal directing the course of the arbitration proceedings
whenever it is permitted to do so by the parties to the arbitration agreement. Parties that
choose to have their arbitration agreement governed by the UNCITRAL Rules are free to
modify the rules to suit their particular circumstances, subject to Article 1(2), which
requires the parties to pay strict adherence to the mandatory law "applicable to the
arbitration. "91 It is every arbitral tribunal's responsibility and obligation to give effect to
the wishes of the parties by exercising its powers in accordance with those wishes.
The ICC and the UNCITRAL Rules provide the procedure, which arbitration proceedings
governed by those rules follow. By ascertaining the procedure, the framework within
which an arbitral tribunal is able to operate is established and consequently the extent to
which its powers may be exercised. The exercise ofpower within this jurisdictional
framework that is determined by the procedure is subject to the essential provisions of an
applicable law whether mandatory or not. Consequently, where the lex arbitri contains
an essential provision on the required procedure that is contrary to the provisions of the
rules of arbitration, the mandatory provision will prevail.92
1.2 A Foreign Investor's Acceptance of a Standing Offer to Arbitrate
Established under a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
An arbitration agreement that is commenced by virtue of a BIT is not the ordinary
arbitration agreement that has been discussed above. The arbitration under a BIT arises
from a treaty between nations. It is one of these nations with an investor from another
member country that makes an offer to arbitrate to the investor. When the investor takes
up the offer to arbitrate, it is deemed to be an international commercial arbitration. A
90 Caron (2006: 21): "The UNCITRAL Rules are highly adaptable for resolution of various types of
disputes."
91 Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules
92
http://www.uncitral.Org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/m/-arb/06-54671 Ebookpdf : page 16, paragraph 6:
"The expectations of the parties as expressed in a chosen set of arbitration rules may be frustrated,
especially by a mandatory provision of the applicable law... Frustrations may also ensue from non-
mandatory provisions which may impose undesired requirements on unwary parties who did not provide
otherwise. Even the absence of non-mandatory provisions may cause difficulties by not providing answers
to the many procedural issues relevant in an arbitration and not always settled in the arbitration agreement."
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standing offer in a BIT does not establish an arbitration agreement until a foreign investor
exercises his autonomy and agrees to arbitration and gets the arbitration underway. Only
when a foreign investor accepts a standing offer under a BIT and resolves to arbitrate
may an arbitration agreement become established. In the absence of a foreign investor's
acceptance of a standing offer to arbitrate, there can be no arbitration agreement under a
BIT. The standing offer therefore enables a non-party to a BIT to be able to utilize the
method of arbitration agreed to by the parties to the BIT even when the foreign investor is
himself not a party to the BIT. By accepting the standing offer, the foreign investor
becomes a party to the arbitration agreement whose terms may have been agreed to by
the State of which the investor is a national.
A number of trading nations enter into a network ofBITs mainly to encourage and
promote cross border trade and investment in order to foster economic growth in their
respective countries. The first BIT was concluded in 1959 between Pakistan and
Germany. Latin America and the Caspian region have seen a rise in arbitrations
established by foreign investors accepting standing offers in BITs. Most BITs that
choose arbitration as a method of resolving trade disputes usually contain a clause giving
a standing offer to arbitrate that may be offered to a foreign investor of a member country
to a treaty. The standing offer to arbitrate if accepted by a foreign investor, gives the
investor an option of resolving his dispute using the process of arbitration in the event of
a dispute arising. This is possible in cases where the BIT has made provision for
arbitration as one of the means of resolving disputes available to a foreign investor that
wishes to establish his rights and obligations in his investment project. The arbitration
agreement in such a BIT therefore only becomes established and effective if it is chosen
as a dispute resolution option by a foreign investor.
Under a standing offer to arbitrate offered by a BIT and administered by ICSID for
instance, an arbitral tribunal's powers and duties may be established by the Additional
Facility Rules.93 Where one party to an arbitration agreement is a member State and
93 ICSID/11 April 2006 - Additional Facility Rules
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signatory to the Washington Convention94 the parties have the option of choosing the
Additional Facility Rules to govern the arbitration proceedings.95 Whilst the United
States of America is a signatory to the Convention for example, jurisdictions such as
Canada are not. As such a Canadian96 investor may accept a standing offer under a BIT
and be able to access the services of the Centre's Secretariat if the other party to the
dispute is American. The access to the Secretariat for purposes of administering an
arbitration agreement is subject to the Secretary General's consent.97 Under such
arbitration proceedings an arbitral tribunal's powers are sourced from the Additional
Facility Rules.
By analyzing the elements that make up the arbitration agreement, one must be able to
identify the parties to the arbitration agreement; the arbitral tribunal; the subject matters
in dispute; the applicable law and the governing rules of arbitration. By so doing, the
extent of the tribunal's jurisdiction and powers are established. Having established the
means by which an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction and powers may be ascertained, an
arbitral tribunal that confirms its willingness to work under that arbitration takes charge
and becomes a master of the arbitration procedure. The acceptance of an appointment
must effectively enable each arbitrator to have an answer to two crucial questions being:
• What is the nature of the dispute that the parties want me to resolve?
• What remedies am I permitted to award?
The answer to these two questions may assist in ensuring a link between the agreement of
the parties to arbitrate and the dispute itself so that the arbitral tribunal is certain that the
dispute before it is covered by the agreement of the parties. Further an answer to these
questions enables the tribunal to know the scope of authority and jurisdiction that the
arbitration agreement has provided for it.
94 Metalclad Corporation and The United Mexican States, ARB (AF)/97/l - Footnote 1 "..a disputing
investor may submit its claim to arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID provided that
either the disputing Party whose measure is alleged to be a breach... or the Party of the investor .. .but not
both, is a party to the ICSID Convention..."
95
op cit, Article 2
96 Canada is not a signatory of the Washington Convention
97
op cit, Article 4
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An arbitral tribunal must commit itself to observe certain fundamental obligations
throughout the period of its mandate. These obligations operate hand in hand with the
exercise of its powers. Just like an arbitral tribunal is given a duty to resolve a dispute by
the parties to an arbitration agreement, the parties expect the tribunal to abide by certain
fundamental obligations if its exercise ofpowers is to be recognized. Section two of this
study will discuss four fundamental obligations which are; disclosure, impartiality,
independence and confidentiality.
II THE FUNDAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS OWED BY THE ARBITRAL
TRIBUNAL TO THE PARTIES TO AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
An arbitral tribunal's assumption of office and its observance of its fundamental
obligations are two sides of the same coin. The decision that an arbitrator makes to
accept an appointment to serve as arbitrator in essence binds him to his fundamental
obligations to exercise procedural justice in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings.
One cannot exist without the other. An arbitrator that accepts an appointment places
himself under an obligation to disclose any material facts that may in any way infringe
upon his work to the parties. This responsibility is on going and disclosure has to be
made before or as the issues arise. An arbitral tribunal is obliged to remain impartial and
independent throughout its mandate. It must also ensure that it maintains confidentiality
to the extent that is expected of the parties to the arbitration agreement. The fundamental
obligations arise from the fact that the parties expect to be treated fairly by a tribunal that
conducts itself in an independent, impartial and juridical manner. The principle of
openness and fair dealing between parties to an arbitration process was discussed in the
case ofAthletic Union ofConstantinople v. National BasketballAssociation98
II. 1 A Tribunal's Duty of Disclosure
An arbitral tribunal owes the parties to an arbitration agreement an obligation to disclose.
This obligation exists throughout the tribunal's mandate. An arbitrator whose name is
98 Footnote No. 857, (2002) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 305 at page 311,
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being floated for possible appointment owes the parties to an arbitration agreement a
general duty of disclosure." At the time that an arbitrator accepts his appointment, he is
obliged to make a statement of disclosure to the parties.100 A statement of disclosure
amounts to an assurance by the arbitrator to the parties that he has laid bare any issues
that are likely to be regarded as influencing his decision making process. These issues
may relate to any previous business dealings or relations that the arbitrator may currently
have or may have had in the past with any of the parties. An arbitrator's duty is to make
a statement of disclosure to the parties stating that he has previously dealt with or worked
for either one or both of them. Thereafter, it is up to the parties to decide whether the
disclosed statement is likely to infringe upon an arbitrator's determination of their rights
and obligations in that particular arbitration. An arbitrator has got the option of refusing
to accept an appointment if the issues in dispute connect him, his business or family
interests to the dispute. In such a case an arbitrator may instead ofmaking a statement of
disclosure prefer to decline the offer of appointment.
In order for an arbitrator to be in a position to make an informed declaratory statement,
he must be availed of the parties' arbitration agreement, written witness statements and
any other relevant documents and information. A perusal of these documents before
appointment may assist a prospective arbitrator to either accept the appointment or
decline the appointment. The duty to disclose is an on-going obligation that an arbitrator
should uphold throughout his term of office as the case progresses. This is because fresh
evidence in the case and fresh witness statements may reveal information that may not
have been previously available to the arbitrator. For example, the arbitrator may discover
that one of the witnesses that a party is calling is the arbitrator's business partner. In such
a case, the arbitrator should immediately make a declaration to that effect and it is up to
the parties to decide whether they believe that the issues raised in the statement of
disclosure place the arbitrator in a compromising position or not.
99 Binder (2005: 119): "A prospective arbitrator should disclose all facts or circumstances that may give
rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence."
100 Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd v. ZCCM Investment Holdings Pic [2005] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 37 at
page 39: "...arbitration is fundamentally a matter of and is limited by, the mutual consent of the parties."
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In instances where the parties are given a statement of disclosure by an arbitrator and if
either of the parties objects to the arbitrator's appointment as a result of the contents of
the disclosure, then the arbitrator may not be appointed. If however the parties are not
affected by the contents of the disclosure, then they may agree to proceed to appoint the
arbitrator to settle their dispute. As such parties to an arbitration agreement may agree to
appoint as arbitrator a solicitor who has previously acted for both parties at different
times in the past as long as they believe that the solicitor is in a position to act impartially
and independently in settling the dispute. An appropriate example here is the case of
Weissfisch v. Julius and others.101
The claimant and the second defendant in the Weissfisch102 case were brothers who had
appointed the first defendant as their solicitor. The first defendant had previously been
instructed to represent both brothers in their personal capacities. The parties agreed to
appoint their solicitor as arbitrator and further agreed to waive their right to challenge the
appointment of the arbitrator. The claimant commenced arbitration proceedings in
England alleging that the agreement was void, as it had been procured by
misrepresentations.
The arbitrator informed the parties that he wished to determine his jurisdiction in Geneva
being the seat of the arbitration. The claimant's position was that challenging the
arbitrator's breach ofhis fiduciary duty and the breach of his professional duty as
solicitor could not be met by the agreed waiver. The judge when refusing to grant the
application for an injunction sought by the claimant noted that under Swiss law the
solicitor had Kompetenz-Kompetenz as arbitrator and was obliged to decide his own
jurisdiction.103 On appeal the court held that the principle ofKompetenz-Kompetenz
sometimes required an arbitrator to be both judge and witness in his own cause.104
(ZUUOJ.
102 ibid
103 ibid, page 505, and page 512
104 ibid, page 505
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If an arbitration agreement adopts rules of an arbitration institution to govern the
arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator may not only owe the parties a duty of disclosure
but the institute105 as well as the other members of the arbitration team. The SCC106
places an obligation on an arbitral tribunal to exercise its general duty of disclosure. An
• • 107
arbitrator owes the parties to an arbitration process this ethical and fiduciary duty of
care. The IBA sets out general standards regarding both impartiality and disclosure. The
second general standard states that:
. .it is the main ethical guidingprinciple ofevery arbitrator that actual bias from the
arbitrator's own point ofview must lead to that arbitrator declining his or her
• y J *>108
appointment.
Although arbitration practice has generally accepted that the duty of disclosure includes
declaring one's impartiality and independence one finds that most instruments that
support the process of international arbitration only go as far as stating the obligation to
be impartial109 and independent without necessarily defining the terminologies.110 The
UNCITRAL Rules refer to this obligation in such a way that one is left in no doubt as to
what the parties are looking for from the arbitrator. Article 9 states as follows:
"A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who approach him in connection with
his possible appointment any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts at to
his impartiality and independence. An arbitrator, once appointed or chosen, shall
disclose such circumstances to theparties unless they have already been informed by him
ofthese circumstances.
Article 7(2) of the ICC Rules states as follows:
105 Article 7(2) of the ICC Rules, Article 17(2) of the SCC Rules and Article 7 of the AAA Rules
106 Article 17(2) of the SCC Rules
107 The IBA Ethics for International Arbitrators
i°8 p_Q7; [3a Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration
109 Redfern, (2004: 200): "The ICC Rules do not use the term "impartiality", for reasons that... the drafters
of the ICC Rules have preferred to express the relevant requirement in terms of independence because
independence is a more objective notion. Independence is generally a function ofprior or existing
relationships that can be catalogued and verified, while impartiality is a state ofmind, which it may be
impossible for anyone but the arbitrator to check or to know when the arbitrator is being appointed..."
110 Article 7(2) of the ICC Rules, Article 7 of the AAA Rules of 2001, Article 5(3) of the LCIA Rules,
Article 17(2) of the SCC Rules, Article 22(b) of the WIPO Rules and, Rule 7(3) of the CPR Rules
111 Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Rules
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"Before appointment or confirmation, a prospective arbitrator shall sign a statement of
independence and disclose in writing to the Secretariat anyfacts or circumstances which
might be ofsuch a nature as to call into question the arbitrator's independence in the
112
eyes ofthe parties.... "
The duty of disclosure may be summed up as being a promise made by an arbitrator to
the parties to the effect that having accepted to conduct the arbitration proceedings he
will conduct himself fairly113, with diligence and skill. The promise by an arbitrator to be
impartial and independent is one way of giving an assurance of fairness without a
compromise on his professionalism. The statement of disclosure is necessary as the
arbitral tribunal's final award is in general regarded as final and binding on the parties.114
II.2 Impartiality and Independence of an Arbitral Tribunal
An arbitral tribunal is mandated to work within the limits of its jurisdiction and in
accordance with the fundamental principles of fair play, impartiality and independence.115
Systems of law and rules of arbitration place an obligation on the arbitral tribunal to be
independent and impartial. The Model Law demands that an arbitral tribunal treats the
parties with equality and give each one of them an opportunity to present their case.116
This is a fundamental obligation that may not be derogated from. Judge Lax when sitting
in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in the case of Corporacion Transnacional de
Inversiones, S.A. de C. V., et al. v. STETInternational, S.p.A. and STETInternational
Netherlands, N.V."7 stated that the purpose ofArticle 18 of the Model Law was aimed at
protecting a party from 'egregious and injudicious conduct by an arbitral tribunal' and
not protecting a party from its own failures.118
112 Article 7(2) of the ICC Rules
113 Footnote No. 7, Article 18
'14
op cit, Article 28(6): "Every Award shall be binding on the parties..."
115 Footnote No. 107: "Every arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at the time of
accepting an appointment to serve and shall remain so during the entire arbitration proceeding until the
final award has been rendered or the proceeding has otherwise finally terminated."
116 Article 18 of the Model Law: "The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a
full opportunity of presenting his case."
117 CLOUT: (1999) 45 O.R. (3d) 183
118 ibid
27
The English Act also places a mandatory responsibility on the tribunal to "actfairly and
impartially as between the parties 19 Eminent authors have defined impartiality and
independence in the context of arbitration. Dr Binder defines impartiality and
independence as enunciated by M.S Donahey as follows:
"Impartiality is the testfor the lack ofimpermissible bias in the mind ofthe arbitrator
toward aparty or toward the subject-matter in dispute. ".. "Independence on the other
hand, is a term that refers to the relationship between the arbitrator and the parties and
indicatesprior or currentpersonal, social or business contact between them. "I20
Impartiality is a fluid principle in that it relates to a person's attitude ofmind and
behaviour. Independence on the other hand "is a necessary external manifestation of
what is required as a prerequisite ofthat attitude and is an objective examination into the
relationship between theparties and appointed arbitrators. "121 The objective test of
impartiality is whether a reasonable man could conclude that the actions of an arbitral
tribunal are biased or not. This test was alluded to in the case ofPorter v. Magill.122 The
test was whether a "fair minded and informed observer, having considered thefacts,
would conclude that there was a realpossibility that the tribunal was biased. "I2i Bias in
this case may arise in circumstances where an arbitral tribunal holds a private meeting in
chambers with one of the parties in the absence of another. The party that is absent may
portray such an action as bias on the part of the tribunal.
The Swedish Act,124 a non-Model Law instrument, provides instances that may point to
an arbitral tribunal being partial such as:
119 Section 33 of the English Act: "(1) The tribunal shall- (a) act fairly and impartially as between the
parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent,
and (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or
expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined. (2) The
tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings, in its decisions on
matters of procedure and evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it."
See also section 18 of India's Arbitration and Conciliation Act
120 Binder (2005: 117)
121 Yu (2003: 935-967)
122
[2001] UKHL 67
123 ibid, at paragraph 103
124 Article 8 of the Swedish Act
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"That the arbitrator or anyone closely affiliated with him is aparty or otherwise may
expect benefit or detriment as a result of the outcome ofthe dispute;... "125
An arbitral tribunal may be considered as being partial if it loses its independence. In the
case ofPorter v. Magill,1"6 Lord Hope referred to the close relationship of independence
to impartiality as was stated in the case ofFindlay v. United Kingdom127 as follows:
"..whether a tribunal can be considered as independent, regard must be had inter alia to
the manner ofappointment of its members and their term ofoffice, the existence of
guarantees against outsidepressures and the question whether the bodypresents an
appearance ofindependence ...As to the question of 'impartiality,' there are two aspects
to this requirement. First the tribunal must be subjectivelyfreefrom personalprejudice
or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartialfrom an objective viewpoint, that is, it must
offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.... The concept
of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked. "I28
In order to be impartial and independent an arbitral tribunal must exercise fairness in its
attitude towards all parties. A failure by an arbitral tribunal to abide by this obligation
could lead to a party raising a personal challenge against an arbitral tribunal. The New
York Convention129 recognizes certain procedural unfairness that is restrictive. The
Convention identifies the types of behaviour that are unfair and which may amount to a
ground for refusing to recognize or enforce an arbitral award.130 However, one finds that
unfairness may go beyond those circumstances that are recognized by the Convention as
grounds for refusing the recognition and enforcement of the award. For instance, an
arbitral tribunal may be biased without being procedurally wrong. An arbitral tribunal
may, whilst ensuring that all parties present their arguments, fail to be open minded or
objective towards one party's arguments. This kind of unfairness is not recognized by
the Convention as a ground for refusing to recognize or enforce an arbitral award,
although in a Model Law country one may argue that an arbitrator failed to act in
accordance with his appointment.
125 ibid
126 Footnote No. 122
127
[1997] 24 EHRR 221, 244-245 paragraph 73
128
op cit
129 Article V(l) (b) of the New York Convention
130 ibid, Article V
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The Model Law provides a limited time frame within which a party may raise a personal
challenge against an arbitrator before an arbitral tribunal. It states as follows:
"
(2)...aparty who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after
becoming aware ofthe constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of
any circumstance referred to in article 12(2), send a written statement of the reasonsfor
the challenge to the arbitral tribunal... "UI
The limitation on time within which an arbitral tribunal may entertain a personal
challenge is a procedural safeguard that prevents the waste of time, and thus helps the
tribunal to work within its set time limits.
Section 29(1) of the English Act132 is a mandatory provision that gives qualified
immunity to an arbitral tribunal in its conduct of its duties. This immunity is only
available if an arbitral tribunal does not act in bad faith. It is possible for an arbitral
tribunal to make mistakes whilst doing its work. For example an arbitral tribunal may in
error fail to award damages where damages are due. Such an act though careless would
entitle an arbitral tribunal to immunity under the English Act, if it is an act not done in
bad faith. But mistakes made by an arbitral tribunal whilst acting in bad faith remove its
immunity. In such a case, an arbitral tribunal may be personally liable to the party.
II.3 An Arbitral Tribunal's Obligation to Maintain Confidentiality
The determination of the parties' position on confidentiality is a key issue that has to be
addressed by the arbitral tribunal at the commencement of the arbitration and throughout
the course of the arbitration proceedings. Dr Lew in his expert report in the Esso v.
Plowman133 case stated that:
131 Article 13(2) of the Model Law & Footnote No. 190
132 Section 29(1) of the English Act: "An arbitrator is not liable for anything done or omitted in the
discharge or purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator unless the act or omission is shown to have
been in bad faith."
133
[1996] XXI Ybk Comm Arbn 137-71
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"The extent to which arbitration proceedings, the content, the nature ofthe dispute and
all aspects ofthe arbitration remain confidential is, in my view, a matter ofagreement by
the parties. "I34
There is no general consensus on the arbitral tribunal's obligation to confidentiality in
arbitration proceedings.135 Most countries prefer to be non-committal on the issue.136 In
the case of In City ofMoscow v. Bankers Trust'37 the court held that confidentiality ought
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The Federal Arbitration Act138 of the United
States also makes no reference to the requirement of confidentiality.139 Some Model Law
countries' arbitration laws such as Norway's Act do not consider the arbitration
proceedings or the ensuing award as confidential unless the parties specifically provide so
in their arbitration agreement. Arbitration proceedings in Austria are confidential in the
sense that they are not open to the public. The New Zealand Act also prohibits the
disclosure of the arbitration proceedings. Spain's Act also promotes confidentiality.
Certain arbitration rules140 such as the SCC Rules require an arbitral tribunal to maintain
confidentiality.141 Whereas the ICC Rules requires an arbitral tribunal to take steps to
maintain confidentiality during the arbitration proceedings,142 a party requiring any piece
of his evidence to be regarded as confidential under the WTPO Rules has to make a
formal application before the arbitral tribunal stating the reasons why the evidence should
be kept confidential.143 On the other hand arbitration rules such as the UNCITRAL144
and the CPR Rules145 both require the arbitral tribunal to uphold the duty of
confidentiality.
135 Tweeddale (2005: 353)




138 The Federal Arbitration Act
139 The South African Act does not also provide for the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings. There
are also no legislative provisions governing the duty of confidentiality under the United Arab Emirates law
on arbitration.
140 Article 34 of the AAA Rules; Article 52 & 73-76 ofWIPO and Article 30 of the LCIA.
141 Footnote No. 106
142 Article 20 of the ICC Rules - gives arbitral tribunals specific powers to protect trade secrets and
confidential information.
143 Article 52 of the WIPO Rules
144 Article 25 of the UNCITRAL Rules
145 Rule 17 of the CPR Rules
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An arbitral tribunal's responsibility is to determine the parties' position in relation to the
issue of confidentiality and work in accordance with that position. The arbitral tribunal
may however, with the agreement of the parties, adopt the IBA Rules, which have a
provision, which may ensure that the arbitration proceedings and the award remain
confidential.146 If the parties have expressly or impliedly provided for confidentiality in
their agreement, the arbitral tribunal's responsibility is just to uphold it. Whilst it can be
seen that most arbitral institutional rules confer the duty of confidentiality on the arbitral
tribunal, most State laws pertaining to international arbitration have left this
responsibility of imposing this obligation on an arbitral tribunal to the parties.147
CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the background from which an arbitral tribunal's powers arise.
It has also dealt with the basic standards of conduct required of an arbitral tribunal. It
therefore marks the foundation of the tribunal's powers and the way in which it is
expected to conduct itself during the duration of the arbitration. The arbitration
agreement is recognized in this chapter as one of the pillars upon which the process of
International Commercial Arbitration rests. The whole structural framework of
arbitration is designed by the agreement of the parties. The parties have got an
independent controlling power over how they would wish the disputes arising between
them in their international commercial contracts to be resolved, and by whom. The
parties' ability to privately design their own dispute resolution mechanism is one of the
attractive features of arbitration. An arbitration agreement may also come about in an
indirect way through an investor accepting a standing offer to arbitrate from the country
in which he has invested. The existence of a treaty between his investment country and
the country where he is domiciled forms the basis of the offer to arbitrate.
146 Footnote No. 107, Article 9: "The deliberations of the arbitral tribunal, and the contents of the award
itself, remain confidential in perpetuity unless the parties release the arbitrators from this obligation."
147 Section 14(1) of the New Zealand Arbitration Act and Sections 22 and 23 of the International
Arbitration Act of Singapore
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This Chapter identified five attributes of an arbitration agreement which when read
together define the roadmap of the arbitration. The study chose to begin by discussing
the nature of an arbitration agreement and its attributes, as an arbitral tribunal is only able
to source powers to conduct an arbitration from an arbitration agreement that is
recognized as valid under the law to which the parties choose to subject it to. The
validity of an arbitration agreement is characterized by it being able to meet the essential
elements as required by the mandatory provisions of the applicable law and the public
policy interests at the seat of the arbitration. As such the elements that one legal system
may require an arbitration agreement to have, may be different from what another legal
system may demand thus showing the subjectivity ofparty autonomy to the parties'
chosen regulatory laws. In addition to the legal requirements of the attributes required by
each legal system however, this study decided that the arbitration agreement must also
have the attributes that were identified as essential.
The first of these attributes is the voluntary nature of arbitration which is seen from the
parties' willingness and consent to subject their disputes to be resolved using the process
of arbitration in a private manner. By virtue of their consent to arbitrate, the parties
become bound to the terms of the agreement and may not depart from them unilaterally.
As the consent specifically relates to the parties agreeing to have their disputes resolved
by an arbitral tribunal using the process of arbitration, it may only extend to the stage
when a tribunal makes its final award. Chapters five and six of the thesis will show that a
party that makes an application before a court either during the course of the arbitration
process or after an arbitral award is made, is not bound by the consent requirement and is
therefore able to make applications even in the absence of the other party if permitted to
do so by the procedural law or the law of the country where enforcement is sought
respectively.
The second attribute is the independent power of the parties through their arbitration
agreement to appoint an arbitral tribunal or designate a method by which the tribunal is to
be appointed. The method that may be used if parties fail to agree under the Model Law
does not permit an appeal from a decision of a court. Under the English Act, an appeal is
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permitted but with the leave of the court. These restrictions assist the speed of the
arbitration process. Also, the tribunal's involvement in the appointment of other
arbitrators is maintained at a minimal level in order to promote party autonomy.
Although the parties have the autonomy to choose any number of arbitrators subject to
the procedural law, the trend in practice favors an uneven number of arbitrators with one
or three being the most common. This enables the presiding arbitrator to have a casting
vote in the event of a tie.
The existence of an international commercial contract between the parties was identified
as the third essential attribute in the study, as it is from the need to establish the parties'
rights and obligations emanating from their contract that led to the need to draw an
arbitration agreement as the basis upon which the arbitral tribunal would have the
disputes resolved. By virtue of the parties' agreeing to have a defined legal contract, a
party may seek the protection of an agreed legal system when his rights are infringed or
in the event ofnon-performance by the other party.
The fourth attribute was the need for the subject matter in dispute to be clear and precise
in the arbitration agreement in order for an arbitral tribunal to know the kind of dispute
that it was to deal with. The subject matter in dispute ought to firstly be arbitrable under
the law to which the parties choose to subject it to and secondly, be within the scope of
the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal must be capable of being able to identify
the issues in dispute between the parties and in this way be able to determine the extent of
its jurisdiction. The fifth element that the study identified as essential in an arbitration
agreement was the separate nature of the arbitration agreement from the parties' contract,
which enables the two instruments to be measured using different benchmarks. This fifth
element is the basis upon which an arbitral tribunal is able to interpret the parties'
contract including issues relating to the validity of the contract.
These attributes are essential as they assist in defining the scope of the arbitration
agreement and the extent of the jurisdiction within which an arbitral tribunal is to
function. Further the attributes also show that parties to a contract are able to draw a
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number of arbitration agreements with different sets of tribunals assigned to deal with
different aspects of a dispute between the parties at any given time. The parties are
obliged to ensure that the arbitration agreements that they draw conform to the legal
system that they wish to subject their arbitration to if the validity of the agreements is to
be assured.
This study also showed how the written form of an arbitration agreement required by the
English Act and the Model Law has a wide connotation that may include oral agreements
as well. The instruments recognize an oral arbitration agreement whose terms are
reduced to a written form as satisfying the 'written form' requirement. In the same vein,
a reference to the oral agreement in the terms of a contract or in a pleading that is not
disputed by the other party satisfies this requirement. Complications may however not be
ruled out when a party whose arbitration agreement is oral but becomes recognized as a
written agreement by virtue of its reference in a statement of claim, wishes to obtain the
enforcement and recognition of the final award. In order to satisfy the requirements of
Article IV(l)(b) of the New York Convention148 the parties' arbitration agreement must
be presented as a written document.
Each arbitrator is under an obligation to ensure that it reaches the threshold of the
standard ofbehaviour befitting of a person conducting juridical duties. This obligation
may be achieved by a party upholding the principles of disclosure, impartiality,
independence and maintaining confidentiality to the extent required by the parties. This
is fundamental as the arbitrator exercises his procedural duties. The adherence to these
principles prevents personal challenges on the arbitrator by a party.
The New York Convention does not provide recourse to a party that seeks to challenge
the recognition of an arbitral award where the arbitrator is biased without being
procedurally wrong. In such a case, a party may seek remedy from local laws in Model
Law countries for instance. Time limits within which to raise personal challenges are
used as a tool to restrict such challenges, thus ensuring that the tribunal keeps to time.
148 Footnote No. 894, Article IV(l)(b)
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The English Act acknowledges that an arbitral tribunal may err in its work and therefore
gives it immunity from liability subject to it not acting in bad faith. Each legal system
takes a stand on the requirement of confidentiality. The parties may also agree on their
position on confidentiality. The parties have an independent controlling power on the
question of confidentiality in general. The fact that most systems of law tend to be silent
on this issue in general boosts the parties' autonomy in this regard.
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CHAPTER TWO
AN ANALYSIS OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL'S POWERS DURING THE
CONDUCT OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
The first chapter in this thesis has provided a perspective of the source from which an
arbitral tribunal draws its legal rights, and authority to deal with a dispute between the
parties to an arbitration agreement.149 The aim of this chapter and chapter three is to
discuss the powers of an arbitral tribunal during the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings150 and when making an arbitral award respectively.151 As was seen in the
previous chapter, an arbitral tribunal is recognized in this study as having the mandate to
perform these functions. It will be evident in this chapter that the powers and duties of an
arbitral tribunal are two sides of the same coin as the two are correlated in the sense that
the duty of resolving the disputes between the parties determines the powers that a
tribunal may exercise.
This chapter will show that although the parties hand over the baton ofpower to an
arbitral tribunal to deal with the disputes once it is appointed, the parties do not hand over
the power relating to the procedural mechanism of the arbitration process. This enables
the parties to continue to have autonomy over the arbitration proceedings. In this way the
parties are still in control of the means by which their dispute is resolved. The strategy
that the parties adopt in planning how their dispute will be handled is, firstly for the
tribunal to resolve the issues in dispute between them and, secondly, for the parties to
direct the arbitration proceedings so that the work of the tribunal is completed in time.152
Consequently, as the discussion will show, any procedural assistance that the arbitral
tribunal may wish to draw from other procedural rules must be agreed to by the parties to
149
Statsky (1985: 588)
150 Section 38(1) of the English Act: "The parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral
tribunal for the purposes of and in relation to the proceedings."
151 Article 1(2) of the New York Convention
152
op cit, Section 40
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the arbitration agreement. Equally, an arbitral tribunal may only exercise procedural
powers in the arbitration process, in a limited way and with the consent of the parties.
The chapter is made up of three sections. The first section deals with the procedural
powers that the parties permit an arbitral tribunal to exercise. The second section
concentrates on the power of an arbitral tribunal to establish the facts of the case between
the parties to an arbitration agreement. The discussion in the first and second sections
herein will draw a distinction in the way in which an arbitral tribunal exercises the
procedural powers and its direct power of resolving the disputes between the parties to an
arbitration agreement. The third section discusses the extent of an arbitral tribunal's
powers to extend time limits during the arbitration proceedings.
I AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEDURAL POWERS THAT AN ARBITRAL
TRIBUNAL MAY EXERCISE IN THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
A party that is appointed to deal with the issues in dispute between the parties is given the
ultimate power to resolve the dispute and make a final award. However, the procedural
mechanism that it uses to resolve the dispute remains under the control of the parties. In
so doing, the parties remain in control of the means by which their dispute is resolved.
The Model Law states that:
" ....the parties arefree to agree on theprocedure to befollowed by the arbitral tribunal
in conducting the proceedings. "I53
The parties therefore have the autonomy to decide every aspect of the arbitration
proceedings, beginning with the commencement date of the arbitration proceedings'54,
the order for directions of pleadings155, the place156 and language of the proceedings157,
153 Article 19 of the Model Law: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on
the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings. (2) Failing such
agreement, the arbitral tribunal may,...conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate..."
154 ibid, Article 21
155 ibid, Article 23
156 ibid, Article 20(1): The parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Failing such agreement, the
place of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the
case, including the convenience of the parties."
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and whether the arbitral tribunal may hold oral hearings or whether it is to rely on the
submitted documents.158 The parties are further free to agree on the procedure to adopt in
the event of a party failing to submit his part of the pleadings159, or the requirement of an
expert arising.160 Any procedural powers that a tribunal may exercise are subject to the
agreement of the parties.161 There is a further mandatory obligation for the parties to
support the work of the arbitral tribunal by complying with the tribunal's case
management style.162
The decision by the parties to agree on how their disputes are to be resolved may also be
made indirectly by their incorporation of rules of arbitration into their arbitration
agreement. By so doing, the rules of arbitration are deemed to be part of the arbitration
agreement. Rules of procedure such as the ICC and the UNCITRAL Rules provide the
procedure that an arbitration tribunal may follow in the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings. Whilst the UNCITRAL Rules provides a detailed step-by-step arbitration
procedure that a tribunal may follow in its conduct of the proceedings, the ICC Rules
tends to give the tribunal a lot of leeway in the choice of procedure.
For instance, the UNCITRAL Rules permits the tribunal to conduct the arbitration
proceedings "in such manner as it considers appropriate.. "163 But this freedom is
curtailed in the sense that it must be exercised subject to the procedure provided by the
rules. The positive aspect of the rule is that an arbitral tribunal does not have to guess the
procedures that the parties want it to follow, thus making the procedure less daunting.
An arbitral tribunal may exercise discretion and obtain evidence through oral hearings or
documents only subject to a party requesting otherwise.164 The ICC Rules on the other
hand enable an arbitral tribunal to be flexible in the sense that it is permitted to choose
any rules ofprocedure where its rules are silent, or when the parties are unable to reach
157 ibid, Article 22
158 ibid, Article 24
159 ibid, Article 25
160 ibid, Article 26
161 Section 1(b) of the English Act
162 Footnote No. 152
163 Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
164 ibid, Article 15(2)
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an agreement on the procedure to adopt.165 An arbitrator therefore gets an opportunity to
add value to the arbitration process as he is given a chance to draw wisdom from his past
experiences and good conscience. Considering that the ICC Court almost wholly
administers the arbitration process and monitors it keenly166, the chance of an arbitral
tribunal abusing the procedural latitude is most unlikely.
Although there is uniformity between the UNCITRAL and the ICC Rules on the need to
permit the arbitral tribunal to have a say in the procedure by which the proceedings are to
be conducted, there is no uniformity on the arbitration procedure itself. This is as it
should be as laying out a distinct arbitration procedure in every set of arbitration rules
would amount to robbing the process of international commercial arbitration of its liberal
attributes, and flexibility which are some of the features that attract parties to
international commercial contracts to the arbitration process.
Where parties select an arbitration institution to govern the arbitration proceedings, the
life span of that arbitration process may be determined by the institutional rules of
arbitration which generally give the arbitral tribunal wide ranging powers to decide its
road map and assist it to expedite the proceedings by providing procedures available to
prevent undue delay. The ICC Rules for example require that an arbitral tribunal once
appointed makes its final award within a period of six months, unless circumstances arise
that would necessitate either the ICC Court or the arbitral tribunal on its own motion to
extend the period.167 Under the ICC Rules an arbitral tribunal is allowed to establish its
own timetable on how it may proceed and in so doing may proceed with its work even in
situations where one of the parties refuses to sign the terms of reference or does not
attend hearings.168 The arbitral tribunal is also empowered to avoid delaying tactics by
being able to block new claims that are submitted after the terms of reference have been
165 Article 15(1) of the ICC Rules: "The proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by
these Rules, and where these Rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the Arbitral
Tribunal may settle on, whether or not reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law
to be applied to the arbitration."
166 ibid, Article 1(2)
167 ibid, Article 24
168 ibid, Article 18
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signed.169 The rules also act as a control mechanism to discourage complacence among
the members of the tribunal.
1.1 An Arbitral Tribunal's Power to Hold a Preliminary Meeting
The holding of a preliminary meeting is one of the issues in the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings that an arbitral tribunal may address. The resolution of this issue is key to
the arbitration process, as it enables the parties and the tribunal to have the opportunity of
agreeing on the procedural direction of the arbitration proceedings. The essence of the
power of an arbitral tribunal to hold preliminary meetings as the case progresses is to
enable it to gauge the case's strengths and weaknesses. The beginning of the arbitration
proceedings or a change in circumstances may necessitate the holding of a preliminary
meeting to enable the parties become aware of the course of action that the arbitral
tribunal intends to assume.
The power to hold a preliminary meeting enables an arbitral tribunal to design its own
case management style, subject to the "right ofthe parties to agree any matter. "170 A
preliminary meeting that is held at the commencing of an arbitral tribunal's work171 is
particularly helpful in the sense that all parties have a clear understanding of the method
that is most suitable for the arbitration proceedings to assume. In ad hoc arbitrations, the
arbitral tribunal may have the initial task of preparing an order ofproceedings, or a
timetable that the proceedings may be conducted by. The proposed timetable may be
tabled before the parties who may also wish to comment and add their own suggestions.
This is an opportune time for the arbitral tribunal to propose an amicable settlement to the
parties, if the facts before the tribunal at this stage of the proceedings show that there
172
could be a possibility of settlement or conciliation.
The consideration of an amicable settlement may also be raised at any time during the
course of the arbitration proceedings, but before a final award is made. If the parties are
169 ibid, Article 19
170 Section 34(1) of the English Act
171 Tweeddale (2005: 276)
172 Article 34(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
41
in agreement with a proposal for settlement or conciliation, there may then be no need for
the arbitration proceedings to progress further. This practice is acceptable under the
Model Law173 and in some non-Model Law countries. Examples are England,174 The
People's Republic of China (PRC),175 and Scotland.176 It may sometimes not be
necessary for the arbitral tribunal to meet the parties physically for a preliminary meeting
more so if they are in different parts of the world. The arbitral tribunal may therefore
with the agreement of the parties communicate through the use of electronic media or
video conferencing.
An arbitral tribunal may at the commencement of its work hold a preliminary meeting in
order to identify a common ground in relation to procedural and evidential issues such as
the determination of the subject matter in the dispute; the venue/s of the hearings; the
language to be used; the parties' position on the question of confidentiality; the parties'
position on documents to be submitted; the format of the hearings and receipt of evidence
and; the acceptable time scales.177 The arbitral tribunal may also discuss the issue of
costs with the parties at this preliminary stage of the arbitration proceedings. This is also
an opportune time for the parties and the arbitral tribunal to agree on a set of rules of
evidence if need be.
An arbitral tribunal's exercise of its power to hold a preliminary meeting may be
exercised at any stage of the arbitration proceedings when there is a change in
circumstances178 and not only at the beginning of its work. The reason for this is that any
173 Article 30(1) of the Model Law: "If during the arbitral proceedings, the parties settle the dispute, the
arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings and, if requested by the parties and not objected to by the
arbitral tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on the agreed terms."
174 Section 51(1) of the English Act
175 Article 18 of the PRC Arbitration Law
176 Footnote No. 7, Article 30
177 Section 34(2) of the English Act: "Procedural and evidential matters include- (a) when and where any
part of the proceedings is to be held; (b) the language or languages to be used in the proceedings...; (c)
what form of written statements of claim and defence are to be used, when these should be supplied and the
extent to which such statements can be later amended; (d) whether any and if so which documents .. .should
be disclosed .. .and produced... and at what stage; (e) whether any and if so what questions should be put to
and answered by the respective parties...; (f) whether to apply strict rules of evidence ...; (g) whether and
to what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law; (h) whether
and to what extent there should be oral or written evidence or submissions."
178 Footnote No. 156
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changes in the agreed course of the arbitration proceedings may require the arbitral
tribunal, in agreement with the parties, to re-strategize on how it is going to proceed. In
the case of Waste Management Inc. v. UnitedMexican States179 although the tribunal had
no role in appointing a new arbitrator, it still had the responsibility of accepting the
resignation, adjourning the arbitration proceedings and informing the Secretary General
of ICSID to necessitate the appointment of a new arbitrator.180
Arbitration Rules in general give an arbitral tribunal the power to design the most suitable
approach of conducting the proceedings and the gathering of evidence subject to the
agreement of the parties.181 The LCIA Rules do not however specifically empower
arbitrators to hold preliminary meetings,182 but in designing the most suitable approach of
conducting proceedings, an arbitral tribunal may with the agreement of the parties hold a
preliminary meeting if it is convinced that it is an effective management tool that may
benefit the arbitration. The ICC Rules permit an arbitral tribunal to establish its
procedural timetable by drawing Terms of Reference that must be signed by the parties
and the arbitral tribunal,183 or approved by the Court.184
The fact that the decisions arising from a preliminary meeting of an arbitral tribunal are
made in consultation with the parties to the arbitration agreement185 implies that a party
may not unilaterally act in disregard of the parties' views in relation to an issue being
discussed in the preliminary meeting. Equally, the tribunal may not just consult one
party's views and disregard the views of the other party. A party may for example agree,
by virtue of consenting to be governed by a set of arbitration rules, to waive certain rights
that are permitted by the procedural law. Such a decision may only be changed by the
agreement of all parties. In the Lesotho Highlands case, the parties agreed to waive
179 ARB (AF)/98/2
180 http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/waste united eng.PDF
181 Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
182 Article 14(1) of the LCIA Rules
183 Article 18 of the ICC Rules
184 Footnote No. 19
185 Buhler (2005: 249): ".. .the Tribunal will consult with the parties prior to establishing the procedure."
186
[2005] 2 All ER 265 at page 268
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their right of appeal that was available to them under Section 69 of the English Act187 by
agreeing to have their arbitration proceedings governed by the ICC Rules.188
A party may however make a unilateral application relating to a preliminary issue that is
not covered by any agreed terms of the parties. In the case of the Republic ofKazakhstan
189
v. Istil Group Inc. the court decided that there was "nothing in the agreement to
prevent Istilfrom seekingfurther security in the event ofa material change of
circumstances. " There is an implied obligation upon the parties and the tribunal to abide
by the agreed course of conducting the arbitration proceedings.190 There may however be
unforeseen circumstances that arise that may be beyond a party's competence, thus
making him unable to abide by the agreed terms in the preliminary meeting.
An example of such a circumstance is the illness of a party that makes him be unable to
attend hearings or submit documents in time. In such circumstances and depending on
the health issues of the party having been communicated to the tribunal and the other
party in time, the tribunal may exercise its discretion unilaterally to change the originally
agreed timescales of attendance or submission of documents. If an arbitrator fails to
exercise this power after having received evidence of the party's illness and therefore
proceeds with the arbitration proceedings, the partymay raise a challenge in court. In the
case ofKanoria and others v. Guinness19' the court set aside the order for enforcement
against the first defendant as he was unable to participate in the arbitration proceedings
and was therefore unable to present his case due to the fact that he was ill at the time.
The arbitral tribunal proceeded with the arbitration proceedings inspite having been
informed by the first defendant that he had undergone surgery and was convalescing at
home. The appellant's appeal was dismissed.
187 Section 69(1) of the English Act: "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings
may (upon notice to the parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an
award made in the proceedings."
188
op cit
189 [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 26 at page 26
190 Section 34(3) of the English Act: "The tribunal may fix the time within which any directions given by it
are to be complied with, and may if it thinks fit extend the time so fixed (whether or not it has expired)."
191
[2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 413
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From the discussion above, it is evident that the power of an arbitral tribunal to hold a
preliminary meeting is a procedural power that an arbitral tribunal exercises in the first
instance. The only qualification is that the exercise of the power is not independent in the
sense that it is exercised jointly with the parties to the arbitration agreement. This is as it
should be, considering that the parties do not give an arbitral tribunal the power to
determine the arbitration procedure out-rightly as it does with the power to resolve the
dispute. Although the tribunal holds the upper hand in directing the preliminary meeting,
the involvement of the parties works to the advantage of the tribunal and the parties
themselves in that everyone is agreed on the direction of the arbitration proceedings.
This in effect helps speed up the arbitration proceedings. In deciding the arbitration
procedure, the parties and the arbitral tribunal have got the responsibility of ensuring that
there is conformity of the mandatory provisions at the lex arbitri.
1.2 The Power of an Arbitral Tribunal to Determine the Language of the
Arbitration Proceedings
The determination of a language that is to be used in the arbitration proceedings is
fundamental to the process of international commercial arbitration as it enables the
parties to present their cases as well as follow the arbitration proceedings. This is the
only means by which procedural justice in the arbitration proceedings may be achieved.
The New York Convention as a leading treaty in international commercial arbitration
demands that parties be given an opportunity ofpresenting their cases failing which the
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may be refused.192 In order for an
arbitral tribunal to be able to meet its fundamental obligation of fairness and impartiality
in the arbitration proceedings193, the proceedings must be conducted in a language or
languages that all parties are happy with. Where the parties fail to reach a compromise,
an interpreter may be used to translate the proceedings. Further, documents that are in
another language other than that which has been chosen as the language of the arbitration
may also have a translated version attached.
192 Article V(l)(b) of the New York Convention
193 Section 33 of the English Act
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Under the Model Law194 and the English Act195, the determination of the language to be
used in the proceedings is the responsibility of the parties. The Model Law gives the
parties the freedom to exercise their autonomy196 by selecting a language of their choice
to be used in the arbitration proceedings. Under both the Model Law197 and the English
Act198 however, an arbitral tribunal may only exercise the power to determine the
language of the arbitration proceedings as a residual power, when the parties choose to
transfer the power to the tribunal, or when they fail to agree. Dr Binder has stated that it
is not in all circumstances that the parties might be in agreement of a language to be used
in the arbitration. He also takes the position that "the determination ofthe language of
the arbitration is vital in international commercial arbitration."199
The UNCITRAL Rules require that the language be determined promptly.200 Under both
the UNCITRAL and the ICC Rules, an arbitral tribunal has got the residual power to
determine the language of the arbitration which power is only exercisable in the event of
the parties failing to reach an agreement. The ICC Rules201 give power to an arbitral
tribunal in the absence of the parties' agreement to determine the language202 to be used
in the arbitration. This power of the arbitral tribunal is usually exercised whilst taking
203
into consideration the language of the contract between the parties. The language of
the contract is an appropriate guide as that may be the language that the parties may have
initially used to communicate in their business transactions.
194 Article 22(1) of the Model Law: "The parties are free to agree on the language or languages to be used
in the arbitral proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the language or
languages to be used in the proceedings..."
195 Section 34(1) - (2) of the English Act
196 A/CN.9/233
197 Footnote No. 194
198 Section 34(2) of the English Act
199 Binder (2005: 200): "This language, however, does not necessarily have to be the one preferred by both
parties for dispute settlement proceedings; therefore, a provision which regulates the determination of the
language of the arbitration is vital in international commercial arbitration."
200 Article 17(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
201 Article 16 of the ICC Rules: "In the absence of an agreement by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal shall
determine the language or languages of the arbitration, due regard being given to all relevant
circumstances, including the language of the contract."
202 Article 17(1) of the LCIA Rules
203 A/CN.9/264, Article 22, paragraph 4
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Once the language is ascertained, an arbitral tribunal has a responsibility of ensuring that
any statements or documents that are submitted which are written in another language
have a translation attached. UNCITRAL qualifies this position by permitting the
submission of a translation of only the portions of a voluminous document that are
relevant to the dispute.204 The determination ofhow the translations are to be handled
depends upon the applicable rules of arbitration205 under which the arbitration
proceedings are being conducted subject to what the lex arbitri permits.
The language that is chosen by the parties or by the tribunal in agreement with the parties
is the same language that the tribunal uses in drawing up the arbitral award. Since the
enforcement of an arbitral award in international commercial arbitration is the
prerogative of a court in the enforcing State, a court may want the award to be submitted
in the official language of the enforcing State. The parties may therefore in some
instances be required to submit translations of the arbitral award in support of their
application for enforcement in the enforcing State. This position is recognized under the
Model Law.206
The determination of the language to be used in the arbitration proceedings is a
procedural issue that is under the control of the parties to an arbitration agreement. An
arbitral tribunal is only able to exercise this power in circumstances where parties choose
to transfer it to it or when the parties fail to reach an agreement. Where the tribunal is
permitted to determine the language of the arbitration proceedings, it will make the
arbitral award in the language agreed to by the parties with translations attached where
necessary.
204 ibid, paragraph 5: .. .the major exceptions were voluminous documents as only a part of the document
would be truly relevant to the dispute.
205 Article 17(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules
206 A/CN.9/592, paragraph 80: "It was agreed that paragraph (2) of article 35 be redrafted as follows: "The
party relying on an award or applying for its enforcement shall supply the original award or a certified copy
thereof. If the award is not made in an official language of this State, the court may request the party to
supply a certified translation thereof into such language."
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1.3 The Power of an Arbitral Tribunal to Select the Seat and Venue of the
Arbitration
The selection of the venue of the arbitration and the juridical seat of the arbitration are
both like the determination of the language of the arbitration proceedings, procedural
matters. The Model Law uses the term 'place' to refer to both the juridical seat of the
arbitration and the venue at which arbitration proceedings take place.207 The English Act
however differentiates the seat of the arbitration208 from the venue where the proceedings
are held.209 This study uses the term 'seat' to refer to the juridical seat of the arbitration
and the term 'venue' to refer to the forum where the arbitration proceedings are held.
The seat of the arbitration is defined as follows:
"... "seat ofthe arbitration " means the juridical seat ofthe arbitration designated-
(a) by the parties to the arbitration agreement, or
(b) by any arbitral or other institution orperson vested by the parties with powers in
that regard, or
(c) by the arbitral tribunal ifso authorised by theparties,
or determined, in the absence ofany such designation, having regard to theparties'
agreement and all the relevant circumstances. "2I°
From this definition it is apparent that the power to determine the seat is vested in the
parties. The arbitral tribunal may be permitted to exercise this power by the parties
where they choose to do so.211 In the case ofCie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v. Cie
d'ArmementMaritime SA,212 the court stated inter alia that:
"An express choice offorum by the parties to a contract necessarily implies an intention
that their dispute shall be settled in accordance with the procedural law ofthe selected
forum... "2I3
207 Footnote No. 156
208 Section 3 of the English Act
209 ibid, Section 34(2)(a)
210 ibid, Section 3
211 Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Notes: . .If the place has not been so agreed upon, the rules governing
the arbitration typically provide that it is in the power of the arbitral tribunal or the institution administering
the arbitration to determine the place. If the arbitral tribunal is to make that determination, it may wish to
hear the views of the parties before doing so."
212
[1971] AC 572, at page 604
213 ibid
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Where parties choose to have their arbitration governed by the ICC Rules they in essence
transfer the power to choose the seat of arbitration to the institute, although the power to
choose the venue becomes vested in the arbitral tribunal when the venue is not
selected.214 The UNCITRAL Rules also permits an arbitral tribunal to exercise the power
to determine the seat and venue of the arbitration.215 The Model Law only permits an
arbitral tribunal to exercise the power to select the seat of the arbitration when the parties
fail to do so.216 In cases where an arbitral tribunal is permitted to exercise the power to
select the seat of the arbitration, it must do so whilst taking firstly, the agreement of the
parties and secondly, their convenience into consideration. The tribunal's freedom to
exercise this power when permitted to do so by the parties is curtailed by these two issues
that it must respect.
Under the Model Law, the parties' hold on the power to determine the venue of the
proceedings is however not as restrictive as it is on the determination of the seat of the
arbitration. India, which is one of the countries that has adopted the Model Law, permits
an arbitral tribunal to meet at a convenient geographical venue that is strategically
217convenient to the parties and the tribunal. The matters that the Model Law considers
as influencing an arbitral tribunal's choice of a venue are; the location of the parties, the
arbitrators, the witnesses and experts and the location of goods, property or documents
218that may require inspection.
Like the Model Law, the English Act does not place any restriction on an arbitral
tribunal's exercise of the power to select the venue for the arbitration proceedings once
the parties decide to transfer this power to the tribunal.219 Lord Wilberforce stated in the
case ofJamesMiller & Partners Ltd v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd220
that:
214 Article 14(2) of the ICC Rules: "The Arbitral Tribunal may, after consultation with the parties, conduct
hearings and meetings at any location it considers appropriate unless otherwise agreed by the parties."
215 Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Rules
216 Section 20 of the Model Law
217 Section 20(3) of India Arbitration and Conciliation Act
218
op cit




" ...the merefact that the arbitrator was to sit eitherpartly or exclusively in anotherpart
ofthe UK, orfor that matter, abroad, would not lead to a different result; theplace might
be chosenfor many reasons ofconvenience or be purely accidental; a choice so made
> yy221
should not affect theparties' rights. "
From this discussion, it is clear that an arbitral tribunal exercises the power to select the
seat and venue of the arbitration only when it is delegated to do so by the parties. The
venue of arbitration does not have to necessarily be the same place as the seat of the
arbitration. In the case ofMargulead Ltd v. Exide Technologies222 the sole arbitrator
decided to conduct the arbitral proceedings in Chicago although the seat of arbitration
was London. In the case ofRepublic ofEcuador v. Occidental Exploration and
Production Co.2"3 the arbitral tribunal chose London as the seat of arbitration but held all
the meetings in Washington.
In the Channel Tunnel224 case, although the seat of the arbitration was Brussels, the
arbitral tribunal found it convenient to hold meetings in Brussels, Edinburgh and Paris.
The reason for selecting only one seat is that the seat is the home of the arbitration and
consequently governs the arbitration proceedings irrespective of the venue of the
arbitration proceedings. Each arbitration agreement has to have a clearly defined
juridical seat which should be there to provide the legal framework within which the
arbitral tribunal is to function.
The English Act as well as the Model Law regulates the need for an arbitral tribunal to
decide the dispute between the parties in accordance with the applicable laws.225
An arbitral tribunal may when necessary choose more than one venue in which to
conduct the arbitration proceedings. Although these venues may sometimes be in
different countries, the arbitration proceedings continue to be regulated by the lex
221 ibid
222
(2005) 1 Lloyd's Law Report 324
223 (2006) QBD 432
224 Footnote No. 61
225 Section 46 of the English Act: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute- (a) in accordance with the
law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute..."
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arbitri.226 In the case ofKaraha Bodas Company, L.L.C v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
MinyakDan Bumi Negara27 the parties' power project in Indonesia entered into two
contracts being an energy sales contract and a finance contract. Both contracts were to be
governed by the law of Indonesia. However, since Geneva was named as the seat of the
arbitration, the courts in Switzerland had primary jurisdiction over the arbitration
228
proceedings. In the case of Wintershall, A. G. v. Qatar since the seat of the arbitration
was The Hague the tribunal was subjected to the mandatory provisions of the Netherlands
Arbitration Law. As the home of the arbitration therefore, the courts at the seat of the
arbitration exercise primary control over applications such as the setting aside of the
arbitral award.
The Court ofAppeal in Singapore in the case ofPTGaruda v. Birgen Air229 distinguished
the seat from the venue of arbitration. The court stated that whereas the arbitral tribunal
could hold its hearings at different venues, the seat of arbitration had to be agreed to by
the parties subject to the laws governing the arbitration proceedings. The fact that the
parties and the arbitral tribunal agree to conduct the arbitration meetings at a venue other
than the seat of the arbitration for the convenience of the parties, witnesses and the
members of the arbitration tribunal, does not mean that the new venue becomes the legal
seat of the arbitration. But all parties to an arbitration agreement as well as the arbitral
tribunal are however obliged to respect all the local laws at all the venues where the
arbitral proceedings are held. This does not imply that the arbitration proceedings'
legality is to be determined by the laws at the venues.
If for instance an English party and a Spanish party select Paris as their seat of arbitration
and Edinburgh as the venue where the arbitration proceedings are to be held, a party that
disagrees with the way in which the arbitration proceedings are being conducted may
raise a challenge in a French court if the parties provide for such a procedure. The
226 Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48 at page 50 "..the fact that parties have
agreed to a place for arbitration is a very strong pointer that implicitly they must have chosen the law of
that place to govern the procedures of the arbitration...."
227 1 90 F.Supp 2d 936 (S.D. Tex., December 04, 2001)
228 2 8 I.L.M. 795, 801 (1989)
229
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French courts may determine the challenge even if none of the sittings are held in Paris
by virtue of it having been chosen as the seat of the arbitration. This was the position of
the court in the ICC Case No. 10623.230 The court had also earlier distinguished the seat
from the venue of arbitration in the case ofNaviera Amazonica Peruana SA v. Compania
Internacional de Seguros del Peru231 when it stated that:
"It may often be convenient to hold meetings or even hearings in other countries. This
does not mean that the 'seat' ofthe arbitration changes with each change ofcountry.
The legalplace ofthe arbitration remains the same even ifthe physicalplace changes
from time to time, unless ofcourse, theparties agree to change it. "232
The discussion in this part of the study has shown that the parties to an arbitration
agreement do not hand over the baton ofpower to determine the seat and venue of the
arbitration to an arbitral tribunal once it is appointed. This power remains with the
parties. An arbitral tribunal may however be permitted to exercise the power to select the
seat or venue of the arbitration when it is convenient to the parties or when they fail to
agree. As such, whether or not an arbitral tribunal is permitted to exercise this power
may be dependent upon the agreement of the parties in each case. However, once the
parties do decide to delegate this power, the tribunal may only exercise power herein
subject to the wishes of the parties. The role of the arbitral tribunal in the selection of the
venue of the arbitration has an impact on the arbitration itself. As the tribunal observed
in the ICC Case Number 1776, the procedure in international commercial arbitration
depended not so much on the venue where the arbitration is conducted but more on the
back ground and experience of the individual members of the arbitral tribunal and the
233
parties' advisers.
1.4 The Power of an Arbitral Tribunal to Change the Venue of the Arbitration
The study so far shows that when parties to an arbitration agreement decide to vest the
power to select the venue of the arbitration in an arbitral tribunal, the tribunal is at liberty
230 Case No. 10623 of December 7, 2001, ASA. Bull (2003) p. 59
231
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to choose any venue it considers appropriate. An inference may therefore be drawn that a
tribunal may exercise power and change the venue it may have chosen when
circumstances change. The change of venue of the arbitration must be done on the same
terms that the parties may have set when permitting the tribunal to select the venue in the
first place.234 An arbitral tribunal may change the venue of the arbitration either at its
own instance or at the request of a party.
Before a change of venue can take place, the arbitral tribunal must ascertain firstly that all
the parties are in agreement with the change of venue and secondly that the lex arbitri
and the arbitration rules chosen to govern the arbitration proceedings provide for such
course of action. Therefore in cases where the change occurs at the instance of the
arbitral tribunal, steps must be taken to ensure that all the parties are aware of the change
and there is no objection to the selected new venue. It is important for the arbitral
tribunal to make sure that this step is carried out in order to avoid unnecessary challenges
as a party may fail to attend a hearing or send witnesses simply because the new venue is
unknown to him. The arbitral tribunal is therefore obliged to exercise this power fairly so
that there is no infringement of any party's interests.
There are a number of reasons that may lead to a change in venue. The reasons for the
change of venue must be justifiable and fair in order to avoid unnecessary challenge. In
an ICC Case No. 10623235 whose parties were of Italian and Ethiopian origin
respectively, the arbitral tribunal decided to hold all meetings in Paris instead of Addis
Ababa which was the seat of the arbitration. This was done for the tribunal's
convenience and that of the Italian party. This action of the tribunal led to the challenge
of the tribunal's award by the Ethiopian party. The Ethiopian party's position was that
the arbitral tribunal had abused its discretionary power by making a decision to move the
venue of the arbitration based on the convenience of one party. Although the Court
rejected the Ethiopian party's application for challenge, the case served to show that the
234 Footnote No. 92, page 16 paragraph 8: "Uncertainty about the local law with the inherent risk of
frustration may adversely affect not only the functioning of the arbitral process but... the selection of the
place of arbitration...
235 Footnote No. 230
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arbitral tribunal must take into account all circumstances of the case when deciding to
move venue, including the non-legal factors such as was the case in the instant case.
It is the responsibility of the arbitral tribunal to ensure that any changes in venues are in
accordance with the agreement of the parties and are in agreement with the procedural
law and the governing arbitration rules. This is essential if recognition and enforcement
of the award is to be assured under the New York Convention.236 This part of the study
looks at some of the reasons.
I.4(i) Change in Political Climate
A sudden change in a country's political environment may lead to a change of venue of
the arbitration.237 A coup d'etat may for instance bring in a leader whose ideologies may
include changes in the law that permit him to impose a state of emergency or a curfew in
order to restrict peoples' freedom ofmovement. When such things occur, there is likely
to be uncertainty in the arbitration. The parties may want to not only have the arbitration
proceedings moved to another venue, but the seat of the arbitration as well. The reason
for this is that the parties may fear that the hostile changes in the laws at the seat, may
result in difficulty in having the arbitral award enforced. In the case of In re Halliburton
Co238 the arbitral tribunal decided that it had the power to hear an application for a
change of the seat of the arbitration due to the change in circumstances that made Tehran
unsuitable. In the case ofHimpurna California Energy Ltd and The Republic of
Indonesia239 the claimant requested the arbitral tribunal to change the venue of arbitration
as Indonesia used its power to deny the claimant effective legal representation. The
tribunal ordered that the arbitration proceedings be held at The Hague. It did not
however change the seat of the arbitration, which remained as Jakarta.
236 Article V(l)(d) of the New York Convention
237 Comeaux (Vol. 2, No. 2 ofApril 1993): "Political risk is the risk ofgovernment intervention faced by a
foreign investor..."
238
(1982), 1 Iran-US, CTR 242
239 Interim Award of 26 September 1999 and final award of 16 October 1999 - Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration, Volume XXV - 2000, page 109, at page 124
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A change in the political climate may also lead to the disregard of the laws and treaties
pertaining to international commercial arbitration. This may result in the courts unduly
interfering in the arbitration proceedings. In order to circumvent such hostile political
changes, parties may agree to include a stabilization clause in their arbitration agreement
that may prohibit the arbitration agreement from being affected by any political changes.
In the Aminoil"40 arbitration the parties provided a stabilization clause in their arbitration
agreement. The clause did not however contain express prohibitions and was therefore
unable to prevent nationalization. A change in the political climate may therefore make
an arbitral tribunal decide to change the venue of the arbitration proceedings. The
tribunal only has power to change the seat of the arbitration when requested to do so by
the parties.
I.4(ii) Restrictions in the Movement of Witnesses
The venue of the arbitration may be changed when circumstances arise that prevent it
from accessing witnesses. An example is a situation where witnesses are prevented from
entering the country where the arbitration proceedings are taking place due to a denial of
entry permission into the said country. Such a situation may require the tribunal to move
the arbitration proceedings to the countries where the witnesses are domiciled in order to
receive their evidence. Alternatively, the arbitral tribunal may with the agreement of the
parties and in order to save costs, move the arbitration proceedings to another country
whose laws are arbitration friendly. The exercise of this power by an arbitral tribunal is
important as it enables the tribunal to meet its fundamental obligations of having
conducted a just arbitration. A change of venue under these circumstances may prevent
challenges being raised by a party whose witness fails to attend the proceedings.
I.4(iii) Proximity
An arbitral tribunal may with the consent of the parties request a change of venue of the
arbitration proceedings to a place that is nearer to the majority of the arbitrators. This
may be done essentially to save costs in the proceedings. If for example the venue of the
240 Government ofKuwait v. American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982)
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arbitration is Toronto and most of the members of the arbitral tribunal reside in Europe,
the parties may agree that most of the meetings be held in Paris in order to save time and
travelling expenses. The arbitral tribunal may also decide to have some of the meetings
at a venue that is nearest to most of the witnesses or where inspection of some sites is
required.
Having looked at the reasons that may lead to a change in the venue of the arbitration
proceedings, it is important to note that it is not in all circumstances that an arbitral
tribunal may be obliged to change the venue of the arbitration when requested to do so by
a party. For example in the ICC Case No. 10439241 the arbitral tribunal refused to change
the seat of the arbitration when requested to do so by an American party. The request
was for a change of seat from Belgrade to Geneva due to the unsettled political climate in
Belgrade that had strained the relationship between Yugoslavia and America. The
arbitral tribunal decided that the parties remained bound by their choice of Belgrade as
none of the members of the tribunal were from that country and the hearings could be
conducted at another venue. There was therefore no need to change the seat of
arbitration. A change of venue in this case would not have sufficed if the changed
circumstances in Belgrade had completely altered the legal system. What would have
brought justice would have been the change of the seat of arbitration.
The discussion in this section shows how party autonomy maintains a firm grip on the
arbitration process during the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. This hold is the
basis of arbitration. Parties to an arbitration agreement resort to the process of arbitration
because it gives them the unusual opportunity to be in control of how their disputes are
settled. An arbitral tribunal may only exercise procedural powers to the extent that the
parties wish it to. However, as the next section will show, although the parties are in firm
control of the procedural mechanism by which their disputes are resolved, they are not
able to resolve the disputes themselves save for instances when they agree to an amicable
settlement as discussed above. When the dispute is contentious however, the parties have
241
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no option but to hand over power completely to an arbitral tribunal to resolve their
differences.
II THE POWER OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO ESTABLISH THE
FACTS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO AN ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT
The powers that a tribunal exercises when establishing the facts in dispute are different
from its permitted procedural powers that have been discussed in section one. Section
one showed that where parties permit an arbitral tribunal to hold preliminary meetings, it
gives the tribunal the power to do so. However, an arbitral tribunal is not able to hold the
meetings and arrive at a decision without taking on board the views of the parties. The
parties therefore have an active role in the preliminary meetings. An arbitral tribunal is
not able to choose to hold a preliminary meeting and conclude it in disregard ofwhat the
parties think. It is imperative that the parties are consulted. The parties have got the
prerogative to choose to exercise the power to select the language to be used in the
arbitration as well as the power to select the seat and venue of the arbitration including
any changes thereto.
An arbitral tribunal is only able to exercise this power when the parties choose to permit
it to do so. As such in cases where the parties choose to exercise the power themselves,
an arbitral tribunal is only able to work in accordance with what the parties have decided.
In the case of the power to establish the facts in dispute however, this is a duty that may
only be carried out by an arbitral tribunal and not by the parties. Once appointed
therefore, an arbitral tribunal is also permitted to exercise power and establish the facts in
dispute between the parties. The establishment of the facts of the case is an arbitral
tribunal's main duty242 and the tribunal therefore exercises direct power under it.
In order to establish the facts of the case, an arbitral tribunal has to begin by identifying
the basic issues in the dispute and the relief sought. It is only when an arbitral tribunal
identifies the bone of contention between the parties, gathers evidence and deliberates, is
242 Article 19 of the Model Law
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it able to iron out the contentious issues between the parties and provide the appropriate
remedies. If for any reason there is an issue that the parties have not touched on but
which the arbitral tribunal believes from experience would assist the parties in the
settlement of their dispute, it is duty bound to put it before the parties in order for them to
have an opportunity to comment on the issue. At least this will prevent parties reading
about some issues that were never raised at the hearing in an arbitral tribunal's ruling.
This was the position taken by Lord Justice Bingham in the case ofZermaltHoldings S.A
v. Nu Life Upholstery Repairs Limited243
The Model Law provides for the claimant to state his case and relief sought in a
Statement of Claim and for the respondent to defend his case in the Defence. In either
case, each party is permitted to attach documents in support of their case.244 Apart from
the parties' statements and exhibited documents the tribunal may also gather evidence
from the opinions of experts and site inspections.245 Having collected the statements,
from the parties, the tribunal may choose to hear evidence or rely on documents only, or
both, subject to the agreement of the parties.246
Although the Model Law provides outright power to an arbitral tribunal to establish the
facts of the case, an arbitral tribunal's exercise ofprocedural powers such as the power to
draw the order of directions and the determination of the time frame within which each
act is to be performed by each party, may only be availed to a tribunal when the parties
agree. The power to determine any procedural issues arising during the course of the
arbitration proceedings as the tribunal establishes the facts of the case lies in the hands of
the parties. For instance, if the parties had already decided in their arbitration agreement
on the course to take in the event of a party wanting to make amendments to his part of
the pleadings, the tribunal may not have the power to decide such a procedural issue.
However, only in the absence of the agreement of the parties may an arbitral tribunal use
its discretion and refuse to allow an application to amend pleadings if it is of the view
243 (1985) 2 E.G.L.R 14 at page 15: "If an arbitrator is impressed by a point that has never been raised by
either side, then it is his duty to put it to them so that they have an opportunity to comment..."
244 Article 23(1) of the Model Law
245 ibid, Article 20(2)
246 ibid, Article 24(1)
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that the application has been made late and admitting it would be detrimental to the other
Like the Model Law, the English Act recognizes the role of an arbitral tribunal to
establish the facts in dispute in order to resolve the differences between the parties as the
essence of arbitration.248 It permits the tribunal to draw the order for directions including
the means by which its facts may be established.249 However this power may only be
exercised subject to the agreement of the parties. This is aimed at maintaining party
autonomy and enabling the parties to decide the procedure by which their dispute is to be
250 ... .resolved. Whilst an arbitral tribunal has the ultimate power to establish the facts of a
case, the parties decide the means by which the tribunal is to carry out such a duty.
Under the English Act like the Model Law, an arbitral tribunal is only conferred with the
power to determine the order for directions when the parties decide to do so. When this
occurs, a tribunal may exercise its discretion subject to its fundamental obligations of
being impartial and independent. An arbitral tribunal must further exercise care and skill
when establishing the facts in dispute between the parties to an arbitration agreement.
In the case of Taylor Woodrow Holdings Ltd and another v. Barnes & Elliot Ltd2^1 the
court showed the role of a tribunal as being that of determining questions of fact. The
English Act may sometimes permit an arbitral tribunal to determine the extent to which it
may "take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law".25" Under the UNCITRAL
Rules however, an arbitral tribunal is conferred with the ultimate power to not only
establish the facts in dispute between the parties, but to decide the course of the
arbitration proceedings. The only limiting factors are that the tribunal must treat all the
parties with equality253 and act in conformity with the lex arbitri. There are two tests that
an arbitral tribunal may use to be certain of the fair treatment of the parties as it
247 ibid, Article 23(2)
248 Section 1(a) of the English Act: "...the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by
an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense."
249 ibid, Section 34(2)
250 ibid, Section 1(b)
251 Footnote Nos. 17 & 879
252 Section 34(2)(g) of the English Act
253 Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
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establishes the facts of the case. The first one is that of ensuring that all parties are
adequately notified of the place, date and time of the hearings. The second one is that of
ensuring that time is managed fairly by giving sufficient time to all parties to peruse the
other party's documents and make a meaningful response.
The general view is that with all things being equal, an arbitral tribunal should give the
parties equal time to present their case. The Model Law places a mandatory fundamental
duty on an arbitral tribunal under Article 18 to treat parties with equality and to give them
a "full opportunity ofpresenting" their case.254 But one finds that countries like Sweden
that have not adopted the Model Law, have toned down this position a little by using 'to
the extent necessary' instead of "full opportunitythus giving finality to a case.
The ICC Rules confer power on an arbitral tribunal to establish the facts of the case
through the use of "all appropriate means. "255 In the case ofElfAquitaine Iran v.
National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC),256 the sole arbitrator made a decision to determine the
procedure that the arbitration was going to follow by virtue of the Exploration and
Production Contract. Whichever way in which an arbitral tribunal is permitted to
establish the facts in dispute between the parties, it has a duty to work within the ambit of
its jurisdiction subject to what the lex arbitri permits.
As an arbitral tribunal is conferred with a direct power to establish facts in dispute
between parties to an arbitration agreement, it must also decide the kind of evidence that
it may wish to admit which evidence forms the basis upon which it is able to make its
finding of fact and draw inferences for its conclusions. Any finding of fact that an
arbitral tribunal may make must be supported by the agreement of the parties or by
evidence. The tribunal's findings of fact and the collected evidence form the foundation
upon which an arbitral award is made. The way in which an arbitral tribunal handles this
phase of the proceedings is reflected in the credibility of the final award. The final award
254 Article 18 of the Model Law
255 Article 20(1) of the ICC Rules: "The Arbitral Tribunal shall proceed within as short a time as possible to
establish the facts of the case by all appropriate means."
256 Preliminary Award of 14 January 1982, 11 YB Comm. Arbn, 97 [1986]
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may therefore not only be as good as the arbitral tribunal, but as good as the evidence that
the arbitral tribunal collects and chooses to admit. The ICC Rules permit an arbitral
tribunal to request the parties for additional evidence where it is required.257
11.1 Method of Collecting Evidence
As has been seen from the discussion above, an arbitral tribunal must collect evidence in
order to establish the facts of the case between the parties to an arbitration agreement.
The Model Law permits an arbitral tribunal to decide the method by which evidence may
be collected.258 The means of collecting evidence that the discussion hereunder focuses
on are:
• Written statements and exhibits (documents only)
• Oral hearing of witnesses
• Inspection of sites
• Engaging experts
It is not unusual for an arbitral tribunal to choose to use all the above stated methods in
the same arbitration if the governing laws and rules of arbitration permit it to do so. An
arbitral tribunal will endeavor to select the method that may assist it most as long as the
method is what the parties require and it meets the justice of the case.259 Such an
opportunity presents itselfmost in arbitration proceedings that are conducted under the
ICC Rules that permit an arbitration tribunal to draw up the Terms of Reference that in
260
essence establish the timetable for the arbitration proceedings.
It must be stated here that it is imperative that any selected method of collecting evidence
is in conformity with the agreement of the parties, the lex arbitri and the public policy
257
op cit, Article 20(5): "At any time during the proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may summon any party
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258 Article 24 of the Model Law
259 A/CN.9/207 paragraph 17: "Probably the most important principle on which the Model Law should be
based is the freedom of the parties in order to facilitate the proper functioning of International Commercial
Arbitrations according to their expectations."
260 Article 18 of the ICC Rules
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requirements at the seat of arbitration as well as with the adopted rules of arbitration.261
Where there is conflict in any of these provisions, the mandatory requirements at the lex
arbitri and the public policy interests prevail over the agreement of the parties and the
governing rules of arbitration. An arbitral tribunal has a responsibility of ensuring that
the parties' exercise of their autonomy in terms of selecting the appropriate procedural
method, does not override the provisions of the mandatory laws and public policy
considerations at the seat of the arbitration. The mandatory laws and the public policy
considerations limit the parties' exercise of their discretion to agree on the method to be
adopted in the arbitration proceedings, as the provisions of the mandatory laws at the seat
of arbitration usually prevail.262
11.1(a) Assistance from Additional Rules of Evidence
In circumstances where the methods that the parties have authorized an arbitral tribunal
to use are not sufficient, an arbitral tribunal may with the consent of the parties, access
further powers ofprocedure from other sets of rules as the need arises. An arbitral
tribunal may also get assistance from additional rules of evidence such as the IBA Rules
on Evidence263 or the UNCITRAL Notes. The adoption of either of these rules has to be
done with the consent of the parties and the tribunal. These rules of evidence may be
adopted in ad hoc arbitrations as well as in arbitrations where the parties have already
adopted a set of arbitration rules to govern the arbitration. For instance, the IBA Rules
were adopted in the CME264 ad hoc arbitration.
The IBA Rules are particularly useful in dealing with witness evidence and document
production as well as in providing common ground where the members of the arbitral
tribunal are from different legal backgrounds. They permit an arbitral tribunal to
determine a method that it considers to be the most appropriate where the rules are
261 Footnote No. 92, page 16 paragraph 7: "...national laws on arbitral procedure differ widely. The
differences are a frequent source of concern in international arbitration, where at least one of the parties is,
and often both parties are, confronted with foreign and unfamiliar provisions and procedures..."
262 Section 1(b) of the English Act
263
Adopted by the IBA Council
264 CME Czech Republic BV v. The Czech Republic [2003] 15(4) WTAM 83, 100265
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silent.266 The UNCITRAL Notes on the other hand are helpful in identifying the type of
procedural issues that may have to be resolved and in suggesting the solutions to such
issues.267 These are usually adopted in ad hoc arbitrations. The method that the arbitral
tribunal chooses to adopt in collecting evidence should be directed at ensuring the fair
treatment of all the parties to the arbitration agreement.
11.1(b) The Use of Documents Only
The use of documents only is efficient and effective as it enables the arbitral tribunal to
conduct the arbitration proceedings at a quick pace and save the parties costs and
expenses. The IBA Rules on Evidence permits written statements as a means of
• 268
collecting evidence as it saves time. The co-operation of all the parties is required if
the effectiveness of the documents only method is to be successful. In the Himpurna269
case, Indonesia chose not to submit documentary evidence as required and did not give
any reasons for its failure to do so. Such lack of co-operation causes unnecessary delay
to the case.
Parties to an arbitration agreement may choose to prepare and file bundles of documents
that are indexed in order to provide quick reference to documents during the arbitration
proceedings.270 It is also the responsibility of an arbitral tribunal to ensure that
• i 271
documents in its custody are kept in a secure place. Each party is obliged to disclose to
the other party the documents that it intends to rely on within the prescribed time limits.
Apart from the party-to-party disclosure of documents, the UNCITRAL Rules272 permits
discovery to be extended to the testimonies of factual and expert witnesses of either party
266 ibid, Article 2(4)
267 Article 43 of the UNCITRAL Notes: "In considering the parties' allegations and arguments, the arbitral
tribunal may come to the conclusion that it would be useful for it or for the parties to prepare, for analytical
purposes and for ease of discussion, a list of the points at issue, as opposed to those that are undisputed."
268 Footnote No. 263, Article 4(4)
269
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270 Articles 18 & 19 of the UNCITRAL Rules
271 UN Doc A/CN.9AVG.IIAVP.108, para 63
272 Article 27(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules
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as well as to the expert witnesses that are invited by the arbitral tribunal.273 Any use of
the discovery process has to be agreed to by the parties.274 In the event that an expert is
called to make an opinion on an issue, documents must be availed to the expert by the
275
parties.
The parties have a responsibility of keeping to the prescribed time frames within which
documents are to be filed. In instances where the arbitration rules permit, the set times of
filing documents may be extended at the instance of either the parties or the arbitral
tribunal. The timely exchange of documents upholds two fundamental obligations276 that
the tribunal owes the parties to an arbitration agreement. These are:
• The equal treatment of all parties and;
• Availing each party with an opportunity ofpresenting their case.
The criteria for determining a fair treatment of the parties by an arbitral tribunal tends to
be subjective in that it is really dependent upon the circumstances of each case. Lord
Justice Tucker in the case ofRussell v. Duke ofNorfolk277 in reference to an arbitral
tribunal's obligation to what entails a fair hearing stated that it would:
'
...depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature ofthe inquiry, the rules under
which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth. '27S
Where it is permitted, an arbitral tribunal may use its discretion and refuse to admit
documents in evidence. An example of this is the production of documents that are
considered as sensitive and touching on the security of a country that is selected as the
seat of the arbitration. This practice is not statutory but done in the interest of the nation.
Documents may also be excluded from production for being irrelevant.279 In a situation
where a party refuses to produce documents, the test as to whether an arbitral tribunal has
273 ibid
274 ibid, Article 24(3)
275 ibid, Article 27(2)
276 A/40/17, paragraph 176
277 [1949] 1 All ER 109 at 118
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dealt with the dispute fairly in the absence of that piece of evidence, depends on the
discovery procedure that is provided by the arbitration agreement.280
In the case ofNational Casualty Company v. First State Insurance Group,281 the court
stated that:
" ...that an arbitrator'sfailure to consider evidence constitutes misconduct only when it
deprives the complainingparty ofa fair hearing. ...the arbitral agreement was silent on
discoveryprocedures and that the arbitrators drew a negative inference against First
Stateforfailure to produce the documents, cured any unfairness resultingfrom the
withholding thereof. "282
The adoption of the use of documents only as a method by which an arbitral tribunal is to
collect its evidence must be provided for by the rules of arbitration that govern the
arbitration proceedings. Further, the law at the seat of the arbitration must permit such a
procedure and where it is permitted, caution must be exercised as to any restrictions that
the law may apply on the type of documents that may be used.283 As discussed above,
the lex arbitri may be reluctant to permit the production of documents that touch on
national interests in a private international commercial arbitration. The ICC Rules
require that an arbitral tribunal exercise its powers in a manner that conforms to the laws
at the seat of the arbitration in order for its final award to be enforceable at law.284
11.1(c) The Power to Hold Oral Hearings
An arbitral tribunal may where it is permitted collect evidence through the use of oral
evidence. There are countries whose laws provide for oral hearings ofproceedings unless
the parties agree not to hold such hearings. In such cases an arbitral tribunal is required
to abide by the terms of the lex arbitri, unless the parties agree otherwise. Scotland for
example, like the Model Law285, gives an arbitral tribunal the discretion to hold an oral
280 ibid
281 Case No. 05-1505
282 ibid
283 Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules
284 Article 35 of the ICC Rules
285 Article 24(1) of the Model Law
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hearing.286 The English Act also permits an arbitral tribunal to decide the extent to which
it may admit oral evidence.287 The PRC also permits arbitration proceedings to be
conducted by means of oral hearings.288 The holding of oral hearings may relate to the
collection of evidence from any of the following groups:
• The oral testimonies ofwitnesses;
• The oral submissions of the parties' representatives or;
• The oral submissions of the parties.
In situations where the receipt of evidence is permitted through oral hearings, an arbitral
tribunal may exercise its discretion and apply such a procedure only to certain aspects of
the dispute. For example in the case ofSEDCO, Inc. & National Iranian Oil
Company,289 oral hearings were held for the sole purpose of hearing the claimant's expert
witness, MrWhitney. Parties exercise autonomy by permitting the tribunal to exercise
discretion on the best procedural method it may use.
From the discussion above, it is clear that the independent right of the parties to choose
the method by which an arbitral tribunal may collect evidence is embraced in most
countries290 as well as by the rules of arbitration referred to herein.291 The parties'
autonomy is limited by the mandatory obligations of Article 18 of the Model Law.292 In
the case of arbitrations established by virtue of an investor accepting a standing offer to
arbitrate in a BIT, the limitation is placed by the obligation on the BIT members to ensure
that a foreign investor is treated in the same manner as the local investors in the country
where the foreign investor has investments.
286 Footnote No. 7, Article 24
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288 Footnote No. 175, Article 39 of Section 3
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Where the method of oral hearing is chosen, there is usually no hard and fast rule on the
length of the hearings.293 It is really dependent on the arbitral tribunal's case
management style. In the case of the Aminoil294 that related to the nationalization of an
oil concession, it was decided that there was no general rule as to the length of oral
hearings. A party exercising its right to be heard orally may decide to call say ten
witnesses. The calling of these witnesses may immediately place a cost burden on the
other party who may not have prepared financially for covering the cost of such a volume
of witnesses. The arbitral tribunal may exercise its discretion and decide that evidence be
covered by less witnesses, where it is evident from their statements that some of their
testimonies are a duplication of the other testimonies. The arbitral tribunal as coordinator
of the proceedings may need to hold a preliminary meeting with the parties to determine
the best course of action.
Where an arbitral tribunal is permitted to exercise discretion as discussed above, a
tribunal may choose to do the following acts:
• Limit the number ofwitnesses, or
• Limit the time within which a witness may testify, or
• Refuse to admit any oral evidence.
11.1 (c)(i) The Power of an Arbitral Tribunal to Limit the Number ofWitnesses
An arbitral tribunal may exercise its discretion where permitted by choosing to
strategically reduce the number ofwitnesses that each party may call. In doing so,
however, the number of expert witnesses that are called by an arbitral tribunal to testify
on specific technical issues, or the experts that are called to testify on points in issue may
not be reduced unless one report duplicates another.295 This is because these are
witnesses that assist the case with professional opinions and not witnesses whose
testimonies relate to the facts of the case. As such each party must ensure that the
witnesses they call address different aspects of the case. The limiting of the numbers is
293 Footnote No. 240
294 ibid
295 Article 27(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules
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important as wealthy parties may decide to call a large number ofwitnesses to prove the
same issue at the expense of the other party. This may be unfair on the other party who
may be forced to pay for witnesses whose evidence is a repetition of the evidence of other
witnesses.
The English Act permits an arbitral tribunal to appoint experts at its own cost in the
9Qf\
absence of an agreement of the parties. The experts that are called by the arbitral
tribunal to make reports on specific issues cannot hold private meetings with the arbitral
tribunal in the absence of the parties as such an action would be considered as being
unfair to the parties. There are however a few exceptions where the tribunal may hold a
meeting with the expert in the absence of the parties. In the case ofLuzon Hydro
297
Corporation v. Transfield Philippines Inc. the court refused to set aside an award made
in Singapore in which an expert on the Philippine law met the arbitral tribunal in the
absence of the parties. The court accepted that the expert had only assisted the arbitral
tribunal in sorting out evidence and in explaining technical terms in their private meeting.
The court took cognizance of the fact that the parties had already previously agreed that
the arbitral tribunal would carry out these tasks.
II. 1 (c)(ii) The Power of an Arbitral Tribunal to Limit the Time within which a
Witness May Testify
The power of an arbitral tribunal to conduct the arbitration proceedings in a manner it
considers most appropriate298 in essence gives it the discretion to limit the time within
which a witness may testify if such action is helpful to the case.299 A decision by an
arbitral tribunal to limit the time within which each witness is to testify has to be
communicated to the parties at the earliest opportunity so that the parties are given
sufficient time to prepare their case. The parties must also at the earliest possible time
296 Section 37 of the English Act
297 (September 13, 2004) SGHC 204 (2004)
298 Article 19(1) of the Model Law
299 Binder (2005: 117)
68
give the arbitral tribunal copies of the witness statements to enable it be aware of the kind
of testimony that each witness has.300 In this way time may be apportioned appropriately.
In the Margulead301 case, a sole arbitrator directed Counsel for both parties to make an
hour's oral submission each. Counsel for Margulead was not permitted by the arbitrator
to reply orally as the arbitrator decided that the reply was irrelevant. Mr Justice Colman
in his judgment observed that the arbitrator had complied with his general duty as
provided by the English Act when he directed each Counsel to take an hour to make oral
closing submissions.
11.1 (c)(iii) The Power of an Arbitral Tribunal to Refuse to Admit Oral Evidence
The third strategy that an arbitral tribunal may adopt when permitted to exercise its
discretion in deciding whether to hold oral hearings or not, is to refuse to admit it. In the
case ofDalmia Diary Industries v. National Bank ofPakistan302 a sole arbitrator refused
to hear oral evidence from witnesses on the basis that the documentary evidence
submitted which was in excess of one thousand pages, was sufficient to enable him arrive
at a decision. The court decided that the decision by the arbitrator was fair. An arbitral
tribunal may not entertain oral hearings if there is a probable risk ofwasting time or if the
oral evidence may only end up confusing issues. A case in point is the Iron Ore
303
Company ofCanada v. Argonaut Shipping, Inc. case. In the case ofDemco v. SE
Banken Forsakring304 the arbitral tribunal in dealing with 222 claims relied on the
evidence that it received from two investors. It was on this evidence that the tribunal
based its findings of fact.
300 Article 20(1) of the LCIA Rules
301 Footnote No. 222, page 325 & page 329: "..."There was nothing wrong with that form of procedure,
provided that it gave each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his
opponent... the procedure that was adopted .. .and what the arbitrator did was well within the scope ofwhat
he was empowered to do; he regulated procedural matters in a way which accorded to Margulead a
reasonable opportunity of putting its case in the context of what was essentially a fair arbitral hearing."
302
[1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223 at page 269
303 [S.D.N.Y. 1985], ICCA Yearbook XII [1987] page 173, at page 176: "...The panel also thought a
subpoena might unduly delay the proceedings...the arbitrators found unacceptable the notion of prolonging
the proceedings for an uncertain period in order to attempt to obtain a perhaps unobtainable, unilluminating
report."
304 [2005] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 650
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From the discussion in this part of the study it is evident that the collection of evidence
by the arbitral tribunal must be done in a way that is permitted by the parties. This is
because this is a procedural issue that falls within the control of the parties. A tribunal is
only permitted to exercise this power in specific circumstances. The bottom line
however, is that an arbitral tribunal requires evidence to enable it to arrive at its
conclusion. At the end of the day however, the method that an arbitral tribunal chooses
to use in collecting evidence must be one that will enable it to arrive at a correct and fair
finding of fact.305
Ill THE EXTENT OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL'S POWER TO
EXTEND TIME LIMITS DURING THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
An arbitral tribunal that wishes to complete the arbitration proceedings within reasonable
time needs to adopt time management techniques. Where time frames are embedded in
the rules306, an arbitral tribunal is obliged to work within those set limits. The fixing of
time frame enables an arbitral tribunal to be able to meet its target ofmaking an award in
time. In cases where the parties choose an appointing authority, it may provide the length
of time within which an arbitral tribunal is to complete its work. Where the parties select
an arbitral institution as their appointing authority the time scales provided by the
institution's rules apply to the arbitration proceedings.
It is not in every situation that an arbitral tribunal manages to complete its work within
the prescribed time. Where an arbitral tribunal does not manage to meet the prescribed
time limits, an extension of such time may be required if the work is to be completed.307
Therefore although rules of arbitration may provide set time limits within which an
arbitral tribunal is to deal with each segment of the arbitration process, extra time may be
required when ironing out a daunting issue. The court monitors the pace of the
proceedings and may prompt an arbitral tribunal to give reasons for delay if the time is
305 The Baleares [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 215 at page 228: "The principle of party autonomy decrees that a
court ought never to question the arbitrator's findings of fact."
306 Article 24 of the ICC Rules
307 Redfern (2004: 49)
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running out. If the court is aware of the reasons for the delay, it may extend a time limit
without an arbitral tribunal requesting for such extension308 if doing so will enable the
tribunal to complete its work.309 The way in which an application for an extension of
time may be made is subject to the rules of arbitration governing the arbitration
proceedings. Any situation that arises that causes destruction of the set course of the
proceedings may result in an application for the extension of time, which application
must be made in time.
There are situations when the application for the extension of time is made to apply
retrospectively as was the case in the Gold Coast Ltd v. Naval Gijon SA310 case. In that
case the buyer made an application to court for a retrospective extension of time to enable
it to apply to the arbitrator to correct the sixth interim award. This application had to be
made in court as the time of 28 days within which the buyer could make the application
before the arbitrator had expired. The court in granting the application took into
consideration the following issues:
• Whether its intervention would cause unnecessary delay to the arbitration
proceedings;
• Whether the failure to comply with the set time limits was excusable and;
• Whether a substantial injustice would be caused to the buyer if it did not have the
extension availed to it.
An arbitral tribunal therefore must work within the time limits that are set for it by the
parties. Extensions of time limits do occur if authorized by the parties. The fact that
there is a time limit to be met enables an arbitral tribunal to structure its work effectively
in order to be able to work within the set time frames. The structuring of the work may
include as will be seen in the discussion hereunder the use of an arbitral tribunal's
discretion to disallow applications that are made out of the set time limits. The use of this
discretionary power by an arbitral tribunal enables it to abide by its fundamental
obligations of fairness and the treatment of the parties equally.
308 Article 24(2) of the ICC Rules
309 ibid, Article 32(2)
310 [2007] 1 All ER 237
71
111.1 The Admission of Additional Claims, Defence and Counterclaims
The Model Law gives an arbitral tribunal the discretion to allow a party to amend or
supplement the statement of claim or defence during the course of the arbitration
proceedings.311 In exercising its discretion, an arbitral tribunal takes two aspects into
consideration:
• The first aspect is whether the subsequent claims or defences are within the scope
of the arbitration agreement and thus the tribunal's jurisdiction.
• The second aspect is the time at which the application is being made in the
proceedings.
In relation to the first aspect, the arbitral tribunal may entertain the application if the new
issues arising relate to the subject matter of the dispute that the tribunal has been
mandated to deal with. There may be times when the same parties enter into a number of
contracts that are interlinked. As a result of the dispute in one contract, a respondent may
add in its counterclaim issues relating to another contract not covered by the arbitration
agreement. If such circumstances arise, an arbitral tribunal may be inclined to refuse to
312
admit the new application.
Alan Redfern has stated that "ifthe set-offclaim is in relation to the same contract, or a
contract with a sufficiently close connection to the main contract, then the arbitral
tribunal may well have jurisdiction to consider the claim. "313 An arbitral tribunal may
exercise its discretion and allow a new claim with issues arising after the arbitration
proceedings are in progress so long as the issues relate to the same subject matter. In the
case ofNational Oil Corporation (NOC) v. Libyan Sun Oil Co. (Sun Oil)314 the tribunal
decided that although the circumstances relating to the new claim arose after the request
for arbitration had been submitted, its terms of reference were broadly drawn and it was
therefore able to admit the new claim. The course of action of an arbitral tribunal faced
311 Footnote No. 247
312 Footnote No. 100
313 Redfern (2004: 293)
314 Final Award of 23 February 1987, 29 ILM (1990)
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with a new application emanating from closely related contracts depends on how it
interprets its powers in the arbitration agreement.
An arbitral tribunal may also be faced with an additional claim relating to one contract.
For example an arbitral tribunal may be appointed to deal with a construction dispute that
results from the undue delay in completing works by one party. Whilst the arbitration
proceedings are going on, a wiring problem crops up at the construction site. An arbitral
tribunal cannot choose to admit additional claim relating to the wiring problem without
the agreement of the parties as the other party may want the wiring problem to be handled
by another tribunal.
The second aspect relates to the time in the arbitration proceedings when a new
application is made. The idea is to ensure that the admission of a new application does
not delay the arbitration proceedings unnecessarily. The Model Law and some
arbitration rules provide what may be considered as reasonable time of every stage of the
arbitration process. For example, the Model Law gives the arbitral tribunal the power to
use its discretion to disallow the application if it is made late. The ICC Rules also
permit an arbitral tribunal to disallow an application for an additional claim if it is made
late or towards the close of the proceedings.316 This is because the application may be
considered unfair.
The ICC Rules give discretionary powers to an arbitral tribunal to consider the nature of
new claims or counterclaims. If the arbitral tribunal believes that the issues raised are
relevant to the dispute, it may allow the evidence supporting the claim or counterclaim to
be admitted.317 In essence, the arbitral tribunal is given powers to extend its jurisdiction
without consulting its appointing authority. The parties to an arbitration agreement may
by agreement extend the authority of the arbitral tribunal in part, depending on the needs
at the time. Say for example there is a mining contract that is supposed to run for a
period of twenty five years. The contract provides for an arbitral tribunal to deal with all
315 Article 23(2) of the Model Law
316 Footnote No. 19
3,7 ibid
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the disputes arising between the parties through out that period. However, ten years on,
one of the parties retires, and a new party takes over. In such a case, the arbitral tribunal
may not in principle be deemed to still have jurisdiction to deal with all the disputes as
the new party may in agreement in the other parties reformulate the terms of the contract.
The new party and the other existing party may wish to redefine the extent of the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction. If the arbitration agreement in this contract was governed by the
ICC Rules, then it will be up to the Court to appoint another tribunal if need be.318
In redefining the extent of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction the parties may either decide
to appoint another tribunal or extend the jurisdiction of the existing tribunal. The parties
to an arbitration agreement are therefore able to make immediate changes to the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in order to accommodate new issues which may not
have been envisaged when giving the arbitral tribunal its original mandate; but which
relate to the dispute at hand. The arbitral tribunal has got no power to extend its own
jurisdiction, as that is the prerogative of the parties. The ICC Rules,319 unlike other rules
provide an arbitral tribunal with a duty to declare the proceedings closed. Article 22(1)
of the ICC Rules however leaves a loophole for an arbitral tribunal to still admit new
claims after it has declared the proceedings closed, thus neutralizing the intended need to
declare the proceedings closed.
111.2 The Non-Attendance of a Party
It is the responsibility of the arbitral tribunal to ensure that all parties are adequately
informed of the hearing dates of the arbitration proceedings.320 The failure by a party to
attend the arbitration proceedings is an issue that may be unforeseen at the beginning of
the arbitration proceedings. As such, parties to the arbitration agreement may not provide
a time scale for non-attendance of a party. Once a party is absent his absence will
consume time that is allocated for other issues to be dealt with. An arbitral tribunal will
318 Article 9 of the ICC Rules
319 ibid, Article 22: "(1) When it is satisfied that the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to present
their cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall declare the proceedings closed...."
320 Section 103(2)(c) of the English Act
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want to find out why the party is absent. The tribunal may only be in a position to know
what to do after receiving reasons from the party for his non-attendance.
The reasons advanced by the party must be compelling enough to justify his absence. If
the reasons are not compelling the other party may object to any application for an
adjournment and insist that the proceedings continue. The power to continue or not
however lies with the arbitral tribunal. An example of a compelling reason is the illness
of a party. In the case ofKanoria and others v. Guinness321 the court set aside an order
for the enforcement of the award against the second defendant who was unable to present
his case as he was convalescing after having undergone surgery. This information was
communicated to the arbitral tribunal, but the arbitration proceedings continued in his
absence.
An arbitral tribunal must be certain that the party not in attendance has failed to provide a
valid reason for his absence before it can proceed with the arbitration proceedings.
Scotland permits a tribunal to proceed exparte only if the respondent defaults in filing
his defence.322 England also permits an arbitral tribunal to proceed with the arbitration
proceedings exparte if a party, without any reasonable cause fails to appear.323 If
however it is the claimant that fails to file his statement of claim,324 then the tribunal has
got power to discontinue the proceedings. This is a fair way of handling the proceedings
because the tribunal will only proceed exparte when a party sits on his rights. When an
arbitral tribunal decides to continue with the arbitration proceedings in the absence of a
party, the decision rendered under such circumstances will be made in default. In the
case ofLibyan American Oil Company v. Libya (LIAMCO)325 Libya decided not to
participate in the arbitration proceedings and as a result of that decision, the arbitral
tribunal made a decision basing its finding of fact on the evidence before it.
321 Footnote No. 191
322 Footnote No. 7, Article 25(b)
323 Section 41 of the English Act
324
op cit, Article 25(a)
325
[1977] 62 ILR 140, 141
75
The Model Law gives an arbitral tribunal instances when it may continue with the
326 327
proceedings in the absence of a party. The ICC Rules give power to an arbitral
tribunal to proceed with the hearing if any party fails to appear without any reasonable
cause after having been served with notice. The rules also permit an arbitral tribunal to
continue with the arbitration proceedings in the absence of a party who refuses to file his
defence or to take part in the proceedings. Once the parties to an arbitration agreement
allot time to an arbitral tribunal, the tribunal is in charge of ensuring that such time
frames are respected.329 Consequently, an arbitral tribunal is able to exercise discretion
subject to it treating the parties fairly, as to the types of applications for adjournment that
it wishes to allow.
111.3 The Non-Attendance of an Arbitrator
The appointment of an arbitral tribunal is the prerogative of the parties330 to an arbitration
agreement which power may be transferred to a court in certain circumstances.331 Some
Rules ofArbitration permit arbitrators to appoint their chairman. In the Karaha
Bodas333 case, Karaha Bodas named its own arbitrator, but the other parties failed to do
so. Karaha Bodas therefore invoked the default provision of nominating arbitrators and
the Secretary General of ISCID appointed the remaining arbitrators, one ofwhom was
made Chairman of the arbitral tribunal.
If the appointment of an arbitral tribunal is done smoothly according to the parties'
chosen method then there really is no issue. Problems arise when parties fail to perform.
In the event of a party failing to make an appointment of an arbitrator then the other party
has to turn to the agreed arbitration rules to see which course of action may be available
to it. Some ad hoc arbitration agreements may provide for the already appointed
326 Article 25 of the Model Law
327 Article 21(2) of the ICC Rules
328 ibid, Article 6(3)
329 Footnote No. 289
330 Article 10(1) of the Model Law
331 ibid, Article 11(3)
332 Footnote No. 52
333 Footnote No. 227
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arbitrator to proceed with the arbitration as a sole arbitrator. This was the case in the
arbitration between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. (TOPCO) & California Asiatic Oil
Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic334 where the Libyan Government refused
to participate in the arbitration.
The power of an arbitral tribunal to continue with the proceedings in the absence of a
member of the arbitral tribunal is discretionary, depending on the reasons that may be
advanced for the absence. An arbitrator that chooses to stay away from the arbitration
proceedings as a ploy to hold up proceedings after having been given sufficient notice
may force the other members of the arbitral tribunal to proceed in his absence. The
WIPO Rules permit an arbitral tribunal whose member is absent to use its discretion and
continue with the proceedings if there is evidence that the arbitrator received notification
and decided not to attend without excusing himself to the other members of the
tribunal.335
An arbitrator may choose to stay away from the proceedings if he is under pressure from
his appointing party to make a decision in the party's favour.336 An arbitrator may also
choose to stay away from the arbitration proceedings if he disagrees with the other
members of the tribunal. In deciding whether to proceed or not, the present members of
the arbitral tribunal may be inclined to make a decision whilst taking into consideration
the stage of the proceedings. In the case of an arbitration governed by the ICC Rules, this
337decision lies with the Court.
There are other reasons that are not deliberate, which may cause an arbitrator to be absent
from the arbitration proceedings. Examples of these are the death or resignation of an
arbitrator. Each set of arbitration rules provides its own acceptable reasons for the
absence of an arbitrator and the course of action that the remaining members of the
334 Award of 19 January 1977, 17 I.L.M 3 (1978)
335 Article 35 of the WIPO Rules
336 Footnote No. 239, page 189 and at page 111: "In their final award the arbitral tribunal stated that if the
arbitrator did not participate without a valid excuse, the appropriate solution was to continue in his absence,
rather than to remove him. Accordingly, as Professor Priyatna's non-participation was found to be without
valid excuse, the arbitral tribunal retained the authority to render an award."
337 Article 12(5) of the ICC Rules
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arbitral tribunal may adopt. It may be unnecessary to replace an arbitrator if the
arbitration proceedings have advanced and are coming to a close. The remaining
members of the arbitral tribunal may exercise their discretion and complete the
proceedings in the absence of the said arbitrator. The time that an arbitral tribunal will
require to settle this issue may change from case to case depending on the circumstances
of each application. The mere absence however of an arbitrator is bound to derail the
proceedings with the consequence of the tribunal being unable to meet the originally set
time limits.
CONCLUSION
This chapter shows how an arbitral tribunal has the ultimate power to resolve the parties'
disputes using the procedure that the parties choose. The arbitral tribunal has got the sole
responsibility of dealing with the issues in dispute between the parties and ensuring that
the parties receive the appropriate remedies. The tribunal is mandated to exercise this
power within the scope of its jurisdiction and in an impartial and independent manner.
The tribunal may when appropriate, table issues arising in the dispute before the parties
so that they may be able to express their position on the issues before the tribunal makes
a decision. The tribunal's findings of fact must be supported by the agreement of the
parties or by evidence as a basis upon which the award is based. In resolving the issues
in dispute, the arbitral tribunal has a duty of ensuring that the parties' chosen order for
directions and procedural law is strictly adhered to unless the parties agree otherwise.
Throughout the arbitration proceedings, the parties have got control and the prerogative
to determine the course of the arbitration proceedings and may only permit an arbitral
tribunal to do so when they are unable to decide or to reach a consensus. The parties are
not obliged to transfer the power to determine the arbitration procedure to an arbitral
tribunal whenever they fail to agree as some rules may require this power to be exercised
by the arbitration institution. The study therefore looked at the extent to which an arbitral
tribunal may exercise procedural powers when permitted to do so by the parties.
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The study showed that the tribunal is permitted to exercise this power in default of the
agreement of the parties and in a limited manner. The course that the tribunal chooses for
the arbitration proceedings to take may only be implemented if the parties agree. The
decision of the parties is influenced by the rules of arbitration and the procedural law.
The UNCITRAL and the ICC Rules both permit an arbitral tribunal to participate in
setting the course of the arbitration proceedings in varying degrees. Whereas the
UNCITRAL Rules provides a set procedure that the arbitral tribunal may adopt when
permitted to direct the course of the proceedings, the ICC Rules enables a tribunal to
exercise discretion. The different procedures that each set of arbitration rules provides
promotes a liberal attribute to the process of arbitration.
The parties permit an arbitral tribunal to exercise the procedural power of holding
preliminary meetings in order to set the course or direction of the arbitration, strategize
and identify common grounds between the parties. As a procedural power, the decisions
of the tribunal must receive the parties' support. The determination of time limits in the
arbitration proceedings is one of the procedural issues that an arbitral tribunal may
exercise. This is usually in situations where circumstances arise that cause the already
agreed time frames to change. An arbitral tribunal may be permitted to use its discretion
and alter the set time limits depending on the reasons that a party may raise for the
change. In such cases, an arbitral tribunal may apply time management techniques to
ensure that the deadlines set by the parties for the arbitration are met. The submission of
additional claims, the non-attendance of a party, an arbitrator or witness, are matters that
may change the set time limits. The tribunal's exercise of discretion when faced with
such applications is subject to the scope of the arbitration agreement and the stage of the
arbitration proceedings when the application is made. The reasons for the non-attendance
of a party must be genuine reasons and compelling to justify the granting of the
application.
The determination of the seat of the arbitration is also a procedural matter that is decided
by the parties with the tribunal taking over this responsibility in exceptional cases when
parties fail to agree. The study saw that it was only feasible that the arbitration
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proceedings have one home, whose laws would regulate the arbitration proceedings, with
different venues where the arbitral tribunal would conduct their proceedings. The
convenience and agreement of the parties were identified as influencing factors to a
tribunal's choice of seat and venue of the arbitration proceedings. A request for a change
of venue must be justifiable and fair if the tribunal is to grant it.
An arbitral tribunal collects evidence using the methods that the parties agree to. The
tribunal's discretion in this area may only be exercised with the agreement of the parties.
This study identified the oral hearings and documents only as methods that are available
to an arbitral tribunal to collect evidence as well as a mixture of both. The parties may
permit an arbitral tribunal to determine the language that is to be used in the arbitration
proceedings. When this happens, the tribunal may take the language used in the parties'
contract into consideration when determining the language to be used in the arbitration
proceedings. The exercise of the power to determine the language of the arbitration is
fundamental in ensuring that each party has an opportunity ofbeing heard. The choice of
a language that is understood by most parties and arbitrators speeds up the arbitration
process. V/liere this is not the case however, translations of scripts and oral evidence
must be submitted. The level of confidentiality that the parties may wish an arbitral
tribunal to uphold during the conduct of the arbitration proceedings must be clear and
precise. The parties must say whether they wish the tribunal to maintain confidentiality
throughout the arbitration process or maintain it in a selective manner.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POWER OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO MAKE AN ARBITRAL AWARD
INTRODUCTION
The essence of this chapter is to discuss the power of an arbitral tribunal to make an
award. The Model Law holds the position that the making of a final award by the arbitral
tribunal signifies the termination of the arbitration proceedings.338 The discussion will
cover the essential elements of an award and the different types of awards that an arbitral
tribunal is able to make. The discussion in this chapter will show that the making of the
award is the ultimate task that an arbitral tribunal performs during its tenure in office.
This stage of an arbitral tribunal's work is fundamental in that the award that is made
must be one that is capable of being enforced at law339 by a party in the enforcing state.
The study shows the need for an arbitral tribunal to ensure that it conforms to the lex
arbitri in the making of an award.340 This is an essential prerequisite if its award is to be
recognized as valid and be capable of enforcement. An arbitral award is enforceable
under the New York Convention341 in countries other than the country in which it is
made.342 As its name suggests, the Convention ensures the recognition and enforcement
of foreign awards. The foreign awards include "not only awards made by arbitrators
appointedfor each case but also those made bypermanent arbitral bodies to which the
parties have submitted. "343 The enforcement of an award is dependent on whether the
party against whom enforcement is sought has got jurisdiction in the country of
enforcement.
In order for jurisdiction to be established, the party applying for enforcement of the
award must be certain that the other party has assets in the country where the application
338 Article 32(1) of the Model Law
339 Article 35 of the Model Law
340 Article 32(7) of the UNCITRAL Rules: "If the arbitration law of the country where the award is made
requires that the award be filed or registered by the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal shall comply..."
341 Article III of the New York Convention
342 ibid, Article 1
343 ibid, Article 1.2
81
for enforcement is to be made. The ability to enforce an award in a country other than
where it is made makes international commercial arbitration an attractive method of
resolving disputes by business entities that engage in trade across borders. An award
should address a specific issue relating to the dispute between the parties and should
include a specific decision of the arbitral tribunal. The rights and obligations of the
parties in the dispute must be established with an award of appropriate remedies. An
arbitral tribunal may only award a remedy to a deserving party if it is within its power to
make such an award.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the making of an
arbitral award and the essential elements of an award. The second section deals with
some of the different types of arbitral awards that an arbitral tribunal may award
including the final award. It further deals with the time limits within which an arbitral
tribunal may make its final award.
I. The Making of an Arbitral Award
An arbitral award is fundamental to the arbitration proceedings as it marks the resolution
of the differences between the parties to an arbitration agreement that may have led to the
initiation of the proceedings. The Model Law,344 the English Act345 and the New York
Convention346 all deal with an arbitral award that is made by an arbitral tribunal. This is
the position held by the ICC347 and the UNCITRAL Rules.348 The discussion in this
section looks at an arbitral tribunal's making of a final award that in essence terminates
its mandate.
344 Article 31(1) of the Model Law
345 Section 47(1) of the English Act: "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal may make more
than one award at different times on different aspects of the matters to be determined."
346 Footnote No. 343
347 Article 25(1) of the ICC Rules: "When the Arbitral Tribunal is composed ofmore than one arbitrator, an
Award is given by a majority decision. If there be no majority, the Award shall be made by the chairman
of the Arbitral Tribunal."
348 Article 31(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
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The issuance of an award that is capable ofbeing enforced is an arbitral tribunal's main
objective. A final award signifies the determination of the parties' rights and obligations
in their relationship as well as the complete resolution of all the issues that may have led
to the dispute between the parties.349 An arbitral tribunal has got the responsibility of
ensuring that issues that are raised by the parties in evidence are addressed adequately in
order for it to be able to draw the correct findings of fact. It is from these findings of fact
that inferences are drawn that help the tribunal to draw its final award.
The case ofAEGIS Ltd v. European, Re350 showed that an agreement by the parties to
arbitrate implies that they are agreeable to the performance of the award. Each party is
therefore bound by the directives of the arbitral tribunal in the award, which directives
have to be obeyed. Where these directives are not obeyed, a party in whose favour the
arbitral award is made, subject to the New York Convention, may request a court to have
the arbitral award recognized and enforced in the country where the losing party has
assets.351
During the drafting of the Model Law, UNCITRAL considered the following definition
of the term award which definition was not adopted in the instrument. The definition was
as follows:
"An award means a final award which disposes ofall issues submitted to the arbitral
tribunal and any other decision ofthe tribunal which finally determine[s] any question of
substance or the question of its competence or any other question ofprocedure but, in the
latter case, only ifthe arbitral tribunal terms its decision an award. "352
Although the definition was never adopted, it is being used in this chapter to provide
guidance of the essential elements of an arbitral award.353 A decision of an arbitral
tribunal that answers the questions raised by the parties and provides specific remedies to
the parties qualifies to be a final award. If the remedy is in the form of damages, it
349 ABC International v. Diverseylever [2003] XXVIII Ybk Comm Arbn 209-16
350
[2003] 1 WLR 1041
351 Footnote No. 341
352 Holtzmann (1989: 154)
353 Redfern (2004: 354): "Award means a final award which disposes of all issues submitted to the arbitral
tribunal..."
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should be such that it is able to restore the injured party to the position he was in before
his rights were infringed. In the A-G v. Blake344 case, Lord Nicholls stated among other
things that:
"The general rule is that.... the measure ofdamages is to be, as far as possible, that
amount ofmoney which willput the injuredparty in the sameposition he would have
>>355been in had he not sustained the wrong... "
An arbitral tribunal is appointed to work under an autonomous process. Its final award is
binding on the parties to the arbitration agreement and may in some cases not be
subjected to an appeal. For instance, whilst the Model Law does not provide for appeal
as a means for recourse against an award,356 the English Arbitration Act does.357 In the
case ofFidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v. V/O Exportchleb358 Diplock LJ stated that:
"Theparties having chosen the tribunal to determine the disputes between them as to
their legal rights and duties are bound by the determination by that tribunal ofany issue
which is relevant to the decision ofany dispute referred to that tribunal. "
Apart from making an award an arbitral tribunal also has power to make a decision in the
form of an order. The issues arising at each stage of the arbitration proceedings and the
governing procedural law determine whether an arbitral tribunal will make an award or
order. Although an arbitral award is mainly concerned with the resolution of substantive
issues in the dispute, the resolution of all other interlocutory matters arising in the
arbitration result in an arbitral tribunal issuing orders or interim awards.359 Under the
Model Law a court may recognize and enforce an interim measure made by a tribunal
360
when requested to do by a party or a tribunal. This may occur in circumstances where
a party fails to execute an order willingly. The coercive powers of the court may
therefore be used under such circumstances.
354 [2001] AC 268 at page 278-280
355 ibid
356 Article 34 of the Model Law
357 Section 58 of the English Act
358
[1965] 2 All ER 4 at page 10
359 Article 32(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules: "In addition to making a final award, the arbitral tribunal shall
be entitled to make interim, interlocutory, or partial awards."
360 A/CN.9/592, Article 17 Novies ofAnnex I
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1.1 The Essential Elements of an Award
A valid award is made up of essential ingredients that alter depending on the parties'
i/-t
agreement. The components of an award must be such that it is enforceable at law.
The New York Convention has provided its own threshold of the minimum standards
362
required of a valid award. In the same vein each legal system and arbitration rules also
provide their own threshold of what they consider to be the minimum standard that a
valid award should attain. The standard taken by most legal systems and rules of
arbitration are in conformity with those of the New York Convention. The discussion of
the essential ingredients of a valid award will mirror the thresholds held by the
Convention and what the arbitration rules provide. The usual ingredients are follows:
• An arbitral award must be in writing.
• An arbitral award must state its seat and be dated.
• An arbitral award must contain reasons.
• An arbitral award must award remedies.
• An arbitral award may award costs.
• An arbitral award may award interest.
• An arbitral award must be in the agreed currency
• An arbitral award must be signed.
The detailed discussion below relating to these ingredients will show that in order for an
award to qualify as a final award, it must in addition to these ingredients be capable of
portraying a binding and final nature.
1.1 (i) A Written Award
The usual practice in international commercial arbitration is for an award to be made in
writing.363 The Model Law sets a standard format upon which an award should conform
to as follows:
361 Turner (2005: 33 & 36): "There is no mandatory style of an award. There is, however, a well
recognised general approach - at least a basis of sequence and nature of content, from which individual
styles or particular awards can evolve..."
362 Article V of the New York Convention
363 A/CN.9/592, Article 7(2)
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"(1) The award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the arbitrator or
arbitrators. In arbitralproceedings with more than one arbitrator, the signatures ofthe
majority ofall members of the arbitral tribunal shall suffice, provided that the reasons
for any omitted signature is stated.
(2) The award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless theparties have
agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an award on agreed terms under
article 30.
(3) The award shall state its date and the place ofarbitration as determined in
accordance with article 20(1). The award shall be deemed to have been made at the
place.
(4) After the award is made, a copy signed by the arbitrators in accordance with
paragraph (1) ofthis article shall be delivered to each party. "364
The UNCITRAL Rules also requires an arbitral award to have the following form and
effect:
"(2) The award shall be made in writing and shall befinal and binding on the parties....
(3) The award shall state the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties
have agreed that no reasons are to be given.
(4) An award shall be signed by the arbitrators and it shall contain the date on which and
theplace where the award was made "365
Unlike the UNCITRAL Rules referred to above, the ICC Rules do not expressly refer to
the written provision of an award, although this is implied. The ICC Rules requires that
an arbitral tribunal submit a draft of its award to the Court for scrutiny before signing
it.366 It is therefore evident that an arbitral award must be in document form. The arbitral
tribunal has a duty ofpreparing hard copies of its arbitration award for submission to the
Court,367 in the case of an arbitration governed by the ICC Rules and, to the parties in the
case of an arbitration governed by the UNCITRAL Rules.368
364 Article 31 of the Model Law
365 Article 32(2), (3) & (4) of the UNCITRAL Rules
366 Article 27 of the ICC Rules
367 ibid: "Before signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in draft form to the Court... No
Award shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been approved by the Court as to its form."
368 Article 32(6) of the UNCITRAL Rules: "Copies of the award signed by the arbitrators shall be
communicated to the parties..."
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1.1 (ii) An Award Stating the Seat of Arbitration and the Date of the Award
The stating of the seat of the arbitration and the date of the award are ingredients that are
fundamental to the validity of the award. The stating of the seat of the arbitration and the
date on which the arbitral award is made though discussed under one umbrella in this
section, serve two distinct reasons. The specification of the seat of the arbitration
identifies the law that an arbitral tribunal applied when conducting the arbitration
proceedings. This is the law by which the validity of the arbitral award is gauged. In
order to be valid therefore, the arbitration proceedings and the ensuing arbitral award
must conform to the mandatory provisions of the law at the seat of the arbitration. The
UNCITRAL Rules requires the arbitral tribunal to make the award at the seat of
arbitration. The English Act states inter alia that an award must be made at the seat
of arbitration. The date on which the arbitral award is made on the other hand marks the
effective date of the award. This date may be used to calculate interest or the time frame
within which to lodge a challenge. An award may only have effect on a party from the
date of service.
The English Act provides the format expected of an arbitral award in the absence of an
agreement by the parties.371 The award must amongst other things state the seat of the
arbitration and the date when the award is made. These elements must be expressly
stated in an award. This is the case even in instances where none of the hearings take
place at the seat of the arbitration.
Members of an arbitral tribunal may in most cases sign the award on different days as
they are usually in different places at the time that the award is signed. Some arbitration
rules provide that the date that is stated on the award is the date that is considered as the
date of the award.372 The English Act gives the parties the initial responsibility of
deciding the date of the award. In the absence of an agreement "the date of the award
shall be taken to be the date on which it is signed by the arbitrator or, where more than
369 ibid, Article 16(4)
370 Section 100(2)(b) of the English Act
371 ibid, Section 52(3), (4) & (5)
372 Article 25(3) of the ICC Rules
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one arbitrator signs the award, by the last ofthem. '°73 In the absence of the agreement
of the parties therefore, the date of the award is determined in relation to the dates when
the arbitrators sign the award.
1.1 (iii) An Award with Reasons
Whether reasons should be given for a decision made really depends on the lex arbitri
and the governing rules of arbitration. A number of arbitration rules and some national
systems of law require that reasons be given for an award.374 It is however good for an
arbitral tribunal to give reasons for its decisions where the rules are silent as to whether it
should give reasons or not. The ICC Rules requires that the tribunal give reasons for its
decision to the parties.375 The English Act requires that an award should contain reasons
unless agreed otherwise by the parties.376 The parties to the arbitration agreement may
request the arbitral tribunal to either attach the reasons to the award or issue them as a
separate statement. Lord Saville stated in the DAC Report on Arbitration Law that:
"To our minds, it is a basic ride ofjustice that those charged with making a binding
decision affecting the rights and obligations ofothers should (unless those others agree)
explain the reasonsfor making the decision. "377
The reasons that are given for the award should be based on issues that have been
addressed in the arbitration proceedings. In the case ofABB AG v. HochtiefAirport GmH
and another?1* the court decided that:
"Whilst the court will never dictate to arbitrators how their conclusions should be
expressed, it must be obvious that the giving ofclearly expressed reasons responsive to
the issues as they were debated before the arbitrators will reduce the scope for the
>>379
making ofunmeritorious challenges... "
373
op cit, Section 54
374 Footnote No. 187
375 Article 25(2) of the ICC Rules
376 Footnote 371, Section 52(4)
377 Footnote No. 18, paragraph 247
378 Footnote No. 279, page 564
379 ibid
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In instances where parties would like the reasons for the award to be private, the tribunal
may issue the reasons separately from the award. Each country takes its own stand on
whether private reasons can be referred to in court in circumstances where a party raises a
challenge against an award.380 It is in principle good and helpful for an arbitral tribunal
to give reasons for its award on the merits. A number of countries such as Scotland that
have adopted the Model Law require that the arbitral tribunal give reasons for its award
381unless the parties agree otherwise. In circumstances where the parties to an arbitration
agreement want an arbitral tribunal to give reasons for its award, then the tribunal is
obliged to give adequate reasons for its decision, failing which its work would face
criticism and challenge for being inadequate.382
The reasons help the parties understand and appreciate the award that is handed to them
by the arbitral tribunal. The issues that are raised in the reasons for the award cannot
only assist the parties to understand how and why the tribunal arrived at its decision, but
they may also assist a losing party who decides to challenge a part of or the whole award.
In instances where the parties reach an amicable settlement, the arbitral tribunal loses its
opportunity to settle the dispute383 and is therefore unable to give reasons. Where parties
settle their disputes amicably, an arbitral tribunal may be tasked to draw the parties'
settlement terms in the form of an award in order for it to be easily enforceable.384 An
arbitral tribunal may only permit the parties to an arbitration agreement to consider an
amicable settlement if the lex arbitri permits such a procedure.
Most countries that have adopted the Model Law recognize the amicable settlement of
disputes. Scotland is one such country that permits the amicable settlement of a dispute
by agreed terms.385 The parties may authorize the arbitral tribunal to record their
380 Tame Shipping v. Easy Navigation Ltd (2004) 2 All ER (Coram) 521 at page 527: "Sometimes the
arbitrator will ask the parties before the conclusion of the hearing whether they wish him to issue separate
reasons "
381 Footnote No. 7, Article 31(2)
382 Torch Offshore LLC v. Cable Shipping (2004) 2 All ER (Comm) 365 at page 370
383 Footnote No. 173
384 Article 26 of the ICC Rules
385 Note further footnote No. 7, Article 30
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settlement on agreed terms in the form of an award that is capable of enforcement.386 It is
a generally held position that an amicable settlement of the disputes leads to the
termination of the proceedings. In the case of countries that do not recognize the
amicable settlement of disputes, the settlement of the disputes by the parties terminates
both the arbitration proceedings and the powers of the arbitral tribunal. Where the
method is permitted however, the settlement of a dispute by agreed terms only terminates
the arbitration proceedings and not the powers of the arbitral tribunal as it may still be
requested by the parties to record the settlement terms in the form of an award.387
1.1 (iv) Remedies
Remedies are in essence an answer or resolution to a dispute between parties to an
arbitration agreement. The terms of the arbitration agreement as well as the lex arbitri
may impose a limit on the remedies that an arbitral tribunal may award. For instance the
English Act enables parties to give power to an arbitral tribunal to decide on the remedies
it may award.388 The remedies may be in the form of an award or an order depending on
the issues that the parties wish the arbitral tribunal to address. The arbitral tribunal has
got power under the English Act to order any of the following remedies; a Declaratory
Order; a Monetary Order in any currency; a Restraining Order; an Order for Specific
180 • • 100
Performance of the contract; and the Rectification of a document. The Act does not
allow a party to invoke the court's jurisdiction without having exhausted any other
391
available procedural options before the tribunal.
Once an arbitral tribunal makes an Order, the English Act does not give it further power




388 Section 48 of the English Act
389 Tweeddale (2005: 345): "Most arbitration legislations permit the arbitral tribunal to make orders and
declarations as between the parties. However, orders for specific performance may not always be
appropriate in international commercial arbitration... Orders for specific performance or injunctions cannot
be as easily transferred from one jurisdiction to another."
390
op cit
391 Section 42(3) of the English Act
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that is able to exercise coercive powers against a party when requested to do so. Without
this assistance from court,392 the arbitral tribunal's pronouncements would be 'academic'
as there would be no assurance of their enforcement. It can be seen that whilst the
English Act in its Section 38 gives powers to an arbitral tribunal to make orders and
declarations, it does not go further to give power to a tribunal to enforce their orders.393
Section 44 the English Act on the other hand, gives powers to a court to make court
orders relating to the directions that may be made by the tribunal. The court orders
contain a penal notice that is absent from an order made by an arbitral tribunal. The
courts in this way do not usurp the arbitrators' powers, but only chip in when the
arbitrators do not have the specific power that the court will be asked to exercise on their
behalfby the parties.394 The courts are thus a partner and vital arm required by the
arbitral tribunal in its performance of its task of ensuring that the arbitration process is
deliberated upon expeditiously and at minimal and reasonable cost.
It is important to note that irrespective of the type of award that an arbitral tribunal makes
and whatever remedy it issues, it generally lacks coercive powers. One finds that almost
any kind of award requires sanctions of one type or another. Courts in countries that
support international commercial arbitration are available to be utilized to cure this
deficiency of the arbitral tribunal. Whilst an arbitral tribunal's powers are usually limited
to giving directions to parties, a court's powers are not so limited and therefore more
extensive395 in that the court can ensure specific performance of an arbitral tribunal's
decision.
An arbitral tribunal may only award remedies that it is permitted to award at the seat of
the arbitration. It must be noted that the type of remedies that are permitted in one
country may not be permitted in another country. Remedies such as exemplary damages
do not have a uniform acceptability. Ireland for instance does not permit an arbitral
392 ibid, Section 44
393 Footnote No. 150
394
op cit, Section 44(5)
395 Redfern (1999: 249)
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tribunal to award punitive damages. An arbitral tribunal must therefore be certain that
the lex arbitri permits the awarding of a remedy before it makes the award, as
enforcement of the award may not be assured if the remedy is not recognized at the seat
of the arbitration. An arbitral tribunal's final award must therefore be clear and precise.
Restitution396 is one of the common remedies available to an arbitral tribunal. This
remedy involves an arbitral tribunal putting a party back into the position he was in
before the occurrence of the dispute. Other remedies such as freezing orders operate only
in personam and do not give any security interest in property, as they do not operate in
1.1 (v) Costs
The issue of how the costs in the arbitration are to be borne lies in the parties' domain.
The parties have got the autonomy to agree in their arbitration agreement on every aspect
of costs. A material change in the circumstances of the case such as the oral hearings
taking twice the anticipated time may only attract more costs if the parties did not take a
stand on further costs.398 However, where the parties fail to agree, an arbitral tribunal is
permitted under the English Act to make an arbitral award that deals specifically with the
399
question of costs.
In the case of Sea Trade Maritime Corporation v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association
(Bermuda) Ltd - The Athena400 the court held that section 47 had given the arbitral
tribunal the power to deal with the issue of costs in a separate award. In instances when
an arbitral tribunal is permitted to deal exclusively with the question of costs, it will
address the issue as it arises any time during the arbitration.401 In cases where an arbitral
tribunal makes a final award but has to later make typographical corrections or interpret
396
Ministry ofDefence and Ashman and Ministry of Defence v. Thompson (1993) 2 EGLR 107
397 Kastner v. Jason (2005) 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 397 at page 399
398
Republic ofKazakhstan v. Istil Group Inc. [2006] 2 AH ER (Comm) 26: The appeal for further security
for costs was allowed by the court.
399 Section 61 of the English Act
400
[2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 648 at page 649: "..there had been nothing unfair in the tribunal deciding to
deal with costs at a further hearing and in a further award."
401 Footnote No. 7, Article 24(5)
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the award pursuant to Article 33 of the Model Law, an additional award on costs may be
made to cover these extra costs. An arbitral tribunal may where permitted indicate in its
award which party is to bear which costs.402 Once an arbitral tribunal makes an order for
costs, the party that is ordered to pay costs is obliged to do so within the prescribed time
limits as any delay may either delay the arbitration proceedings or the parties' receipt of
their award,403 depending on the stage of the proceedings when the order is made.
Where the costs in issue are an advance on costs, and one party fails to make the
payment, the other party may pay on his behalf in order for the arbitration proceedings to
progress. In the case of Coppee Lavalin v. Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited,404
one party paid the advance costs of arbitration on behalf of the other party that did not
pay. An arbitral tribunal has got the power to refuse to deliver an arbitral award to the
parties if the stated portion of the costs that is supposed to be paid before the deliverance
of the award is not met. The way in which an arbitral tribunal may handle the issue of
costs depends on the governing procedural laws and rules of arbitration. In the case of
Indescon Ltd v. Ogden,405 the court decided amongst other things that it was for the
arbitral tribunal to make an order for costs.
The Model Law is silent on what may constitute the costs of the arbitration. The English
Act states that costs of the arbitration include the following:
"(a) the arbitrator's fees and expenses,
(b) the fees and expenses ofany arbitral institution concerned, and
(c) the legal or other costs oftheparties. "406
Costs under the ICC Rules includes the fees and expenses of arbitrators and experts
appointed by the arbitral tribunal; the administrative expenses of the institute; the legal
costs, plus costs relating to any encumbrances that may be incurred by the parties relating
402 Section 62 of the English Act
403 ibid, Section 56(1)
404
[1995] 1 AC 38
405
[2005] 1 Lloyd's Law Report 31 at page 40
406 Section 59(1) of the English Act
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to the arbitration.407 The administrative expenses of the ICC Institute may also include
the costs of the Terms of Reference and the scrutiny of the arbitral award.408 This
administrative cost is a cost that is unique to an arbitration conducted under the auspices
of the ICC Rules.
An arbitration that is governed by the ICC Rules has its costs fixed by the Court of
Arbitration whilst the arbitral tribunal decides which party is to bear which costs and in
which measure.409 As such an arbitral tribunal has got very limited powers in relation to
the issue of costs. This is not the case with the UNCITRAL Rules that gives an arbitral
tribunal the power to conduct the arbitration in a manner it considers appropriate.410 This
may be assumed to include the determination of the costs. Costs under the UNCITRAL
Rules include the arbitral tribunal's fees as well as the expenses that the tribunal incurs
during the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and where appropriate, the legal costs of
the successful party.411 The legal costs in arbitration may sometimes follow the events.
For instance, in the Himpurna412 case, the arbitral tribunal decided that the costs of the
arbitration were to be borne by Indonesia as the losing party.
In instances where an arbitral tribunal is permitted to fix the costs of the arbitration, it
may exercise discretion and take into account the circumstances surrounding the
proceedings when awarding costs. A tribunal may further exercise discretion and make
interim awards but leave the question of costs to be dealt with at a later stage. An arbitral
tribunal may also refuse to award costs413 if the party entitled to costs was instrumental in
causing the delay in the completion of the proceedings. The determination and fixing of
costs is a continuing task that the arbitral tribunal undertakes throughout the proceedings,
although in some cases such as under the ICC, the tribunal has got no power to fix the
407 Article 31 of the ICC Rules
408 ibid, Articles 18 and 27
409
op cit,
410 Footnote No. 163
411 Article 38 of the UNCITRAL Rules
412
Footnote No. 239, at page 213
413 Footnote No. 400, page 654: "There may be cases where it is not clear whether the tribunal has left open
the question of costs for further consideration or has intentionally said nothing about them because it
intends to make no order."
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costs. In whichever case however, it is the arbitral tribunal's responsibility to state the
costs of the arbitration and how they are to be borne.
1.1 (vi) Interest
An award of interest is usually made in a monetary claim where circumstances of the
case demand that interest be claimed. The most usual reason that attracts a claim of
interest is a delay in payment. In the case of Charterer (Liberia) v. Owner (Russian
Federation),414 the arbitral tribunal stated inter alia that:
"It is a generalprinciple of law, as well as of international tradepractice, that the harm
normally sustained as a consequence ofdelay in payment ofa sum ofmoney be
compensated by interest. "4I5
In the case of WestlandHelicopters Ltd. v. Sheikh Salah Al-Hejailan416 one of the issues
that had to be determined was whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to make a separate
award of interest. The court held that the arbitrator was correct to regard the claim of
interest as an independent claim agreed to by the parties but limited to the period referred
to in the initial claim.
The English Act gives power to an arbitral tribunal to award either simple or compound
interest depending on the circumstances of each case.417 In the case ofAgent (Spain) v.
Principal (Denmark)418 it was decided that the rate of interest to be paid in the event of it
not being provided in the contract, would be the rate of interest applicable to the currency
in which the damages were calculated. In cases where an arbitration agreement
authorizes an arbitral tribunal to make an award of interest, the arbitral tribunal has to
determine a justifiable rate of interest pursuant to the provisions of the arbitration
agreement.
414 Final Award in Case No. 9466 of 1999 (2000) XXVII Ybk Comm Arbn 170-80
415 ibid
416
(2004) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 523
417 Section 49(3) of the English Act: "The tribunal may award simple or compound interest from such
dates, at such rates...as it considers meets the justice of the case..."
418 Final Award in Case No. 8817 of 1997, (2000) XXV Ybk Comm Arbn 354-67
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The arbitral tribunal also owes the parties a duty of care in ensuring that the correct type
of interest and rate is applied to the award if applicable. An arbitral tribunal cannot apply
compound interest where the arbitration agreement provides for simple interest. An
arbitral tribunal cannot equally calculate interest at a different rate from that which the
arbitration agreement provides. In an ad hoc arbitration that does not usually provide any
rate of interest to be used, the arbitral tribunal may use the rate of interest of an
appointing authority as a guide in its calculation. If a set of arbitration rules has been
adopted, the arbitral tribunal will base its calculation of interest on what is provided by
the adopted arbitration rules.
In an ad hoc arbitration which has not adopted any arbitration rules and which does not
have an appointing authority, the arbitral tribunal may be guided in its calculation of
interest by the provisions of the arbitration law at the seat of the arbitration in the absence
of the parties' agreement. If the seat of the arbitration is in England or Singapore for
example, the arbitral tribunal is at liberty to apply simple or compound interest as that is
permissible by the English Act419 and the Arbitration Act of Singapore420 respectively.
The EU Directive421 on combating late payments in commercial transactions permits an
8% rate of interest above base rate in circumstances where the parties do not make any
special arrangements on the question of interest.
From this discussion it is clear that the award of interest lies in the discretion of an
arbitral tribunal. A tribunal may therefore award interest in its final award even if it is
not specifically pleaded depending on the facts of each case. An arbitral tribunal may
however not be able to make a separate award of interest unless it is specifically pleaded.
Where an arbitral tribunal makes an award of interest, it will be calculated pursuant to
what is permitted by the lex arbitri and the rules of arbitration.
419 Footnote No. 417




It is also the responsibility of an arbitral tribunal to ensure that the award is drawn in the
currency that the parties have agreed upon. Some arbitration rules such as those of
WIPO422 are flexible in that an arbitral tribunal is given power to express any monetary
amount in any currency. This is not the case with the AAA Rules that require a monetary
award to be expressed in the currency of the contract. These rules as well as the CPR
Rules give the arbitral tribunal the discretion to apply another currency other than that of
the contract to a monetary award if it considers it to be more appropriate.423 International
commercial arbitration legislation such as that of England also gives arbitral tribunals
such discretionary power.424
The power of an arbitral tribunal to express an award in any currency other than that of
the contract was applied by the tribunal in the Lesotho Highlands425 case. In that case,
the contract provided for the applicable currency to be that of Lesotho. However the
arbitral tribunal, by virtue of section 48(4) of the English Act exercised its discretion
therein and instead calculated the monetary value of the award in a European currency.
The arbitral tribunal's use of its discretionary power worked to the advantage of the
claimant, as the European currency was stronger than the Lesotho currency that was the
currency provided for in the contract.
This worked to the disadvantage of the respondents especially considering that the
English law allowed the arbitral tribunal to calculate the monetary value of the award
including interest using compound interest.426 The Court held that the tribunal committed
an error of law in its application of the European currency to the monetary amount of the
award. The tribunal's action amounted to an erroneous exercise of its available powers.
This case prevents the arbitrary use of available powers of the tribunal by looking around
the globe for a currency that is strongest on the market and applying it as well as applying
422 Article 60(a) of the WIPO Rules
423 Article 28(4) of the AAA Rules and Rule 10(6) of the CPR Rules
424 Section 48 of the English Act
425 Footnote No. 68
426 Footnote No. 417
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compound interest to the detriment of the respondent. An arbitral tribunal owes the
parties a duty to exercise its available powers reasonably and fairly.
I.1(viii) A Signed Award
A final award must be sent to the parties immediately it is signed as it only becomes
effective from the time that the parties receive it. The ICC Court requires that an arbitral
tribunal send it the draft form of the award before it is signed for scrutiny and
approval.427 The approval only relates to the format of the final award and not its
substance.428 This is done in order for the award to meet the required threshold. An
arbitral award is signed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the governing
arbitration rules and the applicable procedural rules. Each country may therefore fix its
own benchmarks of the type of signing that it requires.
The English Act considers an arbitral award that is signed by the arbitrators that consent
to it, to be valid 429 Consequently, even if the dissenting parties refuse to sign the award,
it will still be valid. In Scotland, a valid arbitral award must be signed by a majority of
the members of the arbitral tribunal. A statement of the reasons why the others have not
signed must be provided. Scotland conforms to the Model Law position430 that states
inter alia that:
" ...the signatures of the majority ofall members of the arbitral tribunal shall suffice,
provided that the reasonfor any omitted signature is stated. "431
The UNCITRAL and the ICC Rules432 recognize an award signed by a majority of the
members of the arbitral team. In instances where there is no majority, the award may be
427 Footnote No. 367
428 Article 6 ofAppendix II of the ICC Rules: "When the Court scrutinizes draft awards in accordance with
Article 27 of the Rules, it considers, to the extent practicable, the requirements ofmandatory law at the
place of arbitration."
429 Footnote No. 371
430 Footnote No. 364
431 Footnote No. 7, Article 31
432 Article 25(1) of the ICC Rules
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made by the chairman of the tribunal alone433 in order to make progress in the arbitration.
However, the Model Law434 only permits a presiding arbitrator to decide on behalf of the
others in interim applications and not when dealing with the final award. Where only a
majority of the members of an arbitral tribunal are permitted to sign an arbitral award, the
award is still a reflection of what the tribunal as a whole has decided. The fact that an
arbitrator does not sign the arbitral award does not mean that he did not participate in the
making of the award, as he will have worked together with the other members of the team
up to that time.435
It is clear that the fact that a majority decision may sometimes suffice means that it is not
in all circumstances that a tribunal is unanimous in its decision making process. If in a
'three man' tribunal, one member arrives at a different decision from the other two and
therefore refuses to sign the arbitral award, the award reflecting the decision of the two
members is a majority decision. If however, all the members hold different views, then
arbitration rules such as the ICC436 may allow the presiding arbitrator to make the award.
The presiding arbitrator is therefore able to maintain an independent position from the
rest of the tribunal.437 This is assuring as irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal
agrees or not in its decision, the parties still receive an award.
Having said that, it is however more comforting for the parties to receive a majority
decision in a three man or more arbitration as then they are assured that the decision is
the right one. There may however be a need for an arbitrator to concur with a decision of
the other arbitrators in order to form a majority. The court ruled in the case of Guinea-
Bissau v. Senegal438 that:
433 Caron (2006: 749): ".. .the presiding arbitrator may decide procedural matters on his own where a
majority opinion cannot be formed...subject to revision by the tribunal. ... it is a generally accepted
principle of international arbitration that the deliberations of the tribunal shall be kept secret, save for
extreme circumstances where disclosure is compelled in the interest ofjustice."
434 Footnote No. 56: "In arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, any decision of the arbitral
tribunal shall be made, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, by a majority of all its members..."
435 Footnote No. 106, Article 32(1)
436 Footnote No 346
437 Derains (2005: 307)
438
[1991] ICJ Reports 40
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"As the practice ... shows, it sometimes happens that a member ofa tribunal votes in
favour ofa decision of the tribunal even though he might individually have been inclined
to prefer another solution... "439
An arbitrator may refuse to sign an arbitral award for a number of reasons. For example
the arbitrator may be under pressure from the party that appointed him to decide in a
certain way that is contrary to what he thinks.440 He may therefore decide to stay away
instead of going against the wishes of the appointing party. Another arbitrator may
choose to stay away from signing the award simply because he dislikes his colleagues.
This refusal to co-operate would be aimed at frustrating the work. The next course of
action that the remaining members may take is dependent upon what the procedural law
and governing arbitration rules provide.
The other reason why some members of the arbitral tribunal may refuse to sign the
arbitral award is because they hold dissenting views from those of the majority. Some
arbitration rules such as those of the SCC441 may want all the views irrespective, to be
reflected in the award, whilst other rules of arbitration such as the CPR Rules442 may not
wish any dissenting view to see the light of day. The dissenting view is however still
filed and any party wishing to see it may still have access to it. In France however a
dissenting opinion cannot be filed and can therefore not be viewed by the parties. Whilst
the ICC Rules allows dissenting views to be published together with the award, the LCIA
Rules do not allow the dissenting opinions to be part of the award. The dissenting views
are instead annexed to the award and are provided separately to the parties.
Since the UNCITRAL Rules do not make any reference to dissenting views, the Iran-US
Claims Tribunal modified Article 32(3) on adoption to allow dissenting views to be
recorded as part of the award. The sentence that was added states that:
439 Caron (2006: 754)
440 Footnote No. 239, page 109
441 Article 32(4) of the SCC Rules
442 Rule 14(3) of the CPR Rules
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"...Any arbitrator may request that his dissenting vote ... and the reasons therefore be
recorded. "443
From this discussion it is clear that the essential ingredients of an arbitral award are
subject to the agreement of the parties. Consequently, the threshold for the validity of an
arbitral award that may be required in one arbitration may not be as high as what may be
required in another arbitration. What is common however in all arbitrations is for an
arbitral tribunal to issue the parties with an arbitral award that is final and binding.
II Types of Arbitral Awards
A number of legal systems as well as rules of arbitration that recognize international
commercial arbitration recognize an arbitral tribunal's power to make different types of
arbitral awards other than the final award. This part of the study will analyze some of the
types of awards that a tribunal may be permitted to issue. As the studywill show, some
of the awards that deal with an aspect of the dispute in whole are final awards in
themselves, whilst those others that require to be revisited may not be considered as final
awards. In respect of those awards that are made in the course of the arbitration
proceedings but which answer the issues raised by the parties completely, they are final
though not made at the end of the arbitration proceedings. A final award is however
made at the end of the arbitration proceedings when all the issues or the remaining issues
in dispute are addressed by the parties and remedies granted. The doctrine of res judicata
becomes applicable to issues that are resolved in whole by an arbitral tribunal. Where a
tribunal deals with an issue relating to liability in finality before it completes dealing with
an issue relating to damages, the question of liability may be res judicata.
An arbitral tribunal's award made during the course of the arbitral proceedings that is not
in full settlement of an issue is termed differently by different institutions and legal
systems. International commercial arbitration practitioners are agreed on the fact that a
decision of an arbitral tribunal that does not completely resolve an issue cannot be termed
a final award, as the issue will have to be revisited by the tribunal. It is the responsibility
443 Footnote No. 90, page 791
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of an arbitral tribunal to clearly state in its decision whether an award made is interim or
final. Mr Justice Steyn as he then was, in the case of Three Valleys Water Committee v.
Binnie and Partners444 found that an arbitral tribunal's interlocutory decision on a
procedural point amounted to an order unless the interlocutory decision resolved a
substantive issue.445
In the case ofNirma Ltd v. Lurgi Energie andEnstsorgung GmbH446 the High Court of
Gujarat held that a partial award on jurisdiction was a mere arbitral order. In the case of
ABC International v. Diverseylever447 the court held that the order of the arbitral tribunal
refusing the interim payment could not be challenged before French courts, as it was not
an award. The court went further to state that an award was something that put an end to
the proceedings and dealt with the merits of the case by disposing of the issues in dispute
between the parties.
The Model Law permits an arbitral tribunal to make more than one type of decision.448 It
requires a final award to be made by the majority of the arbitrators in the tribunal and for
decisions relating to procedural issues to be dealt with by a presiding arbitrator.449
"The UNCITRAL Model Law does notprovide expressly that the arbitral tribunal has the
power to makepartial, interlocutory, preliminary, or interim awards. However, the
travauxpreparatoires, which may be used to assist interpretation of the UNCITRAL
Model Law, indicate that the draftsmen intended that the arbitral tribunal have such a
,,450
power.
Most countries that have adopted the Model Law permit arbitral tribunals to make
different types of awards. For instance the Arbitration Act of Singapore451 recognizes the
different types of awards that an arbitral tribunal is able to make but excludes orders.
444
(1990) 52 BLR 42
445 Redfern (2004: 354): "... a preliminary award may be treated as 'provisional'- However,... any
decision that is not finally determinative of the issues with which it deals should not be called an 'award'".
446
(2003) XXVIII Ybk Comm Arbn 790-809
447 Footnote No. 349
448 Article 33(3) of the Model Law
449 Footnote No. 56
450 Holtzmann (1989: 868)
451 Footnote No. 420, Section 19A (1) & (2)
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The Netherlands452 also permits an arbitral tribunal to make different types of arbitral
awards. Scotland also gives power to an arbitral tribunal to make additional awards.453
The English Act on the other hand, permits an arbitral tribunal to make different types of
awards in the same arbitration relating to different aspects of the dispute.454
The UNCITRAL Rules also permit an arbitral tribunal to make different types of arbitral
awards apart from the final award.455 The ICC Rules also gives an arbitral tribunal the
power to make more than one decision,456 although it does not expressly state which type
of awards that an arbitral tribunal may make. Whilst the arbitral tribunal has got an
inherent power to make a final award, the power of the arbitral tribunal to make other
types of award during the course of the proceedings may be provided by the local laws.
This provision may not necessarily be in an arbitration agreement. The discussion
hereunder will analyze some of the awards that a tribunal may award and when it may be
appropriate to do so. In the course of the discussion a differentiation will be made
between an arbitral award and an order.
11.1 Preliminary Awards
An arbitral tribunal may make a preliminary award when presented with an issue that
requires such an award. The English Act457 as well as the Model Law,458 give power to a
tribunal to deal with preliminary issues. A tribunal may make a preliminary award when
dealing with a question of law such as the determination of the substantive law of the
contract. The stage of the proceedings when such a question may be resolved depends on
when it is raised. It also depends on the views of the tribunal. It may also further be
dependent on whether an arbitral tribunal wants to make a preliminary award or a final
award. If a party raises this question in the form of a preliminary issue, then an arbitral
452 Article 1049 of the Netherlands Arbitration Act
453 Footnote No. 7, Article 33(3)
454 Footnote No. 345
455 Footnote No. 359
456 Article 31(2) & (3) of the ICC Rules: "2. ...Decisions on costs other than those fixed by the Court may
be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal at any time during the proceedings. 3. The final Award shall fix the costs
of the arbitration and decide which of the parties shall bear them or in what proportion they shall be borne
by the parties."
457 Section 31(1) of the English Act
458 Footnote No. 39
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tribunal may also choose to make a preliminary award if it chooses to resolve the issue
immediately.
A preliminary award results from a tribunal dealing with a preliminary issue and making
the award during the course of the proceedings. If however a tribunal deals with a
preliminary issue and then includes its decision in the final award the resulting award is
not a preliminary award but a final one as it deals with the issue completely. There are
issues for example such as the determination of the language to be used in the arbitration
proceedings that an arbitral tribunal may choose to deal with as a preliminary issue and
makes a preliminary award. There may however be issues such as the determination of
the validity of the arbitration agreement or the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal that are
usually dealt with as preliminary issues by a tribunal where possible, but make its
decision in the final award and not as a preliminary award.
11.2 Interim Measures of Protection
The power of an arbitral tribunal to make an interim measure ofprotection is aimed at
securing a claim. An interim measure ofprotection is aimed at securing the status quo
and it is usually made to cover a specific period of time. As a decision that is made by
the arbitral tribunal in the course of determining the substantive issues in the main action,
an interim measure ofprotection may be either in the form of an order or an arbitral
award. Unlike an award however, an interim measure ofprotection is in general not
accompanied by any reasons although reasons may be required it if is framed in the form
of an award. Under the English Act, an arbitral tribunal is only permitted to grant interim
relief that it would be permitted to grant in a final award.459 The interim measure460 that
an arbitral tribunal may give must be agreed upon and authorized by the parties and
recognized by the lex arbitri.
The revised Model Law defines an interim measure as follows:
459 Sections 39(1) & 48 of the English Act
460 Footnote No. 7, Article 9(2)
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"An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in theform ofan award or in
anotherform, by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award by which the
dispute iffinally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders aparty to:
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute;
(b) Take action that wouldprevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to
cause, current or imminent harm orprejudice to the arbitralprocess itself;
(c) Provide a means ofpreserving assets out ofwhich a subsequent award may be
satisfied; or
Preserve evidence that may be relevant andmaterial to the resolution ofthe dispute. "461
It must be stated that an interim measure ofprotection is much wider than an interim
measure as provided by the revised provisions ofArticle 17(1) of the Model Law462 in
that the interim measure basically provides for the preservation of evidence and the
maintenance of the status quo. In the case of Coppee Lavalin,463 the court stated that an
interim measure ofprotection could be said to be capable of fulfilling three objectives
being:
(1) filling a gap in the absence of arbitrators;
(2) maintaining the status quo thus preventing a party from changing the
circumstances in such a way that even an award would fail to provide the desired
remedy, and;
(3) giving remedies designed to make sure that the award has the intended practical
effect.
The Dervaird Committee recommended that an interim measure ofprotection should for
all intents and purposes be treated as an interim award, which may also be a complete
award.464 Under the Model Law, a party applying for an interim measure of protection
must establish that he is likely to suffer irreparable damage and that there is a likelihood
of him succeeding in the main hearing of the dispute. An arbitral tribunal weighs this
evidence using its own discretion.465 An arbitral tribunal has got the power to dismiss a
461 A/CN.9/592, Article 17(1)
462 ibid
463 Footnote No. 404
464 Footnote No. 6, paragraph 3.23
465 A/CN.9/592, Article 17 bis
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claim provided security for costs466 is not met by the party applying for an interim
measure of relief.
The Model Law now permits an arbitral tribunal to order security for all loss in
connection with an interim measure which power the arbitral tribunal did not always
have.467 An arbitral tribunal's exercise of its power to order interim measures of
protection has its limitations in that an arbitral tribunal does not have any power to
enforce its order. Although the new Article 17 of the Model Law has been approved by
the United Nation's General Assembly, it does not have automatic effect on Model Law
countries. In fact there is no country to date that has modified its arbitration laws and
adopted the revised Article 17. It still needs to be seen whether countries will revise their
arbitration laws and implement the revised Article 17 at which point the courts will be
permitted to enforce interim measures.468
The substance of an interim measure as provided by Article 17(1) is limited in its
application, as a party may not apply for an interim measure without the knowledge of
the other party. This is because Article 18 of the Model Law demands that parties be
treated with equality.469 This causes problems to the effective application ofArticle
17(1) as a party that wishes to apply for an urgent order of an interim measure, without
the knowledge of the other party may not be able to do so.
Sometimes the knowledge possessed by the other party of an intended application of an
order of interim measure may cause that other party to take steps to defeat any interim
measure. An exparte order for an interim measure under Article 17(1) that is made by an
arbitral tribunal cannot be enforced until after forty-eight hours have elapsed from the
time that it is made. It cannot in essence be enforced until after there has been an inter
partes hearing. This is in recognition of Article 18 of the Model Law. Consequently, the
466 Section 41(6) of the English Act
467 A/CN.9/592, Article 17(1) sexies
468 ibid, Article 17 novies
469 Footnote No. 116
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urgency of the application under Article 17(1) is neutralized by the need to comply with
Article 18 that is a fundamental provision that cannot be derogated from.
11.3 Partial and Interim Awards
An arbitral tribunal may in practice use the terms interim award and partial awards
interchangeably depending on what type of award it is permitted to make at each point in
time.470 But it is common to attribute partial awards to those segments of the dispute that
are resolved fully by the arbitral tribunal.471 One would therefore not be wrong to state
that partial awards are final awards when they deal completely with a specific portion of
a dispute. There is therefore no need for an arbitral tribunal to revisit a partial award that
exhausts an issue, as it is final and res judicata. An interim award on the other hand may
ormay not be termed a final award, as it is usually liable to be revisited by the arbitral
tribunal if a party challenges it. If however no party raises a challenge, the interim award
may be a final award.472 Sanders and Berg made a distinction between a partial award, an
interim award and orders that reads as follows:
".. .partial awards are given in respect ofsubstantive issues which are separated, such as
liability and quantum; interim awards are given on jurisdictional issues; and simple
orders are made in respect ofprocedural issues. " 473
In the Lesotho Highlands474 case, Lord Steyn recognized an arbitral tribunal's power to
make interim awards. He stated inter alia that an arbitral tribunal had power to make a
partial award or an interim award on any issue or matter before making a final award. An
arbitral tribunal has got power to make an interim award at any time during the course of
the arbitration proceedings pursuant to an application by the parties. There are two
470 Schafer (2005: 119)
471 Caron (2006: 793-795): "... in the practice of the Tribunal, the term 'partial award' was assigned to an
award that was final as to a distinct claim, while the 'interlocutory award' was used to decide a substantive
or procedural issue bearing on a claim."
472 Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v. V/O Exportchleb [1965] 2 All ER 4, page 10: Diplock LJ said that "An
arbitrator today has power to make an interim award determining particular issues separately from other
issues in the arbitration."
473 Redfem (2004: 352)
474 Footnote No. 68, page 270
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instances when an arbitral tribunal may be required to make an interim award. The first
instance is when an issue needs to be settled before the full exploration of the main
dispute can continue. The second instance is when there is cause for the status quo to be
maintained and to that end a party makes an application for a provisional measure of
relief. An example is an application for an interim injunction. Such an application can
be varied or withdrawn by a party making the application.
The first instance can lead to a final award in relation to the item raised if it is settled
once and for all and there is no cause for the parties to refer to it again. If however, the
application is such that the need arises for the same issue to be determined in the final
award, then the award remains an interim one. In relation to the second instance, such an
award will always remain an interim one if it is made to temporarily protect the interests
of a party in the interim period. Interim awards are not always monetary as they relate to
the rights of the parties in most cases.
An example of a time when an arbitral tribunal may be required to make a partial award
is when an application to challenge its jurisdiction is made. Some awards are termed
interim as there is a likelihood of them being superseded by another award during the
course of the arbitration proceedings. Since the principle of competence-competence
requires that an arbitral tribunal make a decision relating to an application challenging its
jurisdiction in the first instance, a partial award may ensue from such a hearing. An
award made by an arbitral tribunal in response to the application may be final although it
may have been made in response to an interim application. It may be final because the
arbitral tribunal may not need to address it again.
An instance when an arbitral tribunal may be required to make an interim order is at the
discovery stage of the proceedings when the other party refuses to produce documents
that are considered critical to the claimant's case. This type of order though made in an
interim application, may constitute a final decision on the question of the production of
documents depending on the contents of the documents produced. If however, the party
required to produce the documents still refuses to act, the arbitral tribunal may further
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determine the issue at the end of the proceedings when making a decision on the merits of
the case. An arbitral tribunal may only compel a party to produce documents with the
assistance of a court in countries that provide for such a procedure.
11.4 Supplementary and Further Awards
The power of an arbitral tribunal to make a supplementary or further award is determined
by governing arbitration rules and the procedural law pertaining. In the case ofRaymon
L Loewen v. United States ofAmerica475 the United States requested the arbitral tribunal
to make a supplementary award in order to clarify an issue in the award of the 26th June
2003. Eighteen months after the final award was made, the petitioner made an
application for the vacation of the award. The respondent objected to the application
basing their argument on the fact that the application was time barred as it was made
three months after the final award. The petitioner's position was that the award of the
26th June, 2003 was not final for purposes ofhis application to vacate the award as a
decision was still pending before the arbitral tribunal for an application for a
supplementary award. The court held that arbitral awards are final and binding on the
parties when issued, regardless of whether a request for a supplementary decision is filed.
A further award can be made to deal with other segments of the dispute. For instance in
the Kastner v. Jason476 the arbitral tribunal made a further award to quantify damages
payable to Mr Kastner after having already made a supplementary award. In eight out of
ten cases an arbitral tribunal makes a complete award in so far as a particular claim is
concerned. The award so made in relation to a segment of the dispute is final in the sense
that it is res judicata save for corrections and interpretation that are made within the
prescribed period of time.
475 Case No. Civ.A.04-2151 (RWR) See also (Final Award 26th June 2003 (Mason, Mikva & Mustill,
arbitrators) 42 ILM (2003) page 118
476 Footnote No. 397
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11.5 Additional Awards
The life span of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction usually covers the period between its
appointment and the date ofmaking the award, unless unforeseen circumstances lead to
the extension of that jurisdiction. Unforeseen circumstances may include the review or
interpretation of the final award, or the correction of typographical errors.477 In the case
478ofDanae Air Transport Societie Anonyme v. Air Canada, it was held amongst other
things that the arbitral tribunal had made a mathematical error that amounted to a
'procedural mishap' as the method of calculation it used was outside the parties'
contentions. The court based its decision to remit the costs award to the arbitrators for
their reconsideration on the fact that there had been a procedural mishap although the
decision itselfwas not wrong.479
An order that is made after the final award has already been made is usually termed an
additional ward. Additional awards may be made in circumstances where issues that are
raised in the proceedings are omitted in the award. In such a case, an arbitral tribunal
may exercise discretion and make an additional award in fulfillment of its objective.480
The LCIA Rules also provide for a party to apply for an additional award in
circumstances where a decision pertaining to a counterclaim is omitted from the final
award.481
The English Act482 permits an arbitral tribunal to make an additional award in respect of
any claim including a claim for interest or costs, which claim is addressed by the parties
in the proceedings but not dealt with in the award by the tribunal. The Torch Offshore483
case deals with section 57(3)(b) of the English Act that gives power to an arbitral tribunal
to make additional awards in respect of claims presented to the tribunal but not dealt with
in the award. An arbitral tribunal can however not make an additional award in respect
477 Article 33(5) of the Model Law
478
(2000) 2 All ER 649 at page 553-554
479 ibid
480 Footnote No. 382
481 Article 27(3) of the LCIA Rules
482 Section 57(3)(b) of the English Act
483 Footnote No. 382
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of claims not presented to it by the parties as this would amount to an excess of its
jurisdiction.
11.6 Final Award
The generally held position in international commercial arbitration is that an award is
final and binding on the parties.484 This includes a partial award if it is final in relation to
the issue that it deals with.485 It must be stated that every instrument that recognizes the
process of international commercial arbitration as a means of resolving disputes also
recognizes the power of a tribunal to make a final award. The finality of an arbitral
award486 under the Model Law is tested by it being able to withstand all the grounds for
setting it aside provided by Article 34. In the Kuwait v. American Independent Oil
(Aminoil)487 case, the court set aside the award as it failed to take into account the factual
and political circumstances in its award.
There are circumstances when an arbitral tribunal makes an exparte award which if not
challenged may amount to a final award. Such awards are made when no notice is given
to the other party of the hearing dates or when a party makes an application without
informing the other party. These are different from awards made in the absence of a
party who has been informed of the date but fails to attend the hearing. For instance, The
PRC Arbitration Law authorizes an arbitral tribunal to proceed with the hearing if a
respondent fails to appear after having been duly summoned or if he abandons the
proceedings midway.488 Further, in the Himpurna489 arbitration, Indonesia failed to file
its case-in-chief and the tribunal proceeded with the arbitration proceedings in the
absence of the other party.
op cit, Section 58
485
Berger (2006: 554): "Only those arbitral decisions which decide, partially or wholly, on the subject
matter of the arbitration, thus leading to a total or partial termination of the proceedings.. .can be
characterised as genuine final arbitral awards..."
486 Tweeddale (2005: 333)
487 21 I.L.M 976, 998 (1982)
488 Footnote No. 175, Article 42 of the Section 3
489 Footnote No. 239, paragraph 198
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The making of a final award declares the close of proceedings and renders the arbitral
tribunal functus officio,490 An arbitral tribunal may be able to make a number of final
awards in the same dispute if it is dealing with a complex issue with multiple claims. In
such a case, a partial award that addresses a question of liability in full is a final award as
well as a partial award dealing with the question of costs. In the Sea Trade491 case, the
court held that "there was nothing unfair in the tribunal deciding to deal with costs at a
further hearing and in a further award. "492
An arbitral tribunal that makes a decision relating to a dispute that the parties wished it to
resolve, establishes who is liable and also awards remedies, becomes functus officio as its
mandate is exhausted. The exhaustion of an arbitral tribunal's mandate is subject to the
court ordering it to rethink or correct its decision, in which case it may still not be functus
officio until the job is completed. In the case ofHussmann (Europe) Ltd v. Pharaon, 493
the court held that a valid final award on the merits exhausted an arbitrator's jurisdiction.
Once the job is done, an arbitral tribunal cannot of its own accord re-visit an already
decided case as it will no longer have jurisdiction to do so.
An arbitral tribunal that makes a decision in excess of its jurisdiction cannot be said to be
functus officio as it may not have exhausted its jurisdiction if its award is declared
invalid.494 It is the responsibility of an arbitral tribunal to explicitly state in its award
whether it has addressed all the issues arising in the particular segment of the dispute that
it is answering, or if it still intends to revisit the same issues again later. If the arbitral
tribunal states in the award that a particular question has been answered in full, then its
decision becomes res judicata and the issue cannot be revisited as to its merits. As such
the principle of res judicata cannot be a basis for challenging an arbitral tribunal's
jurisdiction as it only confirms that the issue that the parties had raised has received the
arbitral tribunal's full determination. An arbitral tribunal may in the alternative state that
490 Garner :"(Of an officer or official body) without further authority or legal competence because the
duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished"
491 Footnote No. 400
492 ibid at page 649
493
[2003] EWCA Civ 266, CA
494 Tweeddale (2005: 764) :"An invalid award, such as one which has been made against a wrong party
does not render the arbitral tribunal functus officio. "
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a particular question has been answered in full but state in the award that it still intends to
address the issue later in relation to the question of costs arising from that issue.495 In
such a case therefore, an arbitral tribunal's decision is not res judicata. In the case of
Wintershall A.G v. Government ofQatar,496 the arbitral tribunal agreed with the
claimants that:
"Theprinciple ofres judicata prevents the re opening ofnecessarily decidedpoints. It
does notprevent the clarification ofa decision on points which an award has left
undecided. "497
An arbitral tribunal's decision may only be res judicata in relation to that part of the
dispute that has received the arbitral tribunal's final determination. If the issue that is res
judicata relates to a procedural matter such as the question of its jurisdiction, then the
arbitral tribunal still has power to make a decision on the merits of the case. The arbitral
tribunal will continue to exercise its jurisdiction by establishing the parties' rights and
obligations pertaining to the other segments of the dispute that still require its attention.
An arbitral tribunal still has jurisdiction to alter or amend its own decision so long as it
has not become functus officio in relation to the entire dispute.
An arbitral tribunal may face challenge for lack ofjurisdiction from a party if it revisits a
segment of the dispute after it has becomefunctus officio as it will no longer have
jurisdiction to do so.498 Further any action done by an arbitral tribunal that is in excess of
its jurisdiction is outwith whether it has finished its work or not. The making of a final
award marks the date from which the period within which a challenge may be lodged
against an arbitral award begins to count. This is applicable to partial awards that are
made in the course of the arbitration proceedings, which are in essence final. The final
award also marks the end of an arbitral tribunal's mandate unless circumstances arise that
require the award to be revisited. In general however, an arbitral tribunal becomes
495 Proodos Marine Carrier v. Overseas Shipping [578 F. Supp. 207 S.D.N.Y. 919840]
496 Footnote No. 228, para, 837-8
497 ibid
498 Section 67 of the English Act
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functus officio after it has answered all the questions that the parties have raised in their
disputes and it makes a final award.
Il.6(i) Time Limit of Making a Final Award
The fixing of time limits within which a final award may be made is a procedural issue
that is determined by the parties to an arbitration agreement. In cases where the parties
choose to have their arbitration governed by a set of arbitration rules, the rules may
provide such time limits. Under the ICC Rules, an arbitral tribunal has a duty of
rendering an award to the parties within a period of six months.499 This period is
calculated as running from the date that the Terms ofReference are signed to the date of
the award.500 The UNCITRAL Rules on the other hand however, do not provide an
arbitral tribunal with any time limit within which it may make a final award.
Where a time frame is prescribed within which a final award is to be made, an arbitral
tribunal has a duty to abide by the prescribed time limit. The failure by a tribunal to meet
the deadline of the prescribed time limit may render the proceedings irrelevant. Any time
prescribed by the procedural law or the arbitration rules within which to make a final
award can only be changed by the same means by which it is established. An arbitral
tribunal has in general no power to alter the time within which it is to make a final award.
But it may make a request for an extension of time from the parties, where extra time is
required. The ICC Court may in certain circumstances extend the time limit even before
a tribunal makes a request.501 This is because the Court follows the proceedings keenly
and therefore any reason that may lead to any delay is likely to be known to the Court.
The parties must agree to the extension of time and when permitted, an arbitral tribunal
must aim to complete the arbitration within the time provided. If after exhausting the
provided procedure for requesting an extension of time, a tribunal still fails to obtain such
time, it may with the knowledge of the parties, apply to court for such extension under
499 Footnote No. 306
500 ibid
501 Footnote No. 308
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the English Act.502 In the case ofPirtek (UK) Ltd v. Deanswood Ltd and another,'^03 the
court held that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction by among other things making
an additional award relating to interest 17 months after the final award. Deanswood Ltd
failed to prove that it had made a claim for interest before the award was made. There
was also no application before the court for an extension of the statutory time limit within
which an award was to be made.
From this discussion it is evident that the basic role that a tribunal performs in relation to
the time limits within which a final award may be made, is that of ensuring that it works
within the prescribed time limits that are set by the parties. The power of fixing the time
frame is, unlike other procedural powers, not transferred from the parties to the arbitral
tribunal. The most that an arbitral tribunal may do is to request for an extension of time
where permitted if it is unable to meet the deadline set for completing its work.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the power of an arbitral tribunal to make an arbitral award.
What was significant from the discussion is that the award that is made may only signify
the completion of the tribunal's work if it restores the parties to the position that they
were in before the dispute arose or in the alternative, addresses all contentious issues
comprehensively. The award must be one that addresses and answers the issues that may
have been in dispute between the parties and as such bind them to their agreement.
Having complied with and fulfilled the requirements of the lex arbitri, the award must be
one that is recognized by the said law as valid and therefore capable ofbeing enforced.
In order for an award to fulfill this objective, it must first of all be seen to have satisfied
the essential elements of a valid award as required by the lex arbitri. Secondly, it must
be a type of award that is binding on the parties and is final. This is vital as an arbitral
tribunal makes a number of awards and orders during the course of the arbitration
502 Section 50(2) of the English Act
503
(2005) 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 729 at page 734
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process, but it is only the final arbitral award that is binding on the parties and is capable
of terminating the arbitration process.
The study showed the need for a final award to meet the minimum standards required of a
valid award. The arbitral tribunal has a duty to work towards attaining the threshold set
by the lex arbitri upon which its validity may be based and upon the New York
Convention being the treaty that enables it to be enforced across borders. Article
IV(l)(a) of the New York Convention requires that a party wishing to apply for the
enforcement and recognition of a final award produces 'a duly authenticated original
award or a duly certified copy thereof;504 A final award must be in writing if this
requirement is to be satisfied. A final award must further state the seat of the arbitration
and the date of the award. The stating of the seat of the arbitration by the tribunal in its
final award confirms the law that regulated its proceedings and the date signifies the
effective date of application of the award. An award is made at the seat of the arbitration
even though none of the arbitration proceedings take place there. The stating of the seat
confirms the home of the arbitration proceedings. Although the date signifies the
significant date of the award, it is only applicable on the parties from the date of service.
The decision to have an award with reasons is the prerogative of the parties. The parties
may request that the reasons be attached to the award or be in a separate document. But
the granting of reasons has been accepted as good practice in arbitration. The
requirement of an arbitral tribunal to state its reasons for its award enables the parties to
know the grounds upon which the award is based and why the tribunal may find it
essential to rely on them. In instances where parties agree to an amicable settlement, a
tribunal may not be able to state the reasons as the dispute is resolved based upon the
parties' agreed terms and not upon a tribunal resolving the issues in dispute. However,
because the amicable settlement of the dispute also resolves the dispute, the tribunal may
ifpermitted reduce the parties' agreed terms to the form of a final award, but without
reasons. In both cases however, the tribunal's power only terminates with a final award.
504 Article IV(l)(a) of the New York Convention
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It is essential that a final award grants remedies to the parties as prayed. Whilst a tribunal
must grant remedies in accordance with the agreement of the parties, the remedies must
conform to the lex arbitri, as the parties may only enforce an award that has remedies that
are recognized by the procedural law. The tribunal is only able to remedy the parties but
is not in a position to compel the parties to abide by the remedies granted. In order for
the final award to be enforced, a party must apply for enforcement in a court of the
enforcing country. In cases where a tribunal makes an order that is not voluntarily
complied with by a party, the other party may apply to the court at the seat of the
arbitration for the enforcement of the order. This is because an order is not a final award
and is made during the course of the arbitration proceedings. During the arbitration
proceedings, a party may request a court at the seat of the arbitration to enforce an order
as long as the application is territorial. An order of a tribunal that relates to a non-
territorial clause may be enforced in a country other than the seat of the arbitration.
An arbitral tribunal may when requested, make an award that deals solely with the
question of costs. If the award deals with the question of costs in finality and does not
address the issue again, that award may be termed as a final segment of the award.
Whilst the tribunal has got the power to award costs, the parties may in some cases agree
on who is to bear the party to party costs. Further the rules of arbitration may also state
the proportion in which the parties are to deal with the advance on costs. Where this
guidance is available, the tribunal is obliged to abide by it. However, when there is a
dispute relating to the question of costs, then it is for the tribunal to address the issue and
remedy it in the form of an award.
An arbitral tribunal's final award may include an award of interest if a party requests for
interest or if the circumstances of the case demand that a party may only be restored to
his original position with an award of interest. For instance a delay in a monetary claim
may invite an award of interest. Where the arbitral tribunal is permitted to make an
award of interest, it is guided by the lex arbitri in its calculation of the interest. The
agreement of the parties directs the tribunal to the currency that is to be applied to the
arbitration proceedings and to the final award.
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An arbitral tribunal's final award must be signed. Each system of law has got different
standards that state how a tribunal may fulfill this condition. An arbitral tribunal may
therefore be guided by the lex arbitri when determining whether it has fulfilled this
condition or not. The Model Law for instance requires the signature of the majority of
the arbitrators with reasons for showing why some signatures are missing. It may be
helpful to the parties for dissenting views to be submitted to them in a separate document
where this is permitted as this enables the parties to know the decision and views of each
arbitrator.
Whilst an arbitral tribunal may make a number of orders and awards if permitted by the
local laws during the course of the arbitration proceedings, the award that is termed as
final must be one that resolves an aspect of a difference completely and grants remedies.
That aspect of the difference need not be revisited as it is res judicata. An arbitral
tribunal may therefore have more than one final award in any given arbitration process.
The reason for this is that it may, in dealing with a complex problem for instance divide
issues into segments and address them separately. As each issue is resolved and a
remedy is granted, a final award is made. It is however important that the tribunal states
the term that it wishes to attach to its decision to prevent any confusion. An arbitral
tribunal however only exhausts its mandate when all the issues in dispute are addressed
and resolved. The time within which an arbitral tribunal is to make a final award is of the
essence and as a procedural issue it is determined by the parties.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVE ARBITRABILITY AND THE POWER OF AN
ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO DEFINE ITS JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is discuss the extent of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. Whilst
chapters two and three dealt with the powers of an arbitral tribunal to resolve the parties'
dispute and make an award respectively, this chapter discusses the extent of an arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction firstly, in terms of the issues in the dispute that it is permitted to
deal with and secondly the scope of its authority. The discussion intends to show how an
arbitral tribunal's power to deal with a subject matter in a dispute is determined by the
extent of its jurisdiction. The study also shows how the statutory limitations that are
placed on an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction by a country's arbitration laws are maintained
and enforced. The chapter also illustrates how the statutory limitations override the limits
of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction that are drawn by the parties to an arbitration
agreement.
The study begins by analyzing the concept of objective arbitrability that marks the extent
of the parties' autonomy to determine the subject matter of their dispute. It signifies the
boundary between the issues that the tribunal may resolve and the issues that are to be
resolved by the judicial system of a particular country. It is now a commonly accepted
position that disputes that arise in international business contracts may, subject to the
parties' wishes, be resolved through the process of international commercial arbitration.
This chapter will show that a State's public policy requirements may sometimes limit the
parties' liberty to exercise their choice of issues that they are able to refer to arbitration.
In dealing with a subject matter in dispute between the parties, an arbitral tribunal has to
not only consider whether the dispute is within the scope of its authority, but also whether
the law at the seat of the arbitration permits it to subject the dispute to the process of
arbitration.505
505 Craig (2000: 63)
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The study will end by discussing the power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own
jurisdiction. Unlike objective arbitrability that focuses on the subject matter in dispute,
an arbitral tribunal's power to rule on its own jurisdiction is wider in nature as it not only
looks at whether it has power to deal with a subject matter in dispute, but at every aspect
of its jurisdiction. It thus goes further to examine its very foundation. It is the position of
this study that objective arbitrability and an arbitral tribunal's power to rule on its own
jurisdiction both form a boundary of the issues in a dispute that an arbitral tribunal is able
to deal with.
The test of arbitrability is therefore not just a court's determination of the question of
arbitrability, but also an arbitral tribunal asking itselfwhether a subject matter in dispute
lies within the scope of its authority. The Model Law506 and the English Act507 permit
the subjection of the decision of an arbitral tribunal on the question of arbitrability to the
control of a court at the seat of arbitration. The court may set aside an arbitral award if it
finds that the dispute in question is not capable of being settled using the arbitration
process under the law to which the parties have subjected it.508 The discussion will show
that the power of an arbitral tribunal in terms of the remedies available to it is limited as
compared to the issues in the dispute that it is able to deal with. The reason being that
some jurisdictions that would consider a subject matter to be arbitrable may not avail to a
tribunal all the remedies that it would have wished to award a party under that arbitration.
This chapter contains three sections. The first section discusses the concept of objective
arbitrability and what it entails. The second section discusses the limitations placed by a
State's public policy on a party's autonomy to bring issues in a dispute to be resolved
through the process of arbitration. The final section looks at the power of an arbitral
tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction.
506 Article 16(3) of the Model Law
507 Footnote No. 498
508
op cit, Article 34(2)(b)(i)
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1.1 WHAT DOES THE CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVE ARBITRABILITY ENTAIL?
The concept of objective arbitrability relates to the question of the subject matter that is
capable of being subjected to the arbitration process.509 Simply put, arbitrability is the
determination ofwhether a subject matter in dispute is capable of being referred to the
process of arbitration or is not capable of being settled by arbitration. 510 In other words
the determination of arbitrability in favour of arbitration enables an arbitral tribunal to
exercise its power of resolving the parties' disputes through the process of arbitration.
Arbitrability becomes an issue when the power to decide a subject matter that an arbitral
tribunal purports to exercise is questioned.511 A country's legislation pertaining to
international commercial arbitration may provide the extent of an arbitral tribunal's
powers and the powers that the tribunal may not have jurisdiction over.512
Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter describe arbitrability as follows:
"Arbitrability, ...involves determining which types ofdispute may be resolved by
y 513arbitration and which belong exclusively to the domain ofthe courts. "
Julian Lew on the other hand describes arbitrability as:
"
...one ofthe issues where the contractual andjurisdictional natures of international
commercial arbitration meet head on. It involves the simple question ofwhat types of
issues can and cannot be submitted to arbitration. "SI4
Peter Binder agrees entirely with Julian Lew's description of arbitrability.515 What he
sees as causing a problem with the term arbitrability is that one cannot be sure of what is
arbitrable and what is not in any given jurisdiction. Craig, Park and Paulsson believe that
509 Nakamura (2002: 206)
510 Binder (2005: 26):"Whether a dispute is arbitrable or not,, .. .is commonly determined by a state's
national laws or by its constitution."
511 Park (2006: 87): "...the catchall term "arbitrability" can cover several elements of the arbitrator's power
to hear a dispute..."
512 Section 4(1) of the English Act: "The mandatory provisions of this Part are listed in Schedule 1 and
have effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary."
513 Redfern (2004: 138)
514 Lew (2003: 187)
515 Binder (2000: 232): "The main problem identified in the context of the issue of arbitrability is the
uncertainty involved in the determination ofmatters deemed to be non-arbitral by the individual
jurisdictions."
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the concept of arbitrability should be "limited to the inquiry ofwhether the claims raised
areprohibited by lawfrom being resolved by arbitration- irrespective of the otherwise
undoubtedjurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. "5I6 Lord Mustill states that a consensus
opinion on matters that are arbitrable is far fetched.517 These positions confirm the
inconsistencies518 in the approach to the question of arbitrability as whilst they assert that
drawing a list of common factors is bound to fail, attempts have been made by some
countries to identify common features in the issues that are arbitrable. For instance,
Switzerland permits any disputes that have property as a subject matter in the dispute to
be referred to arbitration.519 Germany also recognizes a claim with its seat in Berlin and
involving an economic interest to be arbitrable.520
Professor Hanotiau on the other hand considers arbitrability to be a condition of the
validity of the arbitration agreement and consequently, of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.521
His description of arbitrability shows that in order for the question of arbitrability to be
answered, a lot of other factors such as the validity of the arbitration agreement522 and the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal have to be taken into account. If an arbitration
agreement relates to an issue in the subject matter of the dispute that is not arbitrable
under the laws of the country which the parties wish to subject their arbitration to, then
that arbitration agreement will be invalid in that country. The same arbitration agreement
may however be considered as valid if the parties choose to subject it to the laws of
another country that considers the issues in the subject matter to be arbitrable.
This study takes the position that there is a direct correlation between the question of
objective arbitrability and the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. It is for this reason that
this study has chosen to discuss these two areas together. Objective arbitrability and the
question of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction both focus on one issue which is that of
defining the extent of an arbitral tribunal's power to deal with the issues of dispute
516 Redfern (2004: 60)
517 Mustill (2001: 71)
518 ibid, page 70
519
Art, 177(1) Swiss PILA of 1987
520 Section 1030 ZPO




between the parties. Both areas therefore draw a boundary of where the power of an
arbitral tribunal ends, thus defining the disputes that it is capable of resolving.
The jurisdiction and powers of an arbitral tribunal are subject to the validity of the
523arbitration agreement. A court may determine arbitrability in relation to the validity
and scope of the arbitration agreement. Where an issue is arbitrable but the arbitration
agreement is invalid, the court may determine the issue. In the case ofFirst Options of
Chicago v. Kaplan,524 the court held that the scope of the arbitration agreement was a
matter for courts to decide independently. In the case ofDalimpex Ltd v. Janicki525, the
court stated that it had jurisdiction to decide a case where an arbitration agreement was
invalid.
The starting point of determining objective arbitrability therefore, is firstly, whether there
is in existence a valid arbitration agreement that relates to a dispute capable ofbeing
resolved through the process of arbitration. The second position is that of ensuring that
the question of arbitrability is raised in a country that has jurisdiction over the respondent
in order for the judicial mechanism in that country to compel the respondent to honour
the arbitration agreement. The determination of the question of objective arbitrability
must therefore be by a court in the country where the question is raised. There is a
generally held presumption that an arbitration agreement is valid and the dispute that the
parties subject to the process of arbitration is one that is capable of being settled through
arbitration. In the case ofMoses H ConeMemorialHospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp,526 the court held that doubts that may arise concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favour of arbitration.
523 Article 17 (2) of the ICC Rules
524 1 15 S. Ct. 1920 [1995]
525
[2003] 172 OAC312
526 460 US 1,24-25 [1983]
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1.2 The Stages at Which the Question of Objective Arbitrability may be Raised
The question of objective arbitrability may be raised at any of the following times:
(i) Before the arbitral tribunal is constituted;
(ii) After the award is made; and,
(iii) When enforcement is sought.
In determining the question of arbitrability, the main factor that has to be taken into
consideration is the system of law that is applicable to the arbitration at the stage when the
question is raised. This part of the study looks exclusively at three stages of the
arbitration when the question of objective arbitrability may be raised. It is the position of
this study as will be discussed at the end of the chapter that any question that is raised
relating to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal during the course of the arbitration
proceedings, lies in the exclusive domain of an arbitral tribunal at least in the first
instance. The question of arbitrability amounts to a challenge of the decision to subject an
issue in dispute to the process of arbitration by a party to an arbitration agreement. A
party is obliged to raise the question of objective arbitrability immediately he becomes
aware of the issue that is the subject of the question of objective arbitrability.
1.2 (i) Objective Arbitrability Raised Before the Constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal
The issue of objective arbitrability at this stage of the arbitration could arise at the
determination of the validity of an arbitration agreement. At this stage of the arbitration
proceedings, the arbitral tribunal will still not have taken over the realms ofpower. The
place of arbitration may or may not have been decided upon by the parties. A party may
bring a court action in disregard of the arbitration agreement. In such a situation the other
party may in defence request that the matter be referred to arbitration.
A party may wish to raise the question of objective arbitrability at this stage if there is
evidence to show that the other party is not ready to honour the arbitration agreement by
purporting that the arbitration agreement is defective or non-extent. The New York
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Convention requires that a court in a Contracting State faced with the question of
objective arbitrability send the parties to arbitration if the issue in their dispute is
arbitrable under the law of the said State.527 The court may assume jurisdiction to
determine the dispute if it decides that the arbitration agreement is "null and void,
528
inoperative or incapable ofbeing performed. " In the case ofA Best Floor Sanding Pty
57Q
v. Skyer Australia Pty Ltd the court found that the arbitration agreement was null and
void. In cases where the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, it may
assume jurisdiction of the matter and adjudicate.
A court's determination ofwhether or not an issue should be referred to arbitration
amounts to a determination of the question of objective arbitrability. Both the Model
Law530 and the English Act531 give recognition to the New York Convention's position
referred to above.532 The Model Law's position may be likened to that of France although
France is a non-Model Law jurisdiction.533
If the country before whose court the claimant brings proceedings has adopted Article
8(1) of the Model Law, it is obliged to determine the question of objective arbitrability if
it is requested to do so by a party subject to the terms provided therein. If such a court
recognizes the issues in the subject matter of the dispute as arbitrable by its own laws, it
must refer the parties to arbitration. The case ofRio Algom Ltd v. Sammi Steel Co.534
defined the role that a court assumes before the commencement of arbitration
proceedings, as being confined to determining the validity of the arbitration agreement
pursuant to Article 8 of the Model Law. In the case of Green Tree Financial Corporation
v. Lynn Bazzle535, the court stated that:
527 Article 11(3) of the New York Convention
528 ibid
529 [1999] VSC 170
530 Article 8(1) of the Model Law
531 Section 9(4) of the English Act
532 Binder (2005: 88):"...a party can even rely on Article 8 where the lex loci is in a different state, with the
only connection to the adopting state being, perhaps, that the court action was brought there."
533 French Code ofCivil Procedure , Article 1458
534 [1991] 47 C.P.R. (2d) 251; CLOUT.
535 531 US 79, 90, 121 S. Ct. 513, 522 [2000]
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"in the absence ofclear words to the contrary it was to be assumed that it was the courts
and not the arbitrators who determined questions such as whether theparties have a valid
arbitration agreement. "536
The powers of an arbitral tribunal to determine whether it is permitted to deal with a
specific issue in a subject matter have to be clear and precise.537 When this question is
raised before the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, the court in the country where the
respondent is domiciled deals with the issue. The essence of objective arbitrability at this
stage of the proceedings is to ensure that the parties that choose the process of
international commercial arbitration as a means of resolving their disputes honour their
arbitration agreement. The court will therefore be playing the role ofholding the parties
to their part of the bargain.
1.2 (ii) Objective Arbitrability Raised After the Making of an Arbitral Award
The arbitral tribunal has a primary responsibility of ensuring that the award that it draws is
valid at the seat of the arbitration. Once an arbitral tribunal is made, the tribunal's work
will in general have come to an end. Consequently, the question of objective arbitrability
at this stage of the arbitration may only be raised by a party before a court in the form of a
challenge against the award. The challenging of an arbitral award under the Model Law is
very restrictive in nature in the sense that the only permitted recourse against an arbitral
award is setting it aside under very restricted grounds.538 As the validity of an arbitral
award under the Model Law is determined by the lex arbitri, the question of objective
arbitrability at this stage of the arbitration proceedings may only be raised at the seat of
the arbitration. The Model Law does not provide for courts in other jurisdictions to set
aside an award that is made in another State,539 save for a few exceptions such as the
Indian legal system. Inspite of it being a Model Law jurisdiction, the legal system in
India permits the setting aside of an arbitral award that is made in another country.
536 Tweeddale (2005: 227)
537 Binder (2005: 148)
538 Footnote No. 356
539 Article 1(5) of the Model Law
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The Model Law may permit the question of objective arbitrability to be raised at this stage
of the arbitration only pursuant to the following provisions:
• Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, which states that:
"An arbitral award may be set aside by the court... only if theparty making the
applicationfurnishes proofthat the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by, or
notfalling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope ofthe submission to arbitration, provided that, ifthe decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration can be separatedfrom those not so submitted, only
thatpart ofthe award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration
may be set aside; "54°
• Article 34(2)(b)(i) of the Model Law, which states that:
"An arbitral awardmay be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only if the court
finds that the subject-matter ofthe dispute is not capable ofsettlement by arbitration
under the law ofthis State; "54>
These provisions permit a court at the seat of the arbitration to set aside an arbitral award
on the ground ofarbitrability where such a case is established. The raising of the question
of objective arbitrability at this stage of the arbitration proceedings is a test of an arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction to deal with a particular subject matter in a dispute between the
parties. Where the court decides that the matter is arbitrable, that is a confirmation that
the arbitral tribunal worked within its jurisdiction when it dealt with the issues in dispute.
Ifhowever, the court rules that the matter is not arbitrable at the seat of the arbitration, the
arbitral tribunal may have acted out-with its jurisdiction.
1.2 (iii) Arbitrability Raised at the Stage of the Recognition and Enforcement of an
Arbitral Award
After an arbitral award is made and handed to the parties, a successful party may wish to
have the award recognized and enforced in the country where the unsuccessful party has
540 ibid, Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
541 Footnote No. 508
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assets.542 The unsuccessful party may raise the question of objective arbitrability at this
stage as a ground for resisting the enforcement and recognition of the award. The New
York Convention requires that the recognition and enforcement of the award be done in
accordance with the rules ofprocedure in the State where enforcement is sought.543 The
Model Law and the English Act both recognize the question of objective arbitrability as a
defence that an unsuccessful party may raise against the recognition and enforcement of
an arbitral award.544
The English Act states that:
"Recognition or enforcement ofthe award may also be refused if the award is in respect
ofa matter which is not capable ofsettlement by arbitration, or if it would be contrary to
publicpolicy to recognise or enforce the award. "545
These two provisions echo Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention which states that:
"Recognition and enforcement ofan arbitral awardmay also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is soughtfinds that the
subject matter ofthe difference is not capable ofsettlement by arbitration under the law
ofthat country; "546
Article V(2)(a) referred to above must be read together with Article 11(1) of the
Convention when applying it to the determination of the question of objective
arbitrability.547 This is because an arbitral award that does not meet the standards set by
Article 11(1) may not be recognized or enforced as it will have failed to meet the defence
in Article V(2)(a).
542 Footnote No. 342, Article I
543 Article III of the New York Convention: "Each Contracting State shall recognise arbitral awards as
binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon...."
544 Footnote No. 904
545 Section 103(3) of the English Act




The provisions referred to above show that if the question of objective arbitrability is
raised at this stage of the arbitration, it is a court in the State where the enforcement and
recognition of the arbitral award is sought that determines it.548 This approach guarantees
the enforcing State the opportunity of ensuring that its courts only recognize and enforce
those arbitral awards that are the product ofmatters considered arbitrable under its laws.
This could be useful in protecting the legitimate interests of a forum in ensuring that
certain sensitive or public interest matters are removed from the scope ofprivate
arbitration.
Although the New York Convention, the Model Law or the English Act do not expressly
state the law that is to govern the question of objective arbitrability at this stage of the
arbitration, it would be correct to conclude that it is that of the enforcing State. Reason
being that the arbitration is non-territorial at this stage and consequently each country
where enforcement may be sought may wish to apply its own legal standards. As such an
arbitral award that is not enforced in one State may be enforced in another State as long as
the party against whom enforcement is sought has got assets or jurisdiction in that State.
For instance, the fact that a dispute relating to matrimonial proceedings is arbitrable in
Libya does not mean that England has to also consider matrimonial matters as
arbitrable.549 In Ireland "arbitration is usually believed to be unavailable in the fields of
crime, family law and constitutional matters."550
Where an arbitral award is recognized as valid at the seat of the arbitration, the fact that it
is not enforceable in a country where a losing party has assets does not prevent the
successful party from applying for its enforcement in another country where the
respondent has assets. Conversely, if the arbitral award is set aside at the seat of the
arbitration, the New York Convention may permit refusal of the recognition or
enforcement of such an award in any of its Contracting States. Article V(l)(e) states that:
548 Blanch (2006: cxlvi): "At the recognition and enforcement stage,..., a national court should... seek to
ensure that the hearing was conducted as the parties agreed and that each party has had an opportunity to
present its case."
549 Tweeddale (2005: 107)
550 Reichert (2006: 151)
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"Recognition and enforcement ofthe award may be refused, at the request oftheparty
against whom it is invoked, only ifthatpartyfurnishes to the competent authority where
the recognition and enforcemetit is soughtproof that: (e) The award has notyet become
binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law ofwhich, that award was made. "551
In the case ofFincantieri - Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA and Oto Melara SpA v. Ministry
ofDefence, Armament and Supply Directorate ofIraq, Republic ofIraq,552 the court in
Genoa dealt with disputes relating to a United Nation's embargo on Iraq. It is evident
from the discussion that the question of objective arbitrability is raised by a party in court
at the commencement of the arbitration proceedings and at the end of the arbitration, as
an arbitral tribunal is not in control of the arbitration during these times.553
It is therefore correct to conclude that different national systems of law dictate how far
parties to an international commercial arbitration agreement can utilize their autonomy in
determining the kind of disputes that may be subjected to the process of arbitration. This
conclusion marks the boundaries of the powers of an arbitral tribunal in as far as its
jurisdiction is concerned. Arbitrability when looked at in this sense becomes a meeting
point of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in its effort to determine a dispute before it
on the one hand, and the extent of the contractual freedom that the parties are given by
the national system of law on the kinds of subject matters that are arbitrable on the other
hand. A country's social, political and economic policies influence the determination of
arbitrability. That is why an issue that is arbitrable in one country may be considered as
not arbitrable in another country. The Supreme Court in Belgium stated in the case of
Colvi v. Interdica554 as follows:
"Article II (3) ofthe UnitedNations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York) Convention, although not explicit about the law
under which arbitrability is to be decided, allows a national court to decide the question
ofarbitrability by reference to its own legal system. "555
551 Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention
552 XXI YBCA 594 [1996] 13
553 Blanch (2006: cxlvii): "..the question of whether a dispute is arbitrable arises at two points in the
arbitration process: the first is when the arbitration commences; and the second is at its conclusion."
554 Court ofCassation [15 October, 2004]
555 ibid
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It is clear from this judgment that a national court may deal with matters relating to
international commercial arbitration differently from matters that fall under its
jurisdiction as it acknowledges that it is an arbitral tribunal that has jurisdiction over
arbitration issues. Julian Lew states, in reference to this issue that:
"most national laws contain provisionsfor theprocedures to be adopted in international
arbitration which deviate from the rules to be applied by national courts. These
provisions allow widefreedom to the parties and the arbitration tribunal to determine the
procedure to be followed. "556
By being able to determine the question of arbitrability, courts play an important role in
supporting the process of arbitration. National systems of law ensure the enforcement of
the arbitration agreement, provide assistance to the arbitration proceedings, and ensure the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Without this support, awards would be
unenforceable in circumstances where a losing party does not want to willingly abide by
the terms of the arbitral award. Although national systems of law are not part of the
process of arbitration, they occupy a central place in arbitration that ensures its survival.
Lord Wilberforce once stated during the second reading of the English Arbitration Bill in
the House of Lords that:
" ...I have always wished to see arbitration, as far as possible, and subject to statutory
guidelines no doubt, regarded as a freestanding system, free to settle its own procedure
> }55 7
andfree to develop its own substantive law... "
It is the position of this study that the process of international commercial arbitration is a
freestanding system that is subject to systems of law that regulate the extent ofpowers
that an arbitral tribunal is able to exercise in any given country. This arises from the fact
that an arbitral tribunal lacks a lexfori and is thus subject to the regulations of the
governing legal systems. National systems of law in addition regulate the extent of the
parties' autonomy, as the award that emanates from their chosen system of dispute
resolution, must be enforceable at law. The parties' choice of issues that they may subject
556 Lew (2003: 523)
557 Hansard, 18 January 1996 {568 HL Official Report (5th series), col 778}
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to the process of arbitration, must be in tune with the public policy interests of a country
where they wish to subject their arbitration.
II. PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATIONS ON A PARTY'S AUTONOMY TO SUBJECT
ISSUES IN A DISPUTE TO THE PROCESS OF ARBITRATION
An arbitral award may be set aside if a court at the place of arbitration holds that the
arbitral award violates the public policy of that country. The determining factor for such
a decision may be different from country to country, as each country has its own concept
ofwhat is required by its mandatory public policy interests. This state of affairs explains
why one country may accept a challenge of an arbitral award based on the ground of it
being inarbitrable, which dispute may be regarded as arbitrable in another country. It is
situations such as these that have contributed to the development of the concept of
international public policy. A distinction between national and international public
policy was drawn in the case ofGeneral Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co. Ltd.55S
Some countries have taken steps to establish regulations encompassing this concept. The
most notable of these are France, Switzerland, Germany and Portugal.559 The New
French Code of Civil Procedure560 for example permits the setting aside of an arbitral
award on the ground of its being contrary to international public policy.
"Zimbabwe and Zambia did in 1996 and 2000 respectively include in their legislation a
list of issues that are not arbitrable. The lists include criminal and matrimonial matters,
and agreements in violation of their rules ofpublic policy."561 The United States like
most modern states has considerably broadened the kinds of disputes that are arbitrable.
Such guidelines go a long way in assisting parties who are from different jurisdictions to
have an idea of the issues that can be subjected to the process of international commercial
arbitration in those countries.
558 [1994] AIR 860
559
Portuguese Code ofCivil Procedure [1986] Article 1096(f)
560 Footnote No. 533, Article 1502.5
561 Sanders (2005: 475-6)
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It is a generally held position in international commercial arbitration for courts to
consider the ground ofpublic policy whenever an arbitral award is brought before the
courts for scrutiny.562 The United States court in the Mitsubishi563 case recognized as
arbitrable a dispute involving anti-trust claims, as the ensuing award did not conflict with
the US public policy.564 An English court also stated that the public policy of sustaining
arbitral awards outweighed the public policy of discouraging international commercial
corruption.565 Switzerland recognizes as arbitrable disputes involving an economic
interest.566 Ontario holds public policy as a fundamental and most basic principle of
justice and fairness and an arbitral award made there that is contrary to morality or
includes some iota of corruption may be set aside by the court.
In the case ofHebei Import & Export Corp. v. PolytekEngineering Co. Ltd,567 the court
stated that 'international public policy' meant those elements of a State's own public
policy which are so fundamental to its notion ofjustice that its courts feel obliged to apply
the same not only to purely internal matters but even to matters with a foreign element.
The failure to raise a public policy ground before a court at the seat of arbitration does not
prevent a party from resisting enforcement in the enforcing country on the same
ground.568 This is because each country applies its own public policy considerations.569 It
is noteworthy that whilst some countries differentiate domestic public policy and
international public policy, the New York Convention does not make such a distinction.570
57/
In the case ofParsons and Whittemore v. RAKTA the United States Court ofAppeal
stated that:
562 Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention: "Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."
563 Footnote No. 65
564 Rivkin (2006: 400)
565 Westacre Investments v. Jugoimport-SDPR Holding Co. Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 111 at page 131
566 Article 177 of the Swiss Private International Law Statute
567 [1999] 2 HKC 205
568 Tweeddale (2005: 392): "For a defence ofpublic policy to succeed a party needs to show that there is
some element of illegality or that the enforcement of the award would be 'clearly injurious to the public
good'..."
569
op cit, page 159.
570 Dutch Appellant v. Austrian Appellee [1985] X Ybk Comm Arbn 421 at page 422
571 508 F 2d 969 (2d Cir 1974)
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"..the convention's publicpolicy defence should be construed narrowly... "572
The discussion above shows how public policy573 interests often limits party autonomy by
determining the matters that are arbitrable and those that are not. The limitations in each
country are subject to each country's social, political and economic policies at any given
time.574 In general countries tend to place restrictions on the arbitrability of disputes that
are tinted with corruption, bribery or money laundering.575 There may be situations where
a dispute may be arbitrable, but one of the parties is found to have met his part of the
bargain under the contract by bribing some people. In a country where corruption is a
crime, the arbitrability of such a dispute may be questionable.
On the other hand, a country that does not shun corruption may consider the same dispute
as arbitrable. An award emanating from a dispute tainted with corruption though valid in
the country where it is made may not be enforceable in a country that shuns corruption.
Most countries do not allow commercial transactions to be conducted under the veil of
corruption. A case at hand is the famous Westacre576 case. This case underscored the fact
that the need to suppress bribery and money laundering is an established part of
international public policy that ought to be respected by an arbitral tribunal.
In the celebrated case ofSoleimany v. Soleimany577 the court refused to have an award
enforced in England as it was based on an illegal contract involving the smuggling of
carpets out of Iran into the United Kingdom as enforcing such an illegal contract would
have been contrary to English public policy. Meanwhile, this was not the position with
the Jewish law that governed the arbitration proceedings. Under Jewish law smuggling
was not regarded as illegal and was therefore ofno consequence to the rights of the parties
to the contract. By virtue of the separability578 doctrine, the arbitrator still had jurisdiction
573
Desputeaux v, Les Editions Chaouettes [2003] 1 Supreme Court Reports 178 - ...the court... also
endorsed a very narrow view of the public policy defense to arbitration and to enforcement of arbitral
awards.
574 Davidson, (2000: 61)
575 Article 3 of the 1988 the Vienna Convention
576 Footnote No. 565
577 [1999] QBD 785
578 Footnote No. 77
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to determine the issue of illegality of the main contract. It is worth noting that unlike the
Westacre case, the case ofSoleimany v. Soleimany was a domestic arbitration. The
Soleimany case however highlighted the fact that the governing issue ofpublic policy is
the ability to have enforced decisions made abroad.
It is important to note that a number of State laws though, allow the civil part of criminal
disputes to be resolved through the use of the process of arbitration if that is what the
parties desired. Professor Davidson has stated that:
"matters ofcriminal liability may not be arbitrated, although there is no reason why the
civil consequences ofcriminal behaviour should not be the subject ofarbitration. "579
Disputes that fall in the following categories are now generally considered as arbitrable.580
These are matters relating to patents licences and trademarks; issues relating to antitrust
and competition laws, fraud, corruption and securities laws. Europe for instance now
supports arbitrability of disputes involving corruption and bribery. In the case of fraud,
because accounting is a highly technical field it is more susceptible to national legislation
than to international regulation. Fraud has to some extent not been the subject of the same
degree of international cooperation and rule making as bribery and money laundering.
Whilst being alive to the international public policy implications, it is still felt that an
arbitral tribunal should be allowed to determine issues relating to corruption or bribery.
This can be done whilst keeping in mind the autonomy principle. Therefore, whereas
courts can deal with corruption and bribery in the main contract if a country considers
them to be non-arbitrable by virtue of its public interest concerns, the arbitral tribunal
should be in a position to deal with the civil consequences of corruption and bribery
arising in the arbitration agreement. Whilst this may apply to some countries, there are
still other countries that consider bribery and corruption as non-arbitrable in whatever
form, shape or manner.
579 Davidson (2000: 61)
580 A/CN.9/460 paragraphs 32-34: The Working Group has suggested that it should call on each country to
list the issues which that country considers are not arbitrable. In this way parties to an international
contract will know whether their disputes are capable of settlement by arbitration at the seat of the
arbitration and if their awards are likely to be enforced.
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A country may decide on the issues that can be arbitrated upon and the issues that should
be dealt with exclusively by its courts subject to its own national system of laws whilst
taking into account its social, political and economic policies. The Scottish law for
instance allows any matter that may be the subject of a dispute to be referred to
arbitration apart from matters ofpublic policy and status. In order for a subject matter in
a dispute to be arbitrable, it must have some commercial or economic connotation.
In the case of patents, the argument usually put across is that since patents581 and
trademarks have the capability of affecting third parties who are usually not parties to the
arbitration proceedings, the arbitral tribunal's authority is likely to be limited to the
determination of the relationship between the institution that issues the patent and the
patent holder. It cannot extend to declaring a patent invalid. The award that the arbitral
tribunal would make in such circumstances would have no effect on the third parties.
Such a declaration of invalidity would fall outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal,
as it would be affecting the rights of a public authority that is not a party to the arbitral
proceedings. Courts of each countrywill determine arbitrability in accordance with their
own rules of law and their own interpretation of international public policy.
Employment or labour matters are generally not arbitrable in most countries because of
the fact that they deal with the rights of an individual and it is a generally accepted
position that the judicial process is more protective of an individual's statutory rights than
582
an arbitral process. Disputes relating to banking operations in France are not arbitrable
as they are considered as 'police laws' and matters ofpublic policy. Therefore, the
application of French banking laws by authorized institutions is mandatory in nature and
cannot be derogated from. Having said this it is important to take into account that it is
only those mandatory obligations that would impugn France's international public policy
that may have an effect on arbitration clauses in an international contract. This was the
holding in the case of Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. v. SNC Passion.583 Therefore
581
Berg (2001: 53)
582 Article 15, French Law 84-46
583
[2004] All ER (D) 377 (Mar)
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although the application of French banking law is a mandatory obligation, its non-
arbitrability only relates to the local public policy and not to international public policy.
Limitations on arbitrability sometimes come about as a result ofmandatory provisions in
the laws of certain countries as well as the political, economic and social situations of a
given country. Mandatory provisions as well as international public policy may sometime
be pegged as synonymous principles. The other factor that needs to be considered is that
whilst the mandatory provisions of a state's law may explicitly provide for arbitration of a
certain class of disputes, like commercial contracts for example, the same state's law
pertaining to the winding up of companies584 may provide for the same to be done by way
of application to a commercial court. It is from restrictions such as these that the question
of arbitrability arises. If a dispute does not fall under the jurisdiction of an arbitral
tribunal, the issue of arbitrability will not arise.
Article 1(3) of the New York Convention provides for recognition of disputes arising out
of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial
under a state's laws. What this implies is that a matrimonial dispute for example may
generally not be considered as arbitrable due to its non-commercial nature and also
because it does not fall under the subject of international commercial arbitration to which
the Convention applies. Having said so, the situation would be different if the
matrimonial dispute involves property and worldwide business interests. A husband and
wife with such business interests may resort to international commercial arbitration when
dealing with a separation or divorce where their joint property becomes a subject that
needs to be resolved. In the United States on the other hand, marital status and capacity
are viewed as areas reflecting the public policy of the state concerning family matters and
are therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of law.585
The Model Law was just like The New York Convention, designed specifically to apply
to disputes that are capable of settlement by arbitration. That is arbitrations with an
584 Hackston v. Hackston, [1956] S.L.T 38
585 Carbonneau (1986: 1159)
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international aspect and not national arbitrations. Article 1(1) of the Model Law provides
586
for the scope of application of the Model Law. The perceived need for the Model Law
is the formation of a standard and reliable system of international arbitration. Central to
this system is a limitation in the extent to which the courts may exercise control over the
process of arbitration. One particular aim has been to move away from the use or abuse
of the courts as a source of tactical delays. To that end, the Model Law severely limits the
power of courts to interfere in arbitrations under the Model Law.587 Courts have used the
Model Law to support broad policies ofnon-intervention and the preservation of
autonomy of the forum selected by the parties.
Objective arbitrability is a means by which an arbitral tribunal or country decides on the
scope of issues that can legitimately be the subject of international commercial arbitration.
It is part of the job of an arbitral tribunal to ask itself whether the dispute that is before it
is arbitrable or not.588 Each country faced with the question ofarbitrability should also be
able to determine whether arbitration is an available option in resolving a particular
dispute or not. Parties to arbitration agreements should not be allowed to circumvent the
rules on arbitrability in jurisdictions in which their transaction has its closest connections.
It is the responsibility of an arbitral tribunal to inform the parties if it finds that the dispute
is not arbitrable under the laws to which the parties have chosen to subject it. This
sweeping statement should not be construed to imply that such an action by the arbitral
tribunal implies that the arbitral tribunal is invalidating the governing rules and applicable
law that is chosen by the parties. The statement should be read from a positive angle to
mean that the arbitral tribunal is taking a decision to prevent its award from being set
aside at the place of arbitration whose laws may not recognise the dispute as being
arbitrable.
586 Article 1(1) of the New York Convention
587 Article 5 of the Model Law
588 German Seller v. German Buyer [1980] V Ybk Comm Arbn 260: "The court refused to enforce the
arbitral tribunal's award because the tribunal failed to ask itself whether it had jurisdiction to determine the
dispute.
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Ill THE POWER OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO DETERMINE ITS
JURISDICTION
The discussion so far in this chapter has shown how the determination of the arbitrability
of a subject matter in dispute lies in the domain of a national court. This section
discusses an arbitral tribunal's power to determine the extent of its jurisdiction. Unlike
the question of objective arbitrability that is raised before the commencement of the
arbitration proceedings and after the award is made, an arbitral tribunal determines its
jurisdiction during the course of the arbitration proceedings. The study will show how
this power is available to an arbitral tribunal in the first instance when the question is
raised in most countries. An arbitral tribunal has a duty to determine whether it is
functioning within the scope of its authority or not.589 It does this by examining its very
existence where a doubt is raised.590 The power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own
jurisdiction like party autonomy forms the cornerstone of the process of international
commercial arbitration in the sense that it establishes the independence and autonomy of
the process of international commercial arbitration.
An arbitral tribunal has a duty to act within the confines of its jurisdiction. The fact that
the parties wish the arbitral tribunal to establish certain rights and obligations on their
behalf does not imply that the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction is without bounds. There
must be limits as to what subject matter the arbitral tribunal is allowed to deal with and
what it cannot deal with.591 In the event of a party perceiving that an arbitral tribunal
does not have jurisdiction that party has got the prerogative to immediately raise an
objection.592 The failure by a party to promptly challenge an arbitral tribunal may result
in a party's waiver ofhis rights.593 In the case ofRustal Trading Ltd v. Gill & Duffus
589 Tweeddale (2005: 380): "Jurisdictional challenges focus on failures in the arbitral proceedings which
result in the arbitral tribunal not having any jurisdiction."
590 ibid
591 Glencore v. Agros (CA) [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 410 at pages 416-7
592 Margulead Ltd v. Exide Technologies [2005] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 324 at page 330:".. .In a case
where there is knowledge or reasonable means of knowledge of the grounds for objection, the point must
be raised at the hearing..."
593 Buhler (2005: 156)
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SA594 Judge Moore-Bick drew attention to the function of section 73(1) of the English
Act595 in these words:
'..the subsection as a whole is designed to ensure that aparty who believes he has
groundsfor objecting to the constitution ofthe tribunal or the conduct of the proceedings
raises the objection ifhe wishes to do so, as soon as he is, or ought reasonably to be,
aware of it. He is not entitled to allow the proceedings to continue without alerting the
tribunal and the otherparty to a flaw which in his view renders the whole arbitral
process invalid. That could often result in a considerable waste of time and expense
which is no doubt something which the legislation seeks to avoid. '596
Section 31(2) of the English Act shows that the most appropriate time to raise a challenge
is as soon as the pleader realizes that an arbitral tribunal has acted beyond its powers.
The English Act requires that a challenge before an arbitral tribunal in relation to its
excess ofjurisdiction be raised as soon as a party becomes aware of the anomaly.597 An
arbitral tribunal is able to exercise discretion and alter the time within which an objection
can be made.598 An arbitral tribunal may be able to exercise discretion, depending on the
circumstances of each case when considering jurisdictional challenges that are raised
outside the prescribed period of time.
The tribunal may determine the question of its jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings
in the first instance but not finally by virtue of the principle of competence-
competence, 599 that literally means jurisdiction concerning jurisdiction.600 It is aimed at
delaying court intervention in the arbitration process until after the arbitral tribunal has
made its decision on the challenge.601 This power of an arbitral tribunal is also often
referred to in practice using the German illustration ofKompetenz/Kompetenz that may be
interpreted as meaning jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction.
594 (2000) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 14
Section 73 of the English Act
596
op cit
597 Section 31(2) of the English Act
598 ibid, Section 31(3)
599 Binder (2005: 143 & 145): "'... "Competence-Competence" ..describes the principle that an arbitral
tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, meaning that the tribunal can independently determine its power
to resolve a certain dispute without having to apply to a court for authorisation.'
600 Binder (2000: 110)
601 Park (2006: 93)
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France requires a court to declare itself incapable of dealing with an objection against an
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction once the tribunal starts to deal with the issue.602
Switzerland permits an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction through an
interlocutory decision.603 The reference in this part of the discussion to provisions in
some countries relating to the power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction
shows the worldwide acceptance of the doctrine in both Model Law604 and non-Model
Law jurisdictions.605
The English Act606 and the Model Law607 permits this question to be raised before an
arbitral tribunal itself in the first instance whilst the arbitration proceedings are in
progress. In this way, an arbitral tribunal is able to investigate its own limits on the
powers it has to determine a particular issue in dispute whilst the proceedings are on¬
going thus expediting the arbitration proceedings. A decision that an arbitral tribunal
makes in relation to a challenge against its jurisdiction will remain final and binding on
the parties unless an objection is raised by a party.608 In order for this power of an
arbitral tribunal to be established, the parties to an arbitration agreement must clearly and
precisely intend for the tribunal to possess such power.609
In the Rio Algom6W case, the court held that an arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction in the
first instance to determine its own jurisdiction and the scope of its authority. In the case
ofD.G Jewelry Inc. et al. v. Cyberdiam Canada Ltd. Et al,6" the court held that the
602 Article 1458 of the Nouveau code deprocedure civile (NCPC)
603 Articles 186 of the Loifederate sur le droit international prive (LDIP)
604 Footnote No. 92, paragraph 25: "The arbitral tribunal's competence to rule on its own jurisdiction,.. .is,
of course, subject to court control. Where the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has
jurisdiction, article 16(3) provides for instant court control in order to avoid unnecessary waste ofmoney
and time..."
605 Footnote No. 99, page v
606 Section 30(1) of the English Act
607 Footnote No. 76, Art. 16(1)
608 Tweeddale (2005: 684)
609 Footnote No. 99, page 148: "The existence of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction ...decides whether the
parties are bound by an arbitral award or not. It is therefore necessary that a provision regulating this
distinction has to be sufficiently clear and precise; this can be said of Article 16.... page 145: "Article 16
leaves open the question of which law the arbitral tribunal has to apply in the various issues relating to its
jurisdiction."
610 Footnote No. 534
611 [2002] Ontario Judgments No. 1465 (Lexis)
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dispute was within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the court would therefore not
interfere. The court went further to state that the only time that it could interfere was if
there was evidence that the dispute did not fall within the terms of the arbitration
agreement. This is the position that the court took in the case ofMasterfile Corp. v.
Graphic Images Ltd.612
The English Act gives power to an arbitral tribunal to make a preliminary award when
613
deciding its own jurisdiction. Article 30(1) states that:
"Unless otherwise agreed by theparties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own
substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to-
(a) Whether there is a valid arbitration agreement,
(b) Whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and
(c) What matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration agreement. "6I4
The English Act615 construes an arbitral tribunal's substantive jurisdiction in the light of
Section 30 and the excess of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction is construed as an absence
of the provision.
The ICC616 and the UNCITRAL Rules617 also make available to a tribunal the power to
rule on its own jurisdiction. Under the ICC Rules for instance, an arbitrator who accepts
/to
an appointment undertakes to abide by its rules in conducting its functions. It is
possible for an arbitrator to be faced with a situation where by whilst the claim that he is
faced with is within his jurisdiction, a respondent raises issues in its counterclaim which
are beyond his mandate. It is obvious that the arbitrator in such a case should only deal
with the issues that he is allowed to deal with under his jurisdiction. It is up to the parties
6I2[2002] Ontario Judgments No. 2590 (Lexis) - The court found that the issue was unclear and therefore
that it was best left to the determination of the arbitrator, in accordance with article 16 of the Model Law.
613 Primetrade AG v. Ythan Ltd (The Ythan) [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 157 at page 182
614 Section 30 of the English Act
615 ibid, Section 82(1): "Substantive jurisdiction, in relation to an arbitral tribunal, refers to the matters
specified in section 30(l)(a) to (c), and references to the tribunal exceeding its substantive jurisdiction shall
be construed accordingly."
616 Article 6(2) of the ICC Rules
617 Article 21(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
618 Footnote No. 54
142
to agree to extend his jurisdiction if they wish that the same arbitrator should deal with
the dispute in whole. If an arbitrator disregards the fact that he has got no jurisdiction to
decide an issue and still proceeds with it, any of the parties may challenge his
jurisdiction.
Rules of arbitration may require certain preconditions to be met before a jurisdictional
objection can be filed. The UNCITRAL Rules require that a plea for jurisdiction be
raised not later than the filing of the defence, or with respect to a counter-claim, in the
reply to the counter-claim.619 Under the ICC Rules, the reasons for an objection to an
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction should be submitted to the Secretariat within a prescribed
period of time.620 Although the arbitral tribunal may join the issue of the jurisdictional
objection to the merits of the disputes and make one ruling in the final award, it is
encouraged to treat the question ofjurisdiction as a preliminary issue to which a ruling
may be made before the final award. The most usual manner to pursue these objections
is for a challenging party to raise an objection immediately it becomes aware of the
grounds for the objection. Undue delay could lead to abuse of the arbitral process by the
party who knows that the award will eventually be against him.
The ICC Rules requires that the question of the validity or existence of an arbitration
agreement be raised at an early stage of the arbitration proceedings. For example Article
7 prevents the commencement of arbitration proceedings where it is evident that there is
no prima facie agreement to arbitrate between the parties. This may happen in
circumstances where one party alleges that it is not a party to the contract or to the
arbitration clause contained therein as it allegedly did not sign any contract or arbitration
agreement and the purported signatory did not have that party's authority to sign on its
behalf. That party may go on to state that it can therefore not recognize the authority of
the arbitral tribunal.
The ICC Rules empower an arbitral tribunal to draw the Terms ofReference that could
include the subject matter which the arbitral tribunal may be dealing with. Given this
619 Article 21(3) & (4) of the UNCITRAL Rules
620 Article 11 of the ICC Rules
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scenario, one is led to assume that the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction may be known at this
early stage. Therefore any challenge to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal as
enshrined in the Terms of Reference should be raised at the earliest opportunity at least
before they are signed by the parties.
Under the Model Law, an arbitral tribunal may apply the law of the seat of arbitration
when determining its own jurisdiction. This is because the tribunal's power that is
embedded in Article 16(1) is a territorial provision.621 Only after the arbitral tribunal has
ruled on the scope of its authority may a court intervene when requested to do so by a
party. In order to promote the finality of the arbitration proceedings, the Model Law does
not permit an appeal from a decision that is made by a court under such circumstances.622
Parties determine the time-scale within which a respondent is to submit his defence.623
Even before the submission of the defence however, the respondent is at liberty to raise a
challenge if the claim establishes any grounds to that effect. The respondent is able at
this early stage in the proceedings to raise an objection if need be as the statement of
claim in essence states the issues in contention. Grounds for challenge may in some
cases only become pertinent after the award is made.624 An objection to the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction that is raised later in the proceedings may be based on other
grounds which may not have been known to the respondent at that stage in the arbitration
proceedings.625 The tribunal may in dealing with an objection against its jurisdiction that
is raised in the course of the arbitration proceedings be governed by the lex arbitri.
An arbitral tribunal has got the option of dealing with a challenge immediately it is raised
as a preliminary issue or, it may deal with it with the main case and include its decision
on the question as to its jurisdiction in its award on the merits. Under the Model Law, the
time within which to make such an application in court is of the essence. A party wishing
621 Article 1(2) of the Model Law
622 Footnote No. 506
623
op cit, Article 23
624 ibid, Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
625 ibid, Article 16(2)
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to challenge a party in court ought to do so within thirty days from receiving its decision,
and the ruling of the court on the matter is not subject to appeal.626
The Model Law further permits a double action at this stage of the proceedings and this
enables the arbitral tribunal to get on with its work with minimum delay. The arbitral
tribunal is able to continue with the arbitration proceedings whilst the application against
the arbitral tribunal proceeds in court. The fact that the Model Law specifies the time
frame within which to challenge the decision of the arbitral tribunal promotes finality in
the arbitration process by restricting the court intervention. A party that fails to abide by
the prescribed time factor may be considered as having waived his rights to challenge the
627arbitral tribunal's decision.
In order for Article 16(1) of the Model Law to be operative, there has to be a valid
arbitration agreement in place to hold the parties to their bargain, just like Article 8.628
Article 8 may further send parties to arbitration on condition that they have a valid
arbitration agreement.629 If a court before which an application is brought under Article
8(1) establishes the following facts being:
(1) that there is in existence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties; and
(2) that there is a dispute between the parties which falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement;
it may refer the parties to arbitration. In such a case, Article 16(1) becomes applicable
and therefore permits the arbitral tribunal to determine a jurisdictional objection. A court
may not be able to refer the parties to arbitration under Article 8 if the court finds that the
arbitration agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed."
626 Footnote No. 506
627 Article 4 of the Model Law: "A party who knows that any provision of this Law from which the parties
may derogate or any requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with and yet
proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay or,
if a time-limit is provided therefore, within such period of time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to
object."
628 ABN Amro Bank Canada v. Krupp MaK Maschinenbau GmbH [1994] 135 D.L.R (4th) 130; CLOUT:
"the court held that Article 8 is restricted to parties..."
629 Alvarez (2003: 55)
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The doctrine of separability continues to give power to an arbitral tribunal to hear matters
pertaining to the alleged nullity of the main contract.
A jurisdictional challenge is essential in curing the excess ofjurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. The lack ofjurisdiction or the excess ofjurisdiction
amounts to a violation ofjurisdiction that an arbitral tribunal has under an arbitration
agreement. It is this violation that a party may wish to halt when making an application
for a jurisdictional challenge against an arbitral tribunal. An arbitral tribunal's exercise
ofpower outside its jurisdiction may amount to a ground for a jurisdictional challenge if
not acquiesced. It is common for a respondent to challenge the jurisdiction of an arbitral
tribunal although it is not unusual for a claimant to raise the objection. For instance, in
the Primetrade630 case, the claimant applied to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal.
An arbitral tribunal may be construed as lacking jurisdiction if it functions in the absence
of a valid arbitration agreement. An arbitral tribunal may be acting outside its
jurisdiction if it purports to establish the rights and obligations of a non-party to the
arbitration agreement; or if it deals with a dispute that the parties have not agreed should
be dealt with by the tribunal. A tribunal that fails to abide by the prescribed time limits
including the time within which to make an award risks being challenged for lack of
jurisdiction.
An arbitral tribunal that functions outside the limits of its jurisdiction may invite an
objection from a party aimed at rectifying the position.631 An arbitral tribunal owes the
parties a responsibility to be certain of the limits of its mission. It cannot deliberately
ignore its mandate in pursuance of the interests of one party. Such exercise of its
633
duties would be tantamount to acting in bad faith. There are cases where the arbitrator
630 Footnote No. 613
631 Tweeddale (2005: 376)
632 ICC Case No. 1776
633 Footnote No. 132
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has no intentions of ignoring his mandate but is forcefully made to do so by the
appointing party. A case in point is the Himpurna634 case.
Section 31 of the English Act of635 provides the procedure for challenging the jurisdiction
of an arbitral tribunal. A jurisdictional challenge could be made even before a statement
of claim is filed. This is the most appropriate stage at which the objection to the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction may be made and if the challenge is successful, it may stop the
process before it even begins. This is fair to all the parties as time and money are saved.
The decision that an arbitral tribunal makes in relation to a dispute between the parties is
binding on them unless one of them raises a successful challenge against the tribunal's
ruling on its jurisdiction.636 In dealing with an objection to its jurisdiction, an arbitral
tribunal may choose to make "an award as to jurisdiction, or deal with the objection in
its award on the merits. "637 The procedure to adopt is the prerogative of the tribunal.638
In the case of World Trade Corporation v. C. Czarnikow Sugar Ltd,639 the court stated
that the policy that underlies the English Act is one of enabling the arbitral process to
correct itself where possible, without the intervention of the Court.
Rix J identified some options available under the English Act to a party raising a
challenge against an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction in the case ofAzov Shipping Co. v.
Baltic Shipping Co.640 The options were also upheld in the Primetrade641 case. This case
Footnotes 239, 336 & 489
635 Section 31 of the English Act: "(1) An objection that the arbitral tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction at
the outset of the proceedings must be raised by a party not later than the time he takes the first step in the
proceedings... (2) Any objection during the course of the arbitral proceedings... must be made as soon as
possible after the matter .. .is raised. (3) The arbitral tribunal may admit an objection later than the time
specified .. .if it considers the delay justified. (4) Where ... the tribunal has power to rule on its own
jurisdiction, it may- (a) rule on the matter in an award as to jurisdiction, or (b) deal with the objection in its
award on the merits. .. (5) The tribunal may ...if the parties so agree, stay proceedings whilst an application
is made to the court under section 32 ..."
636 Footnote No. 631, page 684
637 Section 30(4) of the English Act
638 ibid
639 [2005] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 422 at page 431 paragraph 49
640 [1999] 1 All ER 476 at pages 477-478: "Where a challenge to an arbitrator's substantive jurisdiction is
made, the party that challenges the jurisdiction has a number of options under the Act. It may agree to
participate in the argument before the arbitrator of the question of his competence and jurisdiction: see s. 30
of the Act. It may do so while reserving its right to challenge the arbitrator's award as to his own
competence (see s. 67).. .Alternatively, it may seek, without arguing the matter before the arbitrator, to
promote the determination of the preliminary point ofjurisdiction by the court under s.32..The third option
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is an example of an arbitral tribunal's decision on its jurisdiction that was overturned by
the court. The arbitral tribunal decided when challenged that it had jurisdiction, but the
court decided that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider the owner's
claims against Primetrade. In the Weissfisch642 case on the other hand, the court
dismissed an application for an injunction to restrain the arbitrator from acting as such for
the reason that the arbitrator was obliged to rule on his own jurisdiction pursuant to the
principle ofKompetenz-Kompetenz which principle was recognized under the Swiss law
as the seat of the arbitration.
If for any reason there is an issue that the parties have not touched on but which the
arbitral tribunal believes from experience that it would assist the parties in the settlement
of their dispute, it is within its jurisdiction to bring out fresh material provided that it
gives the parties a chance to comment. This was the position taken by the court in the
Zermalt Holdings S.A643 case.
In conclusion therefore it may be seen that an arbitral tribunal's power to rule on its own
jurisdiction is different from its powers discussed in chapters two and three of this Thesis
in the sense that whilst those powers are exercised in order to resolve the dispute between
the parties, this power is a test of its jurisdiction. It questions whether the tribunal is on
the right track or not. It may therefore be described as an exceptional power in the sense
that it helps define the extent of its powers and therefore becomes its own judge when
queried. This power is important as it enables the arbitration proceedings to progress as
scheduled in the sense that an arbitral tribunal is able to determine its own jurisdiction
whilst continuing with the arbitration proceedings. Further, it promotes the independence
of the process of international commercial arbitration as questions pertaining to its
jurisdiction are answered in-house. By raising a jurisdictional challenge before the
of someone disputing an arbitrator's jurisdiction is to stand aloof and question the status of the arbitration by
proceedings in court for a declaration, injunction or other appropriate relief under s.72 of the Act. In such a
case he is in the same position as a party to arbitral proceedings who challenges an award under s.67 on the
ground that there was no substantive jurisdiction."
641 Footnote No. 613, page 182
642 Footnote No. 101
643 Footnote No. 243
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arbitral tribunal a party is able to obtain immediate remedy and in the process save costs
and time.
CONCLUSION
The discussion in this chapter has made reference to a number of countries and legal
instruments other than those under discussion. The reason for this is to illustrate the
diversity of the question of arbitrability. The fact that the question ofarbitrability may
also be subjected to the standards that are not territorial requires a wider analysis of the
bench marks that some countries may set in determining arbitrability. There are some
matters that each State would prefer were resolved through the court process and not
through the process of arbitration. The issues arbitrable in one country may not be so in
another country. Public policy considerations, security issues and those that touch on the
sovereignty of a country may not be permitted to be resolved using a private method of
dispute resolution. These are matters that are left in the jurisdiction of the courts for fear
that an arbitral tribunal may get it wrong644 and thereby affect a country's public
interests. Whilst some countries may bar some matters from being subjected to the
process of international commercial arbitration due to their sensitive nature, other
countries tend to adopt a relaxed approach to their public policy considerations and
include such matters as securities regulations645 and competition law646 among their lists
of arbitrable disputes.
Objective arbitrability acts as a controlling feature of issues that may be subjected to the
process of international commercial arbitration. When this question is raised before the
commencement of the arbitration proceedings or at the end of the arbitration proceedings,
it falls within the jurisdiction of the court, as the arbitral tribunal is not in control of the
arbitration at this time. However, whenever a question that touches on the jurisdiction of
an arbitral tribunal is raised during the course of the arbitration proceedings, the tribunal
644 Park (2006: 88)
645
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 [1989]
646 Footnote No. 65
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deals with it in the first instance. In this way, the arbitral tribunal is able to check and
determine its own jurisdiction.
There is therefore a need for a clear distinction between matters that may be dealt with
using the process of international commercial arbitration and those that must be resolved
using the judicial system. Having said this however, and as will be seen in Part Two of
this Thesis, the judicial system tends to intertwine with the arbitration process in an
exceptional and inevitable manner. It is exceptional in that it is done without interfering
in the work of an arbitral tribunal. It is also inevitable in the sense that it is made
available in instances when an arbitral tribunal lacks power, is challenged or when the
interpretation, maintenance or enforcement of the parties' agreement is required. As
things currently stand, the process of international commercial arbitration still needs a
certain level of court intervention if it is to succeed. The court stated in the Coppee
Lavalin647 case that:
"There is tension as on the one hand...the concept ofarbitration leans against the
involvement ofthe mechanisms ofthe state through the medium ofa municipal court. On
the other side there is theplain fact,... that it is only a courtpossessing coercivepowers
which can rescue the arbitration if it is in danger offoundering... "64S
The support offered by the court is found at every stage of the arbitration process. It
becomes more evident when the arbitral tribunal is not in control of the arbitration
process. This is so at the beginning of the arbitration process and at the end when the
recognition and enforcement of the arbitration agreement and the arbitral award
respectively are required. In support of the process of arbitration courts require that
parties that choose arbitration as a means of settling their dispute proceed that way.649
The Model Law has been compared to the New York Convention in terms of its
dependency on courts for its interpretation and application.650 It is the intention ofPart
647 Footnote No. 404, at page 53
648 ibid
649 Article 11(1) of the New York Convention
650 Born (2001: 30): "The Model Law represents a significant further step, beyond the New York
Convention, towards the development of a predictable international legal framework for commercial
arbitration. Like the New York Convention, the Model Law's efficacy is ultimately dependent upon its
interpretation and application by national courts. But the law goes beyond the Convention by prescribing
in significantly greater detail the legal framework for international arbitration, by clarifying points of
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two of this Thesis to discuss the extent to which the process of international commercial
arbitration requires support from the judicial system.




COURT INTERVENTION IN THE ARBITRATION PROCESS AND AFTER THE
MAKING OF AN AWARD
CHAPTER FIVE
AN ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S INTERVENTION IN THE ARBITRATION
PROCESS BEFORE THE APPOINTMENT OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL AND
DURING THE COURSE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Introduction
Part two of this study is composed of two chapters that discuss court intervention in two
different aspects. These are, the supportive and supervisory role of the courts in the
arbitration process, and after the award is made, respectively. This chapter deals with the
extent to which a court is permitted to intervene in the arbitration process. Chapter six
looks at the supervisory role651 of the court and the extent to which it may react to an
arbitral award. The last chapter ofpart one of this Thesis has shown how each country's
legal system that supports the process of international commercial arbitration provides
distinct benchmarks on matters that may be subjected to the process of arbitration within
its borders. It also showed how an arbitral tribunal is also permitted to investigate the
extent of its jurisdiction. The delimitation that is done by a country describing where the
process of arbitration ends and where the court process begins provides essential
guidance to the process of arbitration. This chapter shows how courts ensure that the set
boundaries are maintained and enforced.
The aim of this chapter is to show how a court is able to assist the process of arbitration
before an arbitral tribunal takes charge of the arbitration and during the course of the
arbitration proceedings without usurping or interfering in the work of an arbitral tribunal.
651 Footnote No. 639, page 425: "The Court does not have a general supervisory jurisdiction over
arbitrations."
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The study takes cognizance of the fact that the parties appoint an arbitral tribunal to deal
f.c'y
with the issues in dispute between them. Consequently, as will be seen in this part of
the study, the court intervention that arises relates only to the attacks on an arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction; its conduct of the arbitration; questions of law and; the need for
the enforcement of the award. The study describes the instances when court assistance in
the arbitration process may be inevitable. This chapter will analyze judicial intervention
from the perspective of what Article 5 of the Model Law and Section 1 (c) of the English
Act permit. The study will show that court intervention permitted by Article 5 of the
Model Law unlike that which is permitted by Section 1(c) of the English Act, tends to be
restrictive in nature. Under both instruments under study however, intervention is limited
to specific instances. The chapter highlights the ancillary role of courts to the process of
international commercial arbitration.653 The role of the court654 in this study is to
intervene in the arbitration process for purposes ofproviding assistance to the extent
necessary.
The first section will essentially look at the basis of court intervention in the arbitration
process that is permitted by the Model Law as well as the English Act. It will further
look at how Article 5 has been adopted in some Model Law countries. The second
section will deal with the instances of court intervention in international commercial
arbitration before the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. This section will discuss the
extent of court intervention at this stage of the arbitration process and further show
whether the intervention is sufficient.655 The third section will deal with the levels of
court intervention during the arbitration process. The discussion will highlight the
effectiveness of court intervention at this stage of the arbitration proceedings and its
effect on the arbitration process, and on the parties' autonomy as well as on the arbitral
652 Footnote No. 19, page 96: "... Parties who submit their disputes to arbitration bind themselves by
agreement, to honour the arbitrators' award on the facts..."
653
Glidepath BV & others v. Thompson and others [2005] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 549 at page 551: "..the
intervention of the court in relation to arbitration is a judicial facility ancillary to the arbitral process..."
654 Park (2006: 11): "... court scrutiny exists to promote the integrity ofarbitration by ensuring that
arbitrators follow a modicum ofprocedural fairness and remain within the limits of their mission."
655 Footnote No. 259, paragraphs 16-17: One of the purposes of the Model Law was "the liberalisation of
international commercial arbitration by limiting the role ofmunicipal courts, and by giving effect to the
doctrine of'autonomy of the will,'..."
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tribunal. The fourth section will discuss some of the areas that are not regulated by the
Model Law such as interest and costs.
I THE BASIS OF COURT INTERVENTION UNDER THE MODEL LAW AND
THE ENGLISH ACT
Court intervention under the Model Law and the English Act, stem from Article 5656 and
Section 1(c) respectively. These provisions permit courts to intervene in the process of
arbitration. Article 5 of the Model Law states that:
"In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in
this Law. "657
Section 1 (c) of the English Act is framed in similar terms as Article 5 of the Model Law
as follows:
"Theprovisions of this Part are founded on thefollowingprinciples, and shall be
construed accordingly- (c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not
intervene except asprovided by this Part. "65S
Court intervention that is permitted by Article 5 of the Model Law659 that is the subject of
discussion in this chapter is established by Articles 8, 9, 11(3), (4) & (5), 13(3), 14(1),
16(3), 17 novies, 17 decies, 17 undecies and 27.660 The English Act also permits court
intervention under the following provisions amongst others: Sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
17(3) & (4), 18(2), (4) & (5), 19, 21(5) & (6), 24, 25, 28, 31(5), 32, 40(2)(b), 42, 43, 44,
45, 50, 56 and, 63(4) & (5). Almost half of the permitted court intervention under the
English Act is mandatory661 and does not, like the court intervention under the Model
Law, leave the parties with any choice on how to deal with a matter that falls under a said
provision. The whole thrust of these provisions however, is to ensure that courts respect
656Footnote No. 92, paragraph 16: ".. .Article 5, which by itself does not take a stand on what is the
appropriate role of the courts but guarantees the reader and user that he will find all instances of possible
court intervention in this Law, except for matters not regulated by it..."
657 Article 5 of the Model Law
658 Section 1 (c) of the English Act
659 Footnote No. 652, paragraph 63
660 Article 6 of the Model Law
661 Schedule 1 of the English Act
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the arbitration process and only intervene for purposes of ensuring that the arbitration
process remains on course.662 The need for court intervention was summed up in the
Coppee Lavalin66i case, where the court stated inter alia that:
"Harmonisation recognises thatparticipation by the court, however unwelcome in
theory, is in certain situations inevitable, "664
Whilst Article 5 of the Model Law is restrictive ("no court shall intervene"), Section 1(c)
of the English Act ( "the court should not intervene ") is aimed at minimizing court
intervention as much as may be reasonably possible.665 In both instruments, recourse to
court tends to be subjective in the sense that it may only be accessible at the instance of a
party or a tribunal and only in cases where such intervention is permitted. The proviso of
'except where provided' sets the maximum limits of court intervention that are available
in both instruments under study. The English Act unlike the Model Law makes court
intervention in some instances mandatory.666 Both instruments however only permit
court intervention in the arbitration process essentially for purposes of supporting the
arbitration process and not hijacking or displacing it.667 In this way the intervention is
available, but at a controlled level.
The Model Law uses time limits as a tool to prevent court intervention in some
instances.669 These limits tend to have closed ends, thus ensuring that the arbitration
proceedings remain on course. The downside of having strict time limits when seeking
recourse to court is in the event of unforeseen circumstances that may prevent a party
from meeting the set deadlines. The English Act670 somewhat takes unforeseen
circumstances into consideration through its lax approach to time within which a party
may seek a court remedy. For instance, in cases where the parties set a time limit in their
662 Redfern (2004: 329): "... the Model Law cannot exclude,... the participation of... the 'competent
court' in carrying out 'certain functions of arbitration assistance and supervision'."
663 Footnote No. 404, page 52
664 ibid
665 Mustill (2001: 28): "... The court is not absolutely barred from intervening in situations 'governed by'
the Act. Instead of'shall not intervene,' as in Article 5, there is found 'should not intervene.'..."
666 Schedule I of the English Act
667 Footnote No. 18, paragraph 22
668 Sukuman Ltd v. Commonwealth Secretariat [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 621, at page 628
669 Article 8, 1 l(3)(a) & 16(3) of the Model Law
670 Sections 12(3), 50(3), and 79(3) of the English Act
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arbitration agreement within which the arbitration proceedings are to be commenced, the
English Act makes available a mandatory provision to extend the said time limit if
requested to do so by a party with cogent reasons.671
In the Lesotho Highlands672 case, the court stated that the major purpose of the English
Act was to drastically reduce the extent of court intervention in the process of
arbitration.673 It may be argued that the fact that a party is able to seek an extension of
the time limits provided in the arbitration agreement, under the English Act,674 works to
the detriment ofparty autonomy as the court is able to overrule the parties in this regard.
Such type of court intervention though helpful to a party in unforeseen circumstances,
may be open to abuse by a party wishing to delay the arbitration proceedings whose
chances of success in the case seem slim. Article 5 of the Model Law on the other hand
restricts party autonomy in a positive manner through set time limits, and thus prevents a
delay in the arbitration proceedings. This enables the arbitral tribunal to get on with its
task of resolving the disputes between the parties.675
Parties that choose international commercial arbitration as a form of settling their
disputes are inclined to feel more comfortable in an atmosphere that has a defined system
of court recourse that is expressly restricted to the barest minimum. The intervention
provided by Article 5 of the Model Law is essentially positive in that it is available to the
parties and the tribunal and may be accessed when required. The fact that the English
Act makes court intervention in some instances mandatory may be interpreted as being
restrictive to party autonomy.676 Whereas under the Model Law the parties may access
court intervention if they wish to, the English Act obliges such intervention where the
Act provides for it as a mandatory provision.677
671 ibid, Section 12
672 Footnote No. 68, page 278
673 ibid"... courts nowadays generally only intervene in order to support rather than displace the arbitral
process..."
674 Section 79(1) of the English Act: "Unless the parties otherwise agree, the court may by order extend any
time limit agreed by them in relation to any matter relating to the arbitral proceedings..."
675 Binder (2005: 54): "Article 5 can be seen as a provision useful in helping to secure the Model Law's
freedom from disruptive court interference."
676 Section 12(1) of the English Act
677 Footnote No. 557
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1.1 The Adoption of Article 5 of the Model Law in Model Law Countries
The positive impact of the Model Law on the process of arbitration has seen the number
of countries adopting the Model Law rise tremendously. In twenty-two years since its
inception, it has seen close to fifty countries adopting it with Hong Kong having been one
of the first common law countries to adopt the Model Law in 1989. This part of the study
is devoted to analysing the stand that some Model Law countries have taken on court
recourse. By adopting Article 5, Model Law countries have ensured that they uphold the
• • • • 678 • 679
original objectives of the Model Law by promoting party autonomy and ensuring
that court680 intervention is kept to the barest minimum. The discussion will show that
the level of court intervention herein is dependent on the policies that each government
holds in relation to international commercial arbitration as a form of dispute settlement.
The Model Law has provided a solid foundation in the field of international commercial
arbitration, as there is now a defined legal framework that forms the foundation for the
uniform character of international commercial arbitration. This uniformity characteristic
of the Model Law is what attracts countries that have not adopted the Model Law to
consider doing so. South Africa is one country that is currently contemplating adopting
ZTOI
the Model Law and in so doing will join countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia that
have already adopted the Model Law in that region.
Article 5 has in some countries been adopted in whole whilst in other countries it has
been modified somewhat.682 Countries that have adopted Article 5 verbatim include
Scotland,683 Thailand684 and Germany.685 Other countries have adopted Article 5 but
either re-phrased it or re-emphasized the type of court intervention that is permitted
678 Sanders (2005: 443): "The Model Law was conceived for International Commercial Arbitration
679 Davidson (1991: 12)
680 Footnote No. 196, paragraph 70: The Working Group feared that Article 5 would have an adverse effect
on the positive and helpful attitude of the court.
681 Arbitration Act of 1996 (No. 6)
682 Footnote No. 203, Article 5, paragraph 4.
683 Footnote No. 7, Article 5
684 Thailand Arbitration Act of 2002
685 The New German Arbitration Act of 1998
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within their borders. The New Austrian Arbitration Law686 chose to re-phrase Article 5
as follows:
"The Court may only become active in matters governed by this chapter if it is so
provided in this chapter. "687
The Californian Arbitration Act that is similar to the arbitration law in Texas and Oregon
688
adopted the Model Law and extended the law that is applicable to Article 5 to include
the 'applicable federal law'. The said Article 5 of the Californian Arbitration Act reads
as follows:
"In matters governed by this title, no court shall intervene except where so provided in
this title, or applicablefederal law. "689
Article 5 as adopted in British Columbia places stringent restrictions on court
intervention in the arbitration process under its Section 5(b). It completely closes the
door and bolts it against wider court intervention in an arbitral tribunal's orders, rulings
or arbitral award.690 Section 27(2) of the British Columbia Act opens the doors sealed by
Section 5(b) by giving power to the court to consolidate related arbitration proceedings
and to add third parties on its own terms. This provision may be portrayed as limiting the
parties' autonomy as the parties may not always have much say in the inclusion of other
parties in their arbitration and in the choice of an arbitral tribunal to resolve the matters in
the consolidated arbitration as the ultimate decision lies with the court.691 Ireland's
adoption of the Model Law supports the limitations on the scope of court intervention in
the arbitration process as permitted by the Model Law. Ireland alludes to the principle
that "a jurisdiction is not conducive to arbitration if it permits repeated forays to the
courts basically to appeal issues of law that arise during the course of the arbitration."692
686 Footnote No. 9
687 ibid, Article 578
688 Born (2001:40)
689 Section 1297.51 of the Californian Arbitration Act
690 International Commercial Arbitration (RSBC 1996) Chapter 233: "5(b) no arbitral proceedings of an
arbitral tribunal or an order, ruling or arbitral award made by an arbitral tribunal shall be questioned,
reviewed ... or otherwise except to the extent provided in this Act."




Germany has adopted the Model Law almost to the letter with minor differences. Those
relevant to this discussion include the court's power to constitute the tribunal if a party is
disadvantaged by the nomination process contained in the arbitration agreement and the
parties' right to have arbitral interim relief enforced by the courts.693 The New German
Act permits court intervention for purposes of determining the admissibility of an
arbitration agreement prior to the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.694 The LR(MP)(S)
Act sums up the functions of the court as made up of "arbitration assistance, supervision
and enforcement. "69S
1.1 (i) The Impact of the Restrictive Nature of Article 5 of the Model Law on
Arbitration
This part of the study is aimed at showing how the restrictive nature ofArticle 5 of the
Model Law impacts on arbitration. It will identify some of the areas that are not
regulated by Article 5. It will further show that court intervention as enshrined in Article
5 may be interpreted to be restrictive in the sense that it does not provide any court
recourse in situations where the parties wish to challenge issues such as 'interest, costs,
fees and the liabilities of arbitrators.'696 Pieter Sanders has shown support of this position
in the following terms:
'The Model Law does not deal with fees and costs in arbitration but the issue, whether
the Model Law should deal with court control on utterly unreasonablefees ofthe arbitral
tribunal, has been left open. In my opinion, fees and costs as such is a topicfor
arbitration rules... "697
Scotland698 being one of the countries that has adopted Article 5 verbatim also does not
provide for court intervention in issues relating to interest, cost, fees and the liability of
arbitrators. These issues are instead addressed by the Scottish Common Law system and
by precedents. Parties that choose Scotland as their seat of arbitration and wish to seek
693
Berger (2000: 16)
694 Footnote No. 685, Section 1032(2)
695 Footnote No. 7, Article 6
696 Mustill (2001:29)
697 Sanders (2005: 473)
698 Footnote No. 7, Article 66(2)
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court recourse in these areas may apart from choosing to have their arbitration
proceedings governed by a set of arbitration rules, in addition also adopt the Scottish
Arbitration Code that provides for court intervention in issues pertaining to fees,
expenses or costs.699
Although the Model Law does not regulate the above stated issues, a party may still seek
a court remedy under Article 34(2)(iv) of the Model Law. Article 34(2)(iv) permits court
recourse against an arbitral award where a party has ground to prove that "the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties."700 The fact that a
party has an issue with the costs, fees, interest, or believes that an arbitral tribunal is
liable may amount to sufficient ground to seek court protection under Article 34(2)(iv).
The only problem is that such recourse may only be accessed after an award is made.
The Model Law does not therefore provide any court recourse in this area during the
course of the arbitration proceedings. This therefore shows that it was never the intention
of the Model Law to provide court intervention during the course of the arbitration
proceedings to challenge the fees, costs, interest or the liability of the arbitrators.
The rules of arbitration such as those of the ICC have a scale that may be used to
calculate the administrative costs of the arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal's fees and
expenses.701 The Court fixes the costs of the arbitration and the arbitral tribunal
709
determines how the costs are to be borne. The ICC Rules further exempt an arbitral
tribunal for its acts or omissions relating to the arbitration.703 The UNCITRAL Rules
gives power to an arbitral tribunal to calculate the costs of the arbitration.704 The
UNCITRAL Rules like the ICC Rules also exempt an arbitral tribunal from liability for
acts or omissions connected to the arbitration "save where the act or omission is shown
699 Articles 8.3 and 24 of The Scottish Arbitration Code
700 Article 34(2)(iv) of the Model Law
701 Article 31(1) as read together with Article 4(1) of Appendix III of the ICC Rules
702 Article 2(6) ofAppendix III of the ICC Rules
703 Article 34 of the ICC Rules
704 Footnote No. 411
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by thatparty to constitute conscious and deliberate wrongdoing committed by the body
orperson alleged to be liable to thatparty. "705
Another issue that is worth mentioning here is that Article 16 of the Model Law does not
make an express reference to the question of arbitrability706 in the same terms as Article
34. However the competence of an arbitral tribunal to decide whether it may settle an
issue by arbitration may include a determination of objective arbitrability. Objective
arbitrabilitymay therefore be raised under Article 16 as well as under Article 34 of the
Model Law. An inference may therefore be drawn that it was the intention of the
draftsmen of the Model Law to permit court intervention based on the question of
arbitrability during the course of the arbitration proceedings and after the arbitral award
was made.
It is clear that Article 5 does not regulate arbitrability, fees, costs, issues relating to
interest and the liability of arbitrators. The English Act however has a mandatory
provision that regulates court intervention in issues relating to the arbitral tribunal's fees
and expenses.707 The discussion so far in this chapter shows that the English Act is more
daring in permitting court intervention as compared to the Model Law. The Model Law
tends to be more restrictive thus promoting party autonomy.
II COURT INTERVENTION BEFORE THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
This section discusses the court intervention that is permitted in the arbitration process
before the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. Court intervention at this stage of the
arbitration is necessary as it protects each party's interest in the dispute and ensures that
the dispute is resolved in accordance with the parties' agreed method of dispute
resolution. Any court intervention at this stage of the proceedings has to be applied for
705 Article 31(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules
706 Tweeddale (2005: 108)
707 Sections 28 and 56(1) of the English Act
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by a party. This study discusses three instances when parties may seek court intervention
before the appointment of an arbitral tribunal, which are:
1. Court intervention for purposes of having the arbitration agreement recognized
and enforced.
2. Court intervention in the appointment of an arbitral tribunal
3. Seeking court intervention in order to maintain the status quo or preserve
evidence through interim measures ofprotection.
11.1 Court Intervention in the Recognition of an Arbitration Agreement
Parties that enter into an arbitration agreement are expected to honour their part of the
bargain. The parties' recognition of their arbitration agreement is fundamental to the
process of international commercial arbitration as the agreement forms the basis upon
which the resolution of their disputes is founded. A party may however for various
reasons choose not to give the arbitration agreement any recognition. In such a situation,
a party who feels that the other party has failed to meet his part of the bargain may
choose to seek court remedy and disregard the arbitration agreement
The Model Law and the English Act have set procedures that a party wishing to
challenge court proceedings that he institutes in lieu of the arbitration agreement ought to
follow. Article 8 of the Model Law and Section 9 of the English Act are both instructive
here. Article 8 of the Model Law states as follows:
"
(1) A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject ofan
arbitration agreement shall, ifaparty so requests not later than when submitting hisfirst
statement on the substance ofthe dispute, refer theparties to arbitration unless itfinds
that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable ofbeingperformed.
(2) Where an action referred to in paragraph (1) ofthis article has been brought, arbitral
proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be made,
while the issue is pending before the court. "70S
708 Article 8 of the Model Law
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This article was designed to also hold parties709 to their bargain and send them to
arbitration on condition that there was a valid arbitration agreement in place.710 A party
that wishes to seek the protection of Article 8(1) must satisfy three prerequisites. Firstly,
the party must establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Secondly, the
party must prove that a dispute exists between the parties, which dispute falls within the
scope of the arbitration agreement. Thirdly, the application before the court for a stay of
proceedings must be made within the prescribed time frame. If a party making the
application fails to establish these prerequisites before the court, then the court711 may not
be able to grant the application as prayed.
Section 9 provides a mandatory obligation on a court to stay legal proceedings that relate
to a claim that is the subject of an arbitration agreement.712 In order for a court to
entertain an application for a stay however, an acknowledgement of receipt of the claim
before the court must be filed. Article 8 of the Model Law permits a court to entertain an
application for a stay of legal proceedings where one party has already set the wheels in
motion for arbitration and the other party commences legal proceedings whilst the
arbitration proceedings are already underway. Since Article 8 and Section 9 are non-
territorial in nature, a party is able to challenge the commencement of legal proceedings
in lieu of arbitration in any court where the legal proceedings will have been instituted.
In this way, a party is able to get immediate redress from the court and may therefore
have the dispute referred to arbitration. Article 8 is given its non-territorial nature by
Article 1(2) of the Model Law which, states that:
"Theprovisions ofthis Law, except articles 8, 9, 17 novies, 17 decies, 17 undecies, 35
and 36, apply only iftheplace ofarbitration is in the territory ofthis State. "7I3
709 Footnote No. 628
710 Alvarez (2003: 55)
711 ATM Computer GmbH v. DY 4 Systems Inc. [1995] O.J. No. 1678; CLOUT: Referral to arbitration
pursuant to Model Law Article 8 requires commencement of an action in the relevant jurisdiction.
712 Section 9 of the English Act: "(1) A party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceedings
are brought (whether by way of claim or counterclaim) in respect of a matter which under the agreement is
to be referred to arbitration may (upon notice to the other parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in
which the proceedings have been brought to stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter..."
713 A/CN.9/592, paragraph 45 "..adopted in substance by the Working Group."
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The need for a valid arbitration agreement is fundamental and is the ground upon which
an application for a stay of legal proceedings is based. The validity of an arbitration
agreement is determined pursuant to the law governing the arbitration agreement. When
the validity of the arbitration agreement is established, a court may grant an order for the
stay of the legal proceedings. In the case of Cecrop Co. v. Kinetic Sciences Inc.,114 the
court held that it was a requirement of Article 8 of the Model Law to grant a stay of court
proceedings if its prerequisites were met subject to a finding that the arbitration
agreement was null and void, inoperative or incapable ofbeing performed. In the case of
International Resource Management (Canada) Ltd v. Kappa Energy (Yemen) Inc.715 the
Court ofAppeal granted an unconditional stay of court proceedings and paved the way
for the parties to proceed with the arbitration process.
Article II (3) of the New York Convention, unlike the above stated provisions, is
71 fi
territorial in nature. If the parties' chosen seat of arbitration has acceded to the New
York Convention, then a party may have the option of requesting the court to send the
matter before it to arbitration pursuant to Article II (3).717 If the other party brings to the
attention of the court that there is in fact an arbitration agreement in place, the court may
stay the proceedings and send the parties to arbitrate.
A court may only decline to give recognition to the arbitration agreement if the
agreement is invalid. In such a case, the dispute may fall under the jurisdiction of the
court, as the issues in dispute may not be arbitrable. A distinction may be drawn between
a court declaring an arbitration agreement and a contract invalid. Whilst the declaration
of a nullity of the arbitration agreement enables the court to litigate the dispute, the
nullity of a contract encompassing an arbitration agreement does not nullify the
arbitration agreement. In the case of AMB Generli HoldingAG v. SEB Trygg Liv
Holding1% the court held inter alia that the 'arbitralproceedings were not a nullity by
714 [2001], 16 B.L.R. (3d) 15 : CLOUT
715 (2001) 92 Alberta Law Reports (3d)25
716 Footnote No. 527
717 Lew (2003: 362)
718
[2006] 1 Lloyd's Law Report 318 at page 323
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reason oftheir having been commenced in the name ofa company that no longer
existed. '719
A court may in cases where liability is accepted not grant a stay ofproceedings as there
may no longer be a dispute between the parties. In the case ofMethanex New Zealand
790
Ltd v. Fontaine Navigation S.A the court found among other things that there was no
basis to stay the court proceedings pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Model Law, as the
defendant never denied liability. The failure to establish the validity of an arbitration
agreement gives a court jurisdiction to determine the issues in dispute between the parties
and may also dismiss the application for a stay. In the case ofSimmonds Capital Ltd v.
Eurocom International Ltd,121 the court held that the plaintiffs claims relating to the
Trademark Act and Copyright Act did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause in
the license agreement because they were independent of the agreement.722
Unlike Article 11(3) of the New York Convention, Article 8 of the Model Law and
Section 9 of the English Act recognize the time within which a party may bring the
information of the existence of the arbitration agreement to the attention of the court to be
of the essence. In the case ofNutrasweet Kelco Co. v. Royal-Sweet International
Technologies Ltd. Partnership723 the court stated that Royal-Sweet had failed to respect
the set time limits for making an application to stay proceedings. Article 8 requires that
the step of informing the court of the existence of the arbitration agreement be done "not
later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute.. " Section 9
on the other hand requires an acknowledgment of receipt of the legal action to be filed
before the respondent may apply for a stay of the proceedings.
The New York Convention however, does not provide for any time limit within which to
take steps to stay legal proceedings. This is a disparity that needs to be resolved. There
is need for the time frames to be resolved in order to prevent parties from sitting on their
720
[1998] 142 F.T.R. 81;CLOUT
721 [1998], 144 F.T.R. 230; 81 C.P.R. (3d) 349
722 Alvarez (2003: 80)
723
[1998] B.C.J. No. 557; 49; 49 B.C.L.R. (3d) 115; CLOUT
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rights whilst claiming protection from Article 11(3). A party may easily take advantage of
Article 11(3) if he forgets to object within the time frame provided above. Article 11(3) of
the Convention when read together with Article 8 of the Model Law may not permit a
party to ignore the time within which to object to the legal proceedings. In this way it
can be stated that these two articles sit side by side. A court that is obliged to refer the
parties to arbitration subject to it establishing that the issue that is raised before it is the
subject of an arbitration agreement will be the court in the country where the legal
724
proceedings are commenced. The court's obligation is subject to a request for stay of
legal proceedings being made by the respondent. Such a court may be at the seat of the
arbitration or in the country where the party that does not recognize the arbitration
agreement is domiciled.
11.2 Court Intervention in the Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal
National courts have an important role to play in the composition of the tribunal, either as
a fall back appointing authority or when the mandate of an arbitrator ends prematurely.
The former situation that is covered in this section of the study arises when parties fail to
agree on the arbitrator or where the prescribed appointment mechanism does not work.
The court may be requested by the parties to an arbitration agreement to intervene in the
appointment of an arbitral tribunal either before the arbitral tribunal takes control of the
arbitration proceedings or during the course of the arbitration proceedings.
The Model Law under Article 11(3) provides for the parties to determine the appointment
procedure of its arbitral tribunal. The court's intervention only becomes applicable after
the parties fail to agree on a procedure for appointment. In approximately ninety nine out
of one hundred times, a party will access Article 11(3) or (4) before the commencement
of the arbitration proceedings. The English Act, like the Model Law, also permits a court
to appoint an arbitral tribunal when the parties fail to do so.725 The appointment of an
724 West Tankers Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta "The Front Comor" [2005] 2 Lloyd's Law
Reports 257 at page 269: .. .this provision identifies the duty which rests on the court seised of court
proceedings to stay those proceedings and to refer the parties to arbitration,.."
725 Section 18(3)(d) of the English Act: "Those powers are to make the necessary appointment itself."
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arbitral tribunal that is made by the court under the Model Law cannot be challenged in a
higher court in the form of an appeal.726 The English Act however permits an appeal, but
with leave.727
The intervention by the court in the arbitration before the tribunal takes control of the
arbitration has to be provided for by the parties. The parties may however in some cases
choose to be governed by rules of arbitration that may not provide for a court to appoint a
tribunal when the parties fail to do so. For instance, in the case ofMicrotec Securi-TInc.
v. Quebec National and International Commercial Arbitration Centre (CACNIQ)728 the
court refused to intervene in the appointment of the arbitral tribunal when the parties
failed to agree, as the CACNIQ arbitration rules had its own appointment procedure
which could be used in the event of a lack of agreement by the parties. The CACNIQ
arbitration rules in essence excluded court intervention in the appointment process of the
arbitrators. It is therefore essential that the parties be held to their contract.729
In cases where the arbitration agreement provides for a court to intervene when parties
fail to agree on the appointment of an arbitral tribunal, the success of the application is
dependent on the grounds that are raised in support of the application. A court may
therefore refuse an application if the grounds raised are not cogent. For example, in Case
number 557,730 "the court rejected the claimant's request to appoint an arbitration tribunal
and declared the arbitration proceedings inadmissible. Since the arbitration clause did
not specify which of the two chambers of handicraft was chosen, it was impossible to
determine the competent tribunal. The court thus declared the arbitration agreement void
for uncertainty, irrespective of the fact that neither of the two chambers was actually
engaged in arbitration or even willing to appoint an arbitrator."731
726 Article 11 (2) - (5) of the Model Law: "(2) The parties are free to agree on a procedure of appointing the
arbitrator.. ..(3) Failing such agreement,... (5) A decision on a matter entrusted by paragraph (3) or (4) of
this article to the court....shall be subject to no appeal...."
727 Footnote No. 47
728
[2003] Quebec Judgements No. 2918 (Lexis)




11.3 Court Intervention Sought for Purposes of Interim Relief
Court intervention may be sought before an arbitral tribunal takes charge of the
arbitration in order to maintain the status quo or during the course of the arbitration
proceedings. An order in this respect may be sought by a party from the court to prevent
evidence from being tampered with. Article 9 of the Model Law permits a party to
request the court to intervene in the arbitration process for purposes ofpreserving
evidence and maintaining the status quo. This is a non-territorial provision that may be
made in a court located in the country where the preservation of evidence is required. An
application of this nature may be made under the Model Law before an arbitral tribunal is
appointed or during the course of the arbitration proceedings. Article 9 states that:
"It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreementfor aparty to request, before or
during arbitralproceedings, from a court an interim measure ofprotection andfor a
court to grant such measure. "732
The English Act also permits a court to entertain an application for interim relief relating
to issues that are the subject of an arbitration agreement when the arbitral tribunal has got
no power to act.733 Court intervention may be accessed before the arbitral tribunal takes
charge of the arbitration or during the course of the arbitration proceedings.734 It may
however only be available to a party if the tribunal has got no power to make the order
for interim measure ofprotection.
Under the English Act court intervention before an arbitral tribunal takes control of the
arbitration process is not only at the request of the parties, but is also mandatory in some
instances. For instance the Act imposes a mandatory obligation on the courts to stay
proceedings in a matter that is brought before it that is the subject of arbitration.736 The
fact that these provisions are non-territorial enables a party to obtain immediate relief
from a court in the country where the evidence he wishes to preserve is and not
necessarily at the seat of the arbitration. These are useful provisions that give protection
732 Article 9 of the Model Law
733 Section 44(5) of the English Act
734 ibid, Section 44(1 )-(4)
735 Footnote No. 87
736
op cit, Section 10(1)
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to a party that strongly suspects the other of wanting to dispose of evidence. The
usefulness of the provisions is not only evidenced by the non-territorial nature of the
provisions, but also because a party may urgently access them through exparte
applications. In this way a party is able to obtain immediate interim relief that is easily
enforceable in the country where the evidence is located. In the case of Cetelem SA v.
Roust Holdings Limited,737 Lord Justice Clarke stated that:
"The whole purpose ofgiving the courtpower to make such orders is to assist the
arbitralprocess in cases ofurgency before there is an arbitration on foot... where the
court is called upon to exercise the power, it must take great care not to usurp the
arbitralprocess. "738
Courts may not usually involve themselves in matters relating to arbitration proceedings
except where provided and only when requested to do so by a party.739 Such involvement
however may not be extended to the substantive issues in a dispute that are dealt with by
a tribunal. The assistance that the court offers the process of international commercial
arbitration before an arbitral tribunal takes control of the arbitration is progressive as it
prevents the tampering of evidence. A court is able with its coercive powers to ensure
that the status quo is maintained and interim relief is available to a party. The court
therefore assists in holding parties to their bargain before an arbitral tribunal takes charge
of the arbitration. But as already stated, the court's assistance can not extend to resolving
the substantive issues in a dispute between the parties as that is the responsibility of the
arbitral tribunal.
Ill COURT INTERVENTION DURING THE COURSE OF THE ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS
During the course of the arbitration proceedings, the arbitral tribunal is in charge of the
arbitration. The Model Law and the English Act both permit parties to seek recourse
from a court in specific circumstances. The instances when recourse to court is available
737 [2005] 2 Lloyd's Law Report 494
738 ibid, page 506
739 Footnote No. 136
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at this stage of the arbitration proceedings, is when a party wishes to attack an arbitral
tribunal directly and when seeking an interim measure ofprotection. This study will
discuss the following issues that may lead to court intervention at this stage of the
arbitration proceedings. These are:
• Personal and procedural objections against an arbitral tribunal;
• Jurisdictional challenges against an arbitral tribunal;
• Interim Measures of Protection, and;
• Assistance in Taking Evidence.
111.1 Personal and Procedural Objections Against an Arbitral Tribunal
A party may seek to remove an arbitrator who does not meet the set standards required of
an arbitrator in a particular arbitration. Each arbitrator owes the parties a fundamental
obligation to make a statement of disclosure that must be given to the parties before the
arbitrator can accept an appointment. The disclosure may inter alia, include the
qualifications that the arbitrator possesses. Having provided the statement of disclosure,
any party may object if fresh information leads to a doubt as to an arbitrator's capacity to
continue to serve as an arbitrator. The Model Law provides the arbitral tribunal itself as
the first port of call under such circumstances. It places a qualification on the extent to
which a party that has participated in the appointment of an arbitrator may go in
challenging its own arbitrator in court. The said party may only raise grounds that come
to his attention after the appointment of the arbitrator is made.740 The Model Law gives a
party the power to seek court protection where any of the permitted grounds are
established.741 However only after an arbitral tribunal has dealt with an objection falling
under this heading may a party resort to court action.
740 Article 12(2) of the Model Law
741 ibid, Article 13(3): "If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by the parties or under the
procedure of paragraph (2) of this article is not successful, the challenging party may request, within thirty
days after having received notice of the decision rejecting the challenge, the court or other authority
specified in article 6 to decide on the challenge, which decision shall be subject to no appeal, while such a
request is pending, the arbitral tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator, may continue the arbitral
proceedings and make an award."
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It is therefore necessary that disclosure is done by each arbitrator at the beginning of the
arbitration process and as necessary as the case progresses, in order to limit challenges
under this head. The Model Law shows that once an arbitrator is appointed, he remains
as such until he is removed or he dies.742 Consequently, the challenged arbitrator still
possesses the mandate to deal with the dispute between the parties whilst he is being
challenged in court, thus recognizing the continuity of an arbitrator's mandate.743
The English Act identifies four grounds that may lead to the removal of an arbitrator by
the court under Section 24(1) as follows:
"(1) A party to arbitralproceedings may (upon notice to the otherparties, to the
arbitrator concerned and to any other arbitrator) apply to the court to remove an
arbitrator on any ofthefollowing grounds-
(a) that circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality;
(b) that he does notpossess the qualifications required by the arbitration agreement;
(c) that he is physically or mentally incapable ofconducting the proceedings or there
are justifiable doubts as to his capacity to do so;
(d) that he has refused orfailed-
(i) properly to conduct the proceedings, or
(ii) to use all reasonable despatch in conducting the proceedings or making an
award,
and that substantial injustice has been or will be caused to the applicant. "744
An arbitral tribunal is therefore duty bound to ensure that he declares to the parties any
issues that may lead to any doubts as to his impartiality,745 his qualifications, his mental
and physical capability, or his inability to function. In cases where any of the grounds
referred to above are established by a court at the seat of the arbitration, the mandate of
the arbitrator terminates immediately.
Under Article 14(1) of the Model Law, a party may request a court at the seat of the
arbitration to remove an arbitrator who becomes "de jure or defacto unable to perform
his functions". Whilst Article 13(3) of the Model Law permits an arbitral tribunal to
742 Section 26(1) of the English Act
743 ibid, Section 24(3)
744 ibid, Section 24(1)
745 ibid
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continue with its work as the objection is pending in court, Article 14(1) does not give
power to an arbitral tribunal to continue with its work whilst the matter is in court.
Article 14(1) covers a situation where a party goes straight to court to seek the
termination of an arbitrator's mandate. In such a case where the arbitrator is not given a
chance to determine the challenge, it cannot continue with its work until after the
outcome of the court case. The way that the arbitral tribunal handles an application under
Article 14(1) is the same way that it would react if one of its members was reported to be
unwell and consequently failed to attend the arbitration proceedings. In such a case, the
arbitration proceedings may not proceed.
The termination of the mandate of an arbitrator may lead to the appointment of a
substitute arbitrator.746 In this case, the parties may wish to use the same method that
they used to appoint the other arbitrator whose mandate will have come to an end.
Article 11 (3)(a) has got a time frame of thirty day within which an arbitrator must be
appointed. It is however silent on the repercussions of failing to meet the said dead line.
The idea ofputting a deadline acts as a safeguard against any delay to the arbitration
proceedings.
Unlike the Model Law that is silent on the question of costs of the arbitration and the
tribunal's fees and expenses, the English Act may hold the parties "jointly and severally
liable"747 for the non-payment of the tribunal's fees. In instances when the tribunal does
not determine the recoverable costs of the arbitration, any party may seek the court's
intervention in this matter.748 The English Act contains a further mandatory provision
that gives power to an arbitral tribunal to withhold an award in cases where the parties
fail to pay its fees.749 A party may in such a case seek recourse from a court in such
circumstances and the decision of the court may only be appealed against with leave.750
Unlike the Model Law that does not provide for appeal once court recourse is sought, the
746 Article 15 of the Model Law
747 Section 28(1) of the English Act
748 ibid, Section 63(4) & (5)
749 ibid, Section 56 (1) & (2)
750 ibid, Section 56(7)
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English Act permits appeals but with leave. The need for leave is an evidence of the
English court's reluctance to intervene in the arbitration process.
The case ofAT & T Corporation and another v. Saudi Cable75' is an example of a matter
that went up to the House of Lords on appeal. In contrast to the English Act that permits
appeals, the Model Law encourages progress of the arbitration proceedings at this stage
of the arbitration by prescribing a time frame within which an arbitratormay be
appointed and by not permitting any court appeals during the course of the arbitration
proceedings. Whilst the English Act tends to provide mandatory provisions for court
intervention, the Model Law permits court intervention as a default mechanism where the
parties fail to agree on a procedure for challenge.
Whilst a court may not determine a question of fact752 it may, when requested, intervene
for purposes of determining a question of law arising in the course of the arbitration
proceedings under the English Act.753 In the case of Taylor WoodrowHoldings Ltd and
another v. Barnes & Elliot Ltd,754 the court held that:
"(1) Once the threshold criteria set out in s 45 were satisfied (namely (a) that the
question arose out ofarbitralproceedings, (b) that the question of law substantially
affected the rights ofthe parties, and (c) the requirements ofs 45(2) were satisfied) the
court retained a discretion as to whether or not to consider the matter.... "755
111.2 Jurisdictional Challenges Against an Arbitral Tribunal
By virtue of the principle of competence-competence, the arbitral tribunal may have the
power to deal with jurisdictional issues arising in the course of the arbitration in the first
751 (2000) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127
752 Footnote No. 19, page 97: "This catalogue of challenges to arbitrator's findings of fact points to the need
for the Court to be constantly vigilant to ensure that attempts to question or qualify the arbitrator's findings
of fact, or to dress up questions of fact as questions of law, are carefully identified and firmly discouraged."
753 Section 45(1) of the English Act: "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may on the
application of a party.. .(upon notice to the other parties) determine any question of law arising in the
course of the proceedings which the court is satisfied substantially affects the rights of one or more of the
parties...."
4 Footnote No. 17
755 ibid
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instance. Both the Model Law and the English Act permit a party to request a
court to intervene in a jurisdictional question. The Model Law demands that such
intervention be sought within a period of thirty days from the date of the tribunal's ruling.
The English Act759 requires a party that wishes to challenge the decision of an arbitral
tribunal on a jurisdictional issue in court to obtain permission to do so from the other
party and the arbitral tribunal. Before a court may have power to determine the tribunal's
jurisdiction, a party must raise the challenge before the arbitral tribunal itself.760 If a
party decides not to participate in the arbitration proceedings as a result of its challenge to
the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction, it may pursuant to section 72 proceed to make an
nc i
application in court pertaining to its challenge.
A party may rely on Section 72(1) of the English Act and choose not to participate in the
arbitration proceedings if the party objects to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction.762 In
such a case, the objecting party may instead request a court to deal with his application
for a challenge of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. In the case ofLaw Debenture Trust
v. Elektrim Finance763 Law Debenture Trust chose not to take part in the arbitration
proceedings and instead sought to raise the question ofjurisdiction under section 72. The
court held that an objecting party had a right to bring proceedings under section 72. The
option ofboycotting the proceedings more often than not works to the detriment of the
party objecting, as the arbitrator may still proceed and make a decision based on the
evidence before him. The downside of this course of action is that the objecting party
may lose an opportunity to present his case before the arbitrator. The only way that a
pleader can make this course of action work in his favour would be by seeking a
756 (1999) XXIVa Ybk Comm Arbn 80-106 - Final Awards Cases Numbers 6515 & 6516 of 1994
757 Footnote No. 506
758 Footnote No. 152
759 Section 32(2)(a) & (b) of the English Act
760 Footnote No. 614 & 506
761 Footnote No. 670
762 Section 72(1) of the English Act: "A person alleged to be a party to arbitral proceedings but who takes
no part in the proceedings may question- (a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, (b) whether the
tribunal is properly constituted, or (c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with
the arbitration agreement, by proceedings in the court for a declaration or injunction or other appropriate
relief."
763 [2005] 2 All ER 476
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restraining order from the court in order to prevent the arbitrator from continuing with the
arbitration proceedings whilst the proceedings are going on.
Section 32764 of the English Act provides the procedure that a party who goes straight to
court with an application for a challenge of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction may adopt.
An application under this section has to be made promptly with the permission of the
tribunal and the agreement of all parties. The decision of the court made pursuant to an
application made under Section 32 is a judgment of the court and can only be appealed
against with the leave of the court. The commencement of an application under Section
32 in court does not halt the arbitration proceedings.
Section 32(4) makes provision for a double action in that a party may request a court to
determine a jurisdictional challenge of an arbitral tribunal whilst the arbitration
proceedings are in progress. Such a determination may be made either by agreement of all
the parties, or with the permission of the arbitral tribunal after satisfying the court that the
determination is likely to produce substantial savings in costs of the proceedings. It is not
in all circumstances that a double action of the objection and the arbitration proceedings is
favoured as it is seen as a duplication of evidence that is presented at the hearing of the
dispute on the merits. There is a likelihood of this procedure being abused by a party who
suspects that he may lose the dispute as the said party would seek the indulgence of the
court whilst the arbitral proceedings are going on just to interfere or delay the arbitration
process and in the process deny the other party justice. As the adage goes, justice delayed
is justice denied.
Whilst the Model Law restricts court intervention at this stage by the use of a time limit,
the English Act tends to be more relaxed, as it requires that the application be made
without delay. This is open ended as without delay may be measured subject to the
764 Section 32 of the English Act: "(1) The court may, on the application of a party to arbitral proceedings
(upon notice to the other parties), determine any question as to the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal.
... (4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings
and make an award while an application to the court under this section is pending.... (6) The decision of
the court on the question ofjurisdiction shall be treated as a judgment of the court for the purposes of an
appeal. But no appeal lies without the leave of the court..."
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circumstances of each case, thus ending up with a disparity in the time limit within which
to resort to court. Both the Model Law765 and the English Act766 respect the continuation
of the arbitral tribunal's mandate by permitting it to continue with its work whilst a
preliminary issue before the court is heard. This also prevents the court from being seen
to be usurping the powers of an arbitral tribunal.
The English Act permits an appeal from the decision of the court with leave but only if
767such appeal is based on a point of law. The decision of the court under the Model Law
on the other hand, is not subject to appeal.768 Article 16(3) of the Model Law gives
power to a court to make a final decision on the question pertaining to the jurisdiction of
an arbitral tribunal provided that the matter is raised within thirty days of a party's receipt
of the arbitral tribunal's ruling on the preliminary jurisdictional question.
In the AT& T Corporation769 case, the ICC ruled that the objection to the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction was not a good challenge. Under the ICC, that decision was final,
yet the party notwithstanding took the appeal right through the English courts up to the
House of Lords. This case was decided under the former arbitration law of England prior
to the enactment of the English Act. The previous Act permitted more court intervention
than the current Act does. Unlike the Model Law, appeals are permissible under the
English Act.770
III.3 Interim Measures of Protection
During the course of the arbitration proceedings, a party may obtain an interim measure
ofprotection from either the arbitral tribunal or from the court. This part of the study
deals with the situation whereby a party seeks this remedy from a court. The discussion
above has shown that the English Act permits appeals in a number of cases though with
765 A/CN.9/216, paragraph 82
766 Footnote No. 764, Section 32(4)
767 ibid, Section 32(6)
768 Footnote No. 506
769 Footnote No. 751
770 Footnote No. 668, page 628
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leave. The court however assists the arbitration process by not providing for appeal when
granting interim measures ofprotection that are sought during the course of the
arbitration process. This prevents the dispute from being dealt with by the court. The
aim of the court at this stage of the proceedings therefore is to exercise its discretion in
such a way that it assists the progression of the arbitration process. An example of this is
relief that a party that has not participated in the arbitration proceedings may seek from
the court.771
The English Act permits courts to intervene in the arbitration process and exercise
coercive power to ensure the compliance of an arbitral tribunal's orders.772 An interim
measure ofprotection should not be used by a party as a means to defeat the purpose of
arbitration by blocking evidence that a party may wish to rely on before a team of
arbitrators. This position was referred to in the Associated Electric and Gas Insurance
Services773 case. The Privy Council upheld the appeal on the ground that it was wrong to
interpret a confidentiality agreement as preventing a party from referring to an award as
that party would then be prevented from enforcing the award, which was the basis of the
arbitration. This judgement was aimed at preventing the abuse of interim measures of
protection. If anything interim measures ofprotection should be used to assist the
process of arbitration and not frustrate it.
The English Act permits a court to grant a remedy staying the arbitration proceedings if a
party does not wish to take part in the said proceedings. This is what the court decided in
the case of Law Debenture Trust Corp pic v. Elektrim Finance BV and others.774 The
court held inter alia that:
'An objectingparty had a right to bringproceedings under section 72... the basis of the
permitted challenge under section 72 was that the objectingperson was not aparty to
what were ostensibly arbitration proceedings because those proceedings were not
actuallyproceedings which could be asserted against him. "775
771 Footnote No. 762
772 Section 42(1) of the English Act
773 Footnote No. 136
774 (2005) 2 All ER (Comm) 476
775 ibid
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Prior to 2006, the Model Law only permitted courts to recognize and enforce arbitral
awards made under Article 35 of the Model Law. The Model Law has now been
revised776 and now permits the recognition and enforcement of interim measures issued
by an arbitral tribunal under Articles 17(1) novies. This provisions which is non-
territorial, permits a party to request the recognition and enforcement of the interim
measure in a court of the appropriate country. The intervention of the court at this stage
of the arbitration proceedings is inevitable if enforcement of the interim measure is to
take effect. The intervention is however qualified in that it is not applicable to the
substance of the interim measure. The court may therefore not be able to question the
reasons behind the arbitral tribunal making its decision. The Model Law under Article 17
decies now provides defences for refusing the recognition and enforcement of an interim
777
measure.
Section 16 of the Arbitration Act of Thailand permits a party to go to court if it seeks a
provisional measure ofprotection whilst the arbitration is going on. This provision may
however not be applicable if Thailand decides to adopt the revised version of Article
17.778 Section 16 states that:
"A party to an arbitration agreement mayfile a motion requesting the competent court to
issue an order imposingprovisional measures to protect his interest before or during the
arbitralproceedings. Ifthe court views that had such proceedings been conducted in
court the court would have been able to issue such order, the court mayproceed as
requested... "119
A court may also assist the arbitration process by enforcing an arbitral tribunal's order
that a party refuses to abide by, as the Model Law does not provide the tribunal with
coercive power.
776 A/CN.9/592
777 ibid, Article 17 decies
778
op cit
779 Section 16 of Thailand Arbitration Act
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III.4 Assistance in the Taking of Evidence
Article 27 of the Model Law780 permits an arbitral tribunal or a party to request assistance
from the court in the taking of evidence. The most common form of assistance that may
be requested from the court is the taking of sworn evidence. An arbitral tribunal lacks
coercive powers and may therefore not be in a position to enforce a summons if a witness
fails to attend the arbitration proceedings or to produce documents. In such a case either
the arbitral tribunal or a party may seek court assistance in order to ensure that the
arbitration proceedings progress effectively. Article 1(2) of the Model Law reduces the
application ofArticle 27 to the territory of the lex loci. Article 27 plays a supportive role
to the process of international commercial arbitration. Arbitration proceedings may fail
to be concluded effectively without the arbitral tribunal being able to collect all the
evidence it believes is essential for it to make an award. Without this support it is
possible to envisage a situation where witnesses choose not to come to give evidence
before the arbitral tribunal even when summoned, or third parties refusing to produce
documents when ordered to do so by the arbitral tribunal.
Section 34(2)(f) of the English Act,781 like Article 27 of the Model Law, also gives power
to a court to assist the parties in the taking of evidence and this power is exercised
pursuant to the court's "rules on the taking of evidence,"782 and upon a request being
made to that effect by a party. Although the English Act contains some mandatory
provisions, Section 34(2)(f) that permits courts to assist in the taking of evidence is not
mandatory, but is only applicable subject to the parties' agreement.
780 A/CN.9/592, paragraph 94: "Another topic suggested for consideration to the Working Group was the
revision of article 27 of the arbitration Model Law, which currently permitted an arbitral tribunal or a party
to request a court to assist in the taking of evidence ... It was suggested that article 27 could be revised to
oblige a court to render such assistance..."
781 Footnote No. 177
782 Article 27 of the Model Law: "The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal
may request from a competent court of this State assistance in taking evidence. The court may execute the
request within its competence and according to its rules on taking evidence."
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CONCLUSION
The discussion in this chapter has shown how court intervention acts as a safety
mechanism to the arbitration process by providing support when necessary and ensuring
that the decision of the parties to resolve their disputes using the process of arbitration is
maintained and enforced. During the course of the arbitration proceedings, the arbitral
tribunal is given power to deal with the disputes between the parties. This is a
responsibility that the parties do not permit to be delegated to another body dealing with
the resolution of disputes such as the courts. However, before the arbitral tribunal takes
conduct of the arbitration proceedings and during the course of the arbitration a court
may where parties permit, intervene in the arbitration process to deal with questions
arising relating to the arbitral tribunal, procedural issues or issues relating to an urgent
application for an interim measure ofprotection. The intervention of the court is
however restricted to specific instances only. Therefore, although a party may want a
matter to be dealt with by a court, this may only be possible if the parties' arbitration
agreement makes provision for such a course of action.
The Model Law and the English Act provide in different ways the instances when a court
may be permitted to intervene. The English Act maintains a system where the courts
restrict appeals in arbitration cases by ensuring that leave is obtained before an appeal can
proceed.783 The English Act permits courts intervention according to the terms set out in
784
Section 1(c) which intervention is in some cases mandatory. Court intervention under
the Model Law is permitted under the terms set out in Article 5.785 Although seeming
restrictive in its approach, Article 5 is favoured in this study as it ensures the least court
interference in the flow of the arbitration process thus fulfilling the Model Law's major
objective ofparty autonomy.786 The fact that the court intervention is restricted to
specific instances only, helps identify the process of international commercial arbitration
as an independent dispute resolution mechanism.
783 Footnote No. 19, page 97
784 Sections 9 &12 of the English Act
785 Footnote No. 665
786 Footnote No. 404, page 51
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The court intervention that is permitted before the arbitral tribunal takes control of the
arbitration process is fundamental in the sense that it helps the parties maintain the status
quo. A party may therefore be prevented from disposing of evidence or assets which step
may make the ensuing arbitration proceedings an academic exercise. The court therefore
holds the arbitration in place on behalf of the arbitral tribunal that is to be appointed by
the parties. This type of court intervention acts as a supplement to the tribunal's powers.
The court intervention that is sought by a party during the course of the arbitration
proceedings when an arbitral tribunal is in control of the arbitration must be clear and
precise as some of the relief sought at this stage of the proceedings may also be obtained
from the arbitral tribunal itself. An example is the relief for an interim measure of
protection. The courts must at this stage not be seen to be interfering or trespassing in the
work of the tribunal, hence the need for courts to only intervene where the parties have
expressly provided for such intervention. The courts therefore exercise their power to
intervene at this stage of the proceedings with caution when a party is able to obtain the
same relief sought from the arbitral tribunal.
Where the arbitral tribunal does not have the power to offer the required relief such as an
exercise of coercive power, the courts come to the assistance of the arbitration process.
Even in this situation however, where the court is being requested because the arbitral
tribunal lacks a certain power, the parties must provide for such intervention. If there is a
mandatory provision for court relief, then the courts must grant such relief as a matter of
right not as a discretionary measure. The idea of requesting for interim measures of relief
is so that the ensuring arbitral award meets its intended effect and can be enforced. The
intervention of the court that is exhibited in the Model Law articles referred to above can
be summed up as being supervisory and supportive and providing 'checks and balances'
to the process of international commercial arbitration and ensuring the enforcement of the
arbitral award.
The court intervention that both the Model Law and the English Act permit is really
meant to be there to act as a support to the arbitration process and not an end in itself.
This is emphasized by the Model Law requirement for the arbitration proceedings to
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continue whilst court intervention takes place thus showing the ancillary role that the
courts hold in the arbitration process. The power of the arbitral tribunal to get on with its
work whilst applications are ongoing in court also prevents delay787 and enables the
arbitration proceedings to remain on course. Parties that choose to have their disputes
resolved by way of arbitration are able to do so confidently knowing that the court will
provide support only for purposes of ensuring the progress of the arbitration and the
enforcement of the arbitral award. The court intervention discussed in this chapter
therefore essentially acts as a rescue boat for the arbitration process once it finds itself in
rough waters. The courts in support of the arbitration process assist and supplement the
arbitration whenever necessary without interfering in the work of the tribunal.
It is clear from the discussion in this chapter that as things stand today, the intervention of
the courts before the arbitral tribunal takes control of the arbitration process is inevitable
in procedural and jurisdictional matters. However, the intervention during the course of
the arbitration proceedings can be further restricted to those instances where the
tribunal's power is limited such as in the taking of sworn evidence. This study shows a
web in the relationship between courts and the process of international commercial
arbitration that remains unbroken throughout the arbitration process. Alan Redfern and
Martin Hunter call this kind of relationship a partnership though not of equals.788
Throughout this relationship it can be seen that courts exercise restraint through the use
of discretionary powers in an effort of ensuring that matters that are the subject of
arbitration are not pursued in court to a logical conclusion, as this would render the
arbitral tribunal's work academic. In support of this principle, courts ensure that they do
not deal with substantive issues as they lie in the exclusive domain of the arbitral tribunal.
Courts have a duty of ensuring that private methods of resolving disputes within their
787 Smit (1998: 235): "While article 5 was criticized as excessively restrictive, the Commission found it
necessary as a safeguard against dilatory tactics and abuse. The purpose of the provision is to increase
certainty as to the maximum extent ofjudicial intervention..."
788 Redfern (2004: 328): "Insofar as the relationship between national courts and arbitral tribunals is said to
be one of 'partnership', it is not a partnership of equals. Arbitration may depend upon the agreement of the
parties, but it is also a system built on law and which relies upon that law to make it effective both
nationally and internationally... The real issue is to define the point where this reliance of arbitration on
national courts begins and where it ends."
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jurisdiction are conducted in a just manner, so that justice is done. At the end of the day




THE EXTENT TO WHICH A COURT MAY EXAMINE THE WORK OF AN
ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL AFTER THE AWARD IS MADE
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which an arbitral tribunal's conduct
and exercise ofpowers may be tested in court after the award is made. The study will
show how the courts assume a supervisory and supplementary role at this stage of the
arbitration. The intervention of the court in the award is restricted to limited
circumstances and under limited grounds. It is also subject to the laws governing the
arbitration at that stage of the arbitration when court recourse is sought.789 Both the
Model Law and the English Act provide the specific times when a party may seek the
court's relief after the award is made. What will be evident from the study is that time
when such reliefmay be sought is of the essence.
It is the position of this Thesis that the power of an arbitral tribunal to make an arbitral
award emanates from the parties' agreement to arbitrate.790 The parties to an arbitration
agreement however, expect the arbitral tribunal to work within the precincts of its
jurisdiction and in accordance with the adopted rules of arbitration subject to the laws
that are chosen by the parties to govern the different aspects of the arbitration. The
tribunal is expected to complete its mandate by making a final and binding award.791 In
some Model Law countries, the finality and binding nature of the award is limited to an
arbitral tribunal's findings on the facts and generally its findings on the law. The award
may therefore only generally be subject to the scrutiny of the courts on matters other than
the arbitral tribunal's findings of fact. This however is not the case in England where
court recourse against an arbitral tribunal's findings of fact and questions of law arising
789 Tweeddale (2005: 376 & 379)
790 LG Caltex Gas Co. Ltd and another v. China National Petroleum Corporation and another [2001] BLR
235: "If there is no arbitration agreement, then there can be no authority in the arbitrator to determine any
disputes between two parties."
791 Footnote No. 652
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out of the award is permitted.792 On the whole however, a court may not set aside an
award on the basis that the tribunal made an error of fact or law, even if the error is
manifest.
The New York Convention, the Model Law and the English Act provide set grounds
upon which court scrutiny may be permitted. This scrutiny may occur at the instance of a
party that seeks enforcement of the award or has reason to believe that some of the
objectives of the arbitration agreement are not fulfilled by the arbitral tribunal.793 The
court intervention at this stage of the arbitration may arise upon a party raising either a
jurisdictional794 or procedural challenge against an arbitral award. The court therefore
assumes the supervisory role when dealing with the challenge to check whether the
arbitral tribunal conducted the arbitration in accordance with the terms of the arbitration
agreement and the governing laws. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first
section looks at court recourse that the Model Law and the English Act permit. The
second section analyses how courts intervene in the recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award.
I COURT RECOURSE AGAINST AN ARBITRAL AWARD AS PERMITTED
BY THE MODEL LAW AND THE ENGLISH ACT
This part of the study will identify the instances when a party may request a court to
intervene in the arbitral award and the criteria upon which a court may be moved. The
discussion will show the court's reaction to such requests for intervention.
1.1 Court Intervention Permitted by the Model Law
The Model Law only offers one form of recourse against an arbitral award under Article
34. A party that wishes to challenge an arbitral tribunal's award is only permitted to do
792 Section 69(1) & (3)(c) of the English Act
793 Park (2006: 71): "...some measure of judicial scrutiny over arbitral jurisdiction remains a vital
safeguard to the integrity of the process, and constitutes an essential corollary to enforcement of legitimate
awards."
794 Footnote No. 589
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so by applying to have the award set aside. Where an award is split into segments by an
arbitral tribunal, and a final award is made in relation to one segment, a party may request
an arbitral tribunal not to take any steps in the proceedings until after the objection raised
under Article 34 is dealt with by the court. In such a situation the tribunal may instead of
proceeding to complete dealing with the other segments of the dispute choose to wait to
hear the court's ruling in relation to its first award. This is designed to save costs and
speed up the arbitration proceedings.
Article 34 lays down a restrictive and exhaustive list of grounds upon which a court may
set aside an arbitral award.795 It is only when a party satisfies one of the grounds
provided in Article 34 that an arbitral award may be set aside by a court at the seat of the
arbitration. The said grounds are limited to procedural and jurisdictional issues and do
not extend to substantive issues. This is a limitation and not a weakness as if courts were
permitted to question the award on the merits they would in essence be interfering in the
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction and consequently be seen to be usurping its powers. The
limitation is therefore important if the process of international commercial arbitration is
to be protected in order for the parties to have their disputes resolved through the use of
their chosen form of dispute resolution.
Courts exercise discretion when dealing with applications under Article 34 of the Model
Law. This is evidenced from the wording of the first sentence in Article 34(2) which
says that 'an arbitral award may be set aside' and not 'an arbitral award must be set
aside' should any of the listed grounds be proved. The Model Law is however silent as to
whether a party that is not satisfied with the decision of the court on this score may be
permitted to appeal to a higher court. The general trend of the Model Law in its other
provisions however is to only permit access to court intervention once without any appeal
thereafter.
795 D. Frampton & Co. Ltd v. Sylvio Thibeault and Navigation Harvey & Freres Inc. (Federal Court of
Canada, Trial Division, 7 April 1988, Unpublished: (1988) F.C.J. No. 305)
It may therefore be assumed that the reference to 'a court' in Article 34 of the Model Law
implies that further court recourse in the form of an appeal may not be sought by a party.
Article 1(2) of the Model Law exclusively gives power to a court at the seat of the
arbitration796 to examine the work of an arbitral tribunal after an arbitral award is made.
Court recourse at this stage of the arbitration is therefore accessed in a territorial manner
under the Model Law. The exception to this position is the legal system in India that
permits the setting aside of an arbitral award that is made in another country.
There are therefore two ways by which an arbitral award may be set aside. The first one
is by a party establishing one ormore of the four grounds stated in Article 34(2)(a). The
second way is by the court establishing either of the two grounds stated in Article
34(2)(b). In the case ofNavigation Sonamar Inc. v. Algoma Steamships Limited797 the
court held that the reasons for setting aside an award had to be 'appropriate, relevant and
comprehensible.'798 A conclusion that the reasons for setting aside the award were
appropriate, relevant and comprehensible could only be reached after examining the
arbitral award in its entirety. Mr Justice Gross in the case of IPCO (Nigeria) v. Nigerian
National Petroleum799 stated that:
"An award cannot be set asidefor misconduct simply because the arbitrators have made
an error offact or law... "800
Mr Justice Gross in refusing to set aside the award in that case was exercising a limited
supervisory jurisdiction rather than an appellate jurisdiction over the arbitration that was
governed by the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
Article 34(3) of the Model Law places a restriction on a party's access to court at this
stage of the arbitration by setting a time limit of three months from the date of the award
within which a party raising the objection to the arbitral award may apply for the setting
796 Footnote No. 789, page 372: "In most cases the courts with jurisdiction to hear the challenge will be
those of the place in which the award was made."
797
Superior Court of Quebec, 16 April 1987, (published in French: (1987) R.J.Q. 1346)
798 ibid
799
(2005) 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 326 at page 331
800 ibid
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aside of the award. Article 4 of the Model Law maintains that a party that sits on his
rights and does not raise an objection within the prescribed period of time may be
deemed to have waived his right of objection and may therefore be bound by the award.
The setting aside of the arbitral award is the only remedy that Article 34 provides save for
the times when it becomes necessary under Article 34(4) of the Model Law to give the
tribunal another chance to make good the issues that may have resulted in the application
to set aside the award. After the award is made, courts immediately take over the baton
of power over the arbitration from the arbitral tribunal and any further applications that
the parties to an arbitration agreement may wish to make are made to the court at the seat
of the arbitration.
However, Article 34(4) offers a party an exclusive remedy aimed at giving the arbitral
tribunal a chance to rectify the issues that may have resulted in an application to set aside
the award. This remedy is subject to a request for the same being made by a party where
appropriate. This provision is important in that it provides flexibility to the process of
international commercial arbitration as the arbitral tribunal is granted a rare opportunity
oo 1of "eliminating the groundsfor setting aside " the award. As long as the arbitral
tribunal is still dealing with the dispute, the tribunal is not functus officio ,802 An arbitral
tribunal may only becomefunctus officio after it has rendered a valid and final decision in
relation to the entire dispute that the parties may have requested it to resolve.803
An arbitral award usually marks the end of an arbitral tribunal's powers, unless in
exceptional circumstances where a municipal court exercises its remedy of sending the
award back to the arbitral tribunal for correction pursuant to Article 33 of the Model Law.
Any extension of an arbitral tribunal's powers after the award may only be permitted
pursuant to Article 34(4) or Article 33 of the Model Law. The arbitral tribunal may only
restore arbitration proceedings to life on its own initiative after an arbitral award is made
801 Article 34(4) of the Model Law
802 Burke (Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, Second Edition, 1977): "Functus officio - having discharged
his duty - an expression applied to a judge, magistrate or arbitrator who has given a decision or made an
order or award so that his authority is exhausted."
803 Redfern (2004: 8-40)
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in specific instances provided by Article 33(2). This can be done within a time limit of
thirty days from the date of the award.804
This part of the study will deal with the grounds that may be raised to set aside an arbitral
award in detail hereunder. The discussion will differentiate the procedural issues from
the jurisdictional issues that a party may raise as a ground for setting aside the award.
1.1 (i) Article 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law
Under the first permitted procedural ground that a party may raise in support of his
application to set aside an arbitral award in the Model Law, the establishment of any of
the following issues may suffice. These are:
• The incapacity of a party to an arbitration agreement and;
• The invalidity of the arbitration agreement under the law that it is subjected to or
under the law at the seat of the arbitration.
Each party to an arbitration agreement has to satisfy the contractual capacity of the
contract that in turn entitles him to enter into the arbitration agreement. The capacity of
the parties to enter into a contract and consequently an arbitration agreement is essential
if the arbitration agreement is to be recognized as valid. Each party must therefore first
and foremost be of sound mind in order for them to be in a position to perform the
obligations that are due to the other party and to discern the rights due to them and the
80S
role that the other party is to perform.
It is only a party with capacity to enter into an agreement that may rightfully seek
remedies from an arbitral tribunal or court where they are due. A court may for instance
not be in a position to hear a party who is below the majority age as determined by the
OA/T
law governing the arbitration agreement. Each party has an obligation to ensure the
capacity of the party that he wishes to do business with. It is important that a party raises
an objection immediately he has reasonable cause to believe that the other party is
804 Article 33(2) of the Model Law
805 Park (2006: )26
806 Mustill (2001: 62)
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without capacity. Where this issue is discovered after the arbitral award is made, it may
be used as a ground to set aside the arbitral award. An arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction may
be challenged if there is no valid arbitration agreement in existence or if the agreement is
not recognised by all the parties.
1.1 (ii) Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law
The second ground upon which an arbitral award may be set aside may be satisfied upon
the establishment of any of the following positions:
• The lack ofproper notice of the appointment of the arbitral tribunal or of the
arbitration proceedings to the party contesting the award and;
• Circumstances arising that make the contesting party unabl e to present his case
before the arbitral tribunal.
Like the first ground referred to above, the second ground that a party seeking recourse
against an arbitral award from the court may use relates to procedural issues. It is
mandatory that each party be given adequate information on what is happening in the
arbitration. This assists a party to properly and adequately prepare his case. In cases
where the parties are involved in the appointment of a tribunal, communication must be
completed when the process is finalized. Where the appointment is made by a court an
order of the court must be served on the parties as confirmation of the appointment of a
tribunal. A set of arbitration rules may also put in place a communication procedure to
ensure that all parties are aware of the members of the arbitral tribunal. In cases where an
arbitral tribunal is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator, there has to be effective
communication to the parties of the new appointee.
Once appointed, it is the responsibility of an arbitral tribunal to adequately serve notices
on the parties of the arbitration proceedings. Without this notice, a party may fail to
properly instruct his representatives and thereby be unable to present his case before the
tribunal. Article 18 of the Model Law requires that the arbitral tribunal treats the parties
to the arbitration agreement with equality.807 The court stated in the Corporacion
807 Footnote No. 116
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808Transnational de Inversiones case that the purpose ofArticle 18 of the Model Law
was aimed at protecting a party from 'egregious and injudicious conduct by an arbitral
tribunal' and not protecting a party from its own failures. A party that is unable to
present his case may raise an objection under this ground after the arbitral award is made.
This is the downside ofArticle 18 as a challenge ofbeing unfairly treated is only
available after the arbitral award is made. The Model Law does not give power to an
arbitral tribunal to deal with an objection that is raised based on Article 18.
A party that has participated in the appointment of an arbitrator may only challenge an
arbitrator on issues that were not made known to him on appointment.809 The burden of
proof lies on that arbitrator to show that he was not aware of the reasons that are the basis
of the challenge at the time ofhis appointment.810 The Model Law provides for a party to
object to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator it has appointed only if the objection relates to
issues that are not disclosed by the arbitrator to the parties or brought to their attention
811
prior to his appointment.
1.1 (iii) Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law
An arbitral award may be set aside if it deals with a dispute that does not fall within the
scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. In this case, it is only that part of the award
that deals with matters falling outside the scope of the arbitration agreement that may be
set aside. This ground covers jurisdictional issues, in that it questions the extent of an
arbitral tribunal's authority. An arbitral tribunal may lack jurisdiction to deal with a
dispute that does not fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement. Further, an
arbitral tribunal may be acting in excess of its jurisdiction if it acts over and above its
scope of authority.
Footnote No. 117
809 A/10017, paragraph 67: "..A party should be permitted to challenge even the arbitrator nominated by
him.... For circumstances unknown at the time of the nomination..."
810 Caron (2006: 238)
811 Article 12(2) of the Model Law:".. .A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in whose
appointment he has participated, only for reasons ofwhich he becomes aware after the appointment has
been made."
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An arbitral tribunal may be lacking in jurisdiction if it deals with a dispute that is not
covered by the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal may decide on its own motion
whether it has jurisdiction to deal with a particular subject matter or not usually in the
first instance before a court finally deals with the issue. The precise wording of the
arbitration agreement must be the arbitral tribunal's guiding factor as to the subject
matter that the parties intend it to address. Therefore if the parties wish the arbitral
tribunal to deal with parts 'a' and 'b' of an issue that will have occurred as at the date of
the appointment of the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal has got no jurisdiction to deal with
parts 'c' and'd' of the same dispute that arise after its appointment unless the parties
have acquiesced.
Ifparties engaged in a ten-year oil contract disagree on the quality of oil in the fourth
year of their contract, they may refer the dispute to an arbitral tribunal that will have
jurisdiction to deal with the dispute as it is pertaining at December 2006 when it
commences the arbitration proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may without the
acquiescence of the parties not have jurisdiction to determine the issues arising in January
2007 relating to the amount due for the delivered oil. The issue arising in January after
the appointment of the arbitral tribunal relating to the amount owing is an issue that will
not fall within the scope of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. An arbitral tribunal may
lack jurisdiction in such a case. However, if the quality of the oil continues to be low in
January, and that information is used as part of a party's evidence and accepted by the
tribunal, the tribunal may be acting in excess of its jurisdiction. If the other party fails to
raise an objection immediately he becomes aware of this situation, he may be in great
danger of being deemed acquiesced to the tribunal's act of dealing with issues out-with
its jurisdiction.
An arbitral tribunal is expected by the parties to conduct the arbitration proceedings and
make an award whilst exercising its permitted powers. An arbitral tribunal's lack of
jurisdiction or excess ofjurisdiction must be differentiated with a tribunal's excess of
power. Whilst the Model Law permits the setting aside of an arbitral award under this
812 Mustill (2001: 108)
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ground for the lack or excess ofjurisdiction, an arbitral tribunal's award that exceeds its
power may not be set aside. This is because an arbitral tribunal that exceeds its powers
does not necessarily act outwith its jurisdiction. A tribunal may, whilst within its scope
of authority, exercise power over and above what the arbitration agreement has permitted
it. Excess ofpower therefore relates to a power that an arbitral tribunal has, but which it
exercises in excess.
For instance where the governing rules of arbitration provide that interest be calculated
based on a simple interest rate and a tribunal decides to apply compound interest instead,
it will not only have made a mistake, but have exceeded its permitted power of awarding
interest. Whilst it has jurisdiction to award interest, it does not have the power to award
it in compound form. Such excess ofpower may result in a mistake in the calculation of
what is due to a party to whom interest is due. By virtue of a tribunal's actions, a party
may be awarded a monetary award that he is not entitled to. A distinction must be drawn
between a mistake that an arbitral tribunal makes during the course of its work and a
mistake made as result of it having exceeded its powers. Whilst it is human to err, it is
wrong for an arbitral tribunal to exceed its powers. Klaus Peter Berger states as follows
in reference to this issue:
"The merefact that the tribunal has misinterpreted an ordinary provision oflaw never
justifies the setting aside ofthe award, even though it may have had a decisive impact on
the outcome of the case. This is the risk that aparty accepts when agreeing to arbitration
and to theprinciple offinality ofarbitral awards... "813
In the case ofSovietDanube Steam Navigation Co. v. Travel Agency814 the court
considered that the legal effectiveness of a foreign arbitral award cannot be contested
because of the lack of a valid arbitration agreement, when the party that was affected by
the award is, according to the law of the foreign country, no longer able to have the
award set aside because of the expiration of the time limit for means of recourse.
813 Berger (2006: 578)
814
[1991] XVI Yearbook Comm. Arbn 546
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1.1 (iv) Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law
An arbitral award may be set aside if a party proves that the composition of the arbitral
tribunal or the arbitration procedure is not in accordance with the arbitration agreement.
The only exception to this ground is if the agreement of the parties is in conflict with a
mandatory provision of the governing law of the agreement or of the law at the seat of the
arbitration. This ground is aimed at giving precedence to the arbitration agreement. It
demands that the composition of the arbitral tribunal as well as the procedures that are
adopted in the arbitration proceedings conform to the requirements of the arbitration
agreement. Where the agreement of the parties is in conflict with the law at the seat of
the arbitration, this ground may not be used successfully to set aside the arbitral award.
1.1 (v) Articles 34(2)(b)(i) and 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law
An arbitral award may be set aside if the court finds that the issues in dispute are
inarbitrable under the lex arbitri or that the arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy at the seat of the arbitration. These two grounds are used by a national system of
law at the seat of the arbitration, through its court machinery to draw the boundary of the
extent of an arbitral tribunal's powers in terms of the subject matter arbitrability and
public policy limitations.815 As with the other grounds discussed above, the
inarbitrability of the subject matters in dispute and the public policy limitations are
measured against the law as it pertains at the seat of the arbitration. The court may
therefore set aside an arbitral award under these two grounds if it establishes that the
award deals with a dispute that is inabitrable or is contrary to the public policy of the seat
of the arbitration respectively.
An initially valid arbitration agreement may if tainted with illegal activities such as
816
bribery, corruption, fraud or money laundering become void and may consequently
815 Chapter Four of Thesis
816 Cremades (November 2003/January 2004: 78 - 79): "... There is no longer doubt that they can no
longer be tolerated in international commerce.. ..The Bribe Payers Index indicates that the perceptions of
corruption are highest in the areas of public works and construction, arms and defense, and oil and gas - all
sectors ofmajor importance for international commercial arbitration."
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lead to the setting aside of the ensuing award.817 If however an allegation of any of these
activities is made, entertained and rejected by an arbitral tribunal, then the award may be
enforced by the enforcing state, as it will have emanated from a valid arbitration
agreement. An error of fact or law by a tribunal may not generally be used as a ground
for setting aside an award.
1.2 Permitted Objections to an Arbitral Tribunal's Award under the English Act
This part of the study looks at court recourse as it is permitted under the English Act.
The discussion above showed how limited are the objections that are availed to a party
under the Model Law after the arbitral award is made. Apart from a party establishing
the procedural and jurisdictional faults against an arbitral tribunal before a court, the
Model Law permits the court to set aside an award that is in conflict with a country's
legal position on arbitrable matters and its public interest considerations. The English
Act, like the Model Law recognizes the limited nature of the court's supervisory role over
the arbitration once an arbitral award is made. The court intervention818 that is permitted
by the English Act is under very strict and limited terms. This study identifies three of
the grounds that a party may rely on when seeking recourse against an arbitral tribunal's
arbitral award from a court. These may be by way of an objection against an award or in
the form of an appeal. The three grounds are:
• The challenge of an award based on an arbitral tribunal's substantive
O 1 Q #
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 67;
• A challenge based on serious irregularity affecting the tribunal and the
proceedings or award pursuant to Section 68, and;
• An appeal to court by a party based on a question of law820 arising out of the
award pursuant to Section 69.
817 Footnote No. 7, Article 34(2)(v)
818 Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (EURASIA) Ltd v. New India Assurance Company
Limited (2005) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 67
819 Footnote No. 615
820 ibid
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This part of the study will discuss the three grounds upon which recourse to court may be
obtained after an arbitral award referred to above is made.
I.2(i) A Challenge of an Award based on an Attack of an Arbitral Tribunal's
Substantive Jurisdiction
A party to an arbitration agreement may challenge the final award of an arbitral tribunal
under Section 67 of the English Act by querying the arbitral tribunal's substantive
jurisdiction. The court places the burden ofproof on the party that wishes to invoke
Section 67. A jurisdictional challenge is essential in curing the excess of jurisdiction821
or lack ofjurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.822 An arbitral tribunal's failure to deal with
the parties fairly may not constitute a jurisdictional challenge as it does not go to the root
of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction but relates to its personal attributes.823 The Act
permits a party to raise an objection against an arbitral tribunal's substantive jurisdiction
before a court during the course of the arbitration proceedings under Section 32 and after
824the award is made under Section 67.
If any of the parties are not happy with the decision of the arbitral tribunal in an
arbitration governed by English law, the same may be referred to the court and the court
may either review the arbitral tribunal's decision or hear the proceedings de novo which
decision may allow the court to hear the evidence concerning the jurisdictional question
821 Footnote No. 380, page 533
822 Footnote No. 18, paragraph 143: "A challenge to jurisdiction may well involve questions of fact as well
as questions of law."
823 JSC Zestafoni G Nikoladze Ferroalloy Plant v. Ronly Holdings Ltd [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 335 at page
364: "Colman J stated that "the principle of openness and fair dealing between the parties to an arbitration
demands not merely that ifjurisdiction is to be challenged under section 67 the issue as to jurisdiction must
normally have been raised at least on some grounds before the arbitrator but that each ground of challenge
to his jurisdiction must previously have been raised before the arbitrator if it is to be raised under a section
67 application challenging the award."
824 Section 67 of the English Act: "(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties
and to the tribunal) apply to the court- (a) challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive
jurisdiction; or (b) for an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, in
whole or in part, because the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction. A party may lose the right to
object (see section 73) and the right to apply is subject to the restriction in section 70(2) and (3). (2) The
arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make a further award while an application to the
court under this section is pending in relation to an award as to jurisdiction.. ..(4) The leave of the court is
required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section."
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afresh.825 The way in which the court may intervene in the arbitration after the award is
made, is dependent upon the parties' agreement.
An applicant that has participated in the arbitration proceedings may wish to challenge an
arbitral tribunal's award under Section 67. This is because usually a party may only
discover an arbitral tribunal's lack ofjurisdiction or its having acted in excess of its
jurisdiction after the arbitral award is made. It is usual for a respondent to challenge the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal although it is not unusual for a claimant to raise the
objection. For example, in the case ofPrimetrade AG,826 Primetrade instituted
proceedings in court pursuant to Section 67 to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal. The court held that no right of suit had passed to Primetrade and accordingly,
the arbitrators did not have jurisdiction to consider the owner's claims against
Primetrade.
The court takes cognizance of the fact that the question ofjurisdiction has already been
dealt with by the arbitral tribunal, subject to instances when a party decides not to take
part in the arbitration proceedings and instead seeks remedy directly from a court as
permitted by Section 72. Under an application made under Section 67, the court may
choose to review the decision of the arbitral tribunal. In such a case, the extent to which
the court may permit fresh evidence relating to an issue already addressed by the tribunal
will be limited. Permitting fresh evidence under such circumstances may prejudice the
other party.827 Fresh evidence may however be permitted if there is consent from the
other party. The case ofR (on the application ofLunn) v. Governor ofMoorland
Prison828 is instructive here. Without the consent of the other party, an application may
be made to the court.
825 Michael W. Buhler and Thomas H. Webster, Handbook of ICC Arbitration: Commentary, Precedents,
Materials, (First Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005), page 155
826 Footnote No. 613
827 Footnote No. 119
828 [2006] All ER 377: "It is unnecessary in this case to consider the position in relation to an order which is
unlawful on its face or which is made in excess ofjurisdiction, though as appears from the authorities an
order which is valid on its face is binding even if it was made in excess ofjurisdiction and is therefore
liable to be set aside."
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In the case ofJSC Zestafoni829 the court refused to entertain a new jurisdictional
challenge as Zestafoni failed to justify before the court why it had not raised the illegality
point before the arbitrator. The discussion hereunder will deal with the arbitral tribunal's
lack of and excess ofjurisdiction that amounts to a violation ofjurisdiction that an
arbitral tribunal purports to have. It is this violation that a party may wish to halt when
making an application for a jurisdictional challenge against an arbitral tribunal in court.
The court's role is basically to investigate how an arbitral tribunal has exercised its
substantive jurisdiction and to remedy the situation in instances where the tribunal has
acted out-with its jurisdiction.
I.2(i)(a) Lack of Jurisdiction
An arbitral tribunal's lack ofjurisdiction means that the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal
to exercise a particular power does not exist. This may relate to an arbitral tribunal
dealing with issues that do not relate to the contract at hand and consequently to the
arbitration agreement. Alternatively, an arbitral tribunal may be dealing with an issue
emanating from the contract between the parties but not within the scope of the
arbitration agreement. An arbitral tribunal may not have jurisdiction to deal with an issue
that falls outside the terms of the arbitration agreement. In the case ofMetalDistributors
830
(UK) Ltd v. ZCCMInvestment Holding Pic, for instance, MDL sought to have its
counterclaim relating to debt restructuring determined by the arbitral tribunal.
Meanwhile the arbitration agreement did not extend to debt restructuring. The arbitral
tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim. MDL
applied to the court to set aside the arbitral award under Section 67 of the English Act.
The court dismissed the application as the counterclaim arose under a separate contract.
Cresswell, J stated among other things that:
829 Footnote No. 823
830 Footnote No. 100
"Where the claimant had a disputed claim which fell within an arbitration agreement,
and the respondent raised a cross-claim which lay outside the clause, the arbitrator did
not have jurisdiction to entertain the cross-claim.. "831
Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter also assert that:
"Jurisdiction in relation to a counterclaim is occasionally contested by a claimant on the
grounds that the respondent's claims do notfall within the contract that contains the
arbitration clause. Ifthis is so, the arbitral tribunal has no option but to exclude it. "832
The JSC Zestafoni833 case referred to above shows how a party successfully invoked
Section 67 of the English Act. The objection in this case arose as a result of variations to
a multi-party agreement. The exchange of correspondence between the parties'
representatives gave jurisdiction to a sole arbitrator, Mr Kinnell, instead of a three-man
tribunal as the initial arbitration agreement had provided. An agreement by the parties'
representatives through an exchange ofmail resulted in the amendment of the terms of
the arbitration agreement pertaining to the number of arbitrators and in essence gave
jurisdiction to Mr Kinnell. When Fapet raised an objection to Mr Kinnell's jurisdiction,
he ruled that he had jurisdiction. An application that was made before the court to set
aside the award because Mr Kinnell lacked jurisdiction, failed.
An arbitral tribunal only has jurisdiction to establish the rights and obligations of the
parties to an arbitration agreement and in general not those of third parties.834 By acting
otherwise, the tribunal may be challenged for lack ofjurisdiction. Leggatt J. stated in The
Eastern Saga835 as follows:
" The concept ofprivate arbitration derives simplyfrom thefact that the parties have
agreed to submit to arbitrationparticular disputes arising between them and only
between them. It is implicit in this that strangers should be excludedfrom the hearing
S36and conduct ofthe arbitration... "
831 ibid
832 Redfern (2004: 310)
833 Footnote 823
834 Davidson (2000: 19): "An arbitral tribunal is constituted by agreement and thus has no power over third
parties."
835 [1984] 3 All ER 835 at 843c-d
836 ibid
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In the case ofSvenska Petroleum Exploration AB v. Government of the Republic of
Lithuania,837 Lithuania challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal, but the tribunal
dismissed the objection and ruled it had jurisdiction as Lithuania was a party to the
arbitration agreement.
In circumstances where the arbitral tribunal does proceed to establish the rights and
obligations ofpurported third parties, the parties to the arbitration agreement must agree
to have the arbitration agreement enforced by a third party.838 In the case ofAzov
Shipping Co 839 Azov challenged the arbitrator's award based on the fact that the
arbitrator had no jurisdiction as Azov was not a party to the arbitration clause and could
therefore not be bound by it. Rix J held that the justice of the case required that he agrees
with Azov.
An arbitral tribunal's award may be challenged based on its lack ofjurisdiction if it is
proved that the arbitration agreement under which it is operating is not recognized by all
the parties. In the case ofArab National Bank v. El-Abdali,840 the court held among other
things that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction as the arbitration agreement had been
obtained by fraud and the arbitral tribunal had not been properly constituted.841 In order
for an arbitration agreement to be recognized as valid, it must in no uncertain terms,
define the agreement of the parties, the dispute and the mles of law giving that
relationship its efficacy. The burden ofproof however lies with the party making the
challenge. Parties to an arbitration agreement are obliged to ensure that they are in
agreement on the alterations or amendments to the arbitration agreement that they wish to
make if they are to maintain the validity of their agreement.
837
[2006] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 181
838 Footnote No. 805
839 Footnote No. 640
840
[2005] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 541
841 ibid., at page 546: "On the basis of these facts, I am satisfied that the Bank has established on
overwhelming evidence that the arbitral award has been obtained by fraud; that there was no arbitration
agreement in force; that the arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted and that there was never any
agreement as to the scope of the arbitration...."
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I.2(i)(b) Excess of Jurisdiction
An arbitral tribunal that exercises authority over and above what the parties would wish it
to exercise acts in excess ofjurisdiction. In this situation, a tribunal may have
jurisdiction to deal with an issue, but only to the extent permitted by the parties. For
instance, the parties to an arbitral tribunal may appoint a tribunal to deal with a dispute
arising from a party's failure to complete works on a project within a prescribed period of
time. In such a case, the tribunal may have jurisdiction to deal with the dispute up to a
specific date. If however, there is another dispute relating to the failure to pay for the
services rendered, an arbitral tribunal may be acting in excess ofjurisdiction if it deals
with the monetary issue that though relating to the same contract is not covered by the
arbitration agreement. An arbitral tribunal owes the parties an obligation to exercise
caution and ensure that its powers are only exercised within the precincts of its
jurisdiction. The parties have a prerogative to appoint another arbitral tribunal to deal
with the other segment of their dispute. In the case ofNisshin Shipping Co.842 the court
held that the scope of the arbitration agreement was wide enough to cover the dispute
between the respondent and the chartering brokers thus giving the tribunal jurisdiction in
the matter.
An arbitral tribunal may be challenged by a party for exceeding its jurisdiction by dealing
with a matter that is not submitted to it for arbitration. A case in point is the case of
National Insurance and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v. M Young Legal Services Ltd 843 In
that case the court held that a claim in tort was outside the scope of the arbitration clause.
Also in the case ofPirtek (UK) Ltd,844 an arbitrator made a further award of interest after
he had become functus offico. There was no evidence on record to show that he had been
requested by the parties to make such an award. In the case ofHome ofHomes Limited v.
Borough ofHammersmith & Fulham LBCMS the court dismissed the application for the
removal of the arbitrator for failing to conduct himself properly. The application alleged
842 Footnote No. 73
843
[2005] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 46




that the arbitrator had relied on issues that had not been raised before him in making the
award.
I.2(i)(c) Prerequisites of an Application Under Section 67 of the English Act
The English Act requires a party that wishes to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for
purposes of examining the jurisdiction of a tribunal after an award is made under Section
67 to fulfill certain prerequisites. A party must satisfy the statutory requirements
contained in Section 70(2) and (3)846 and Section 73.847 In addition to the statutory
prerequisites herein, a party making the application for challenge of an arbitral award
must notify the other party and the arbitral tribunal of his intention to lodge a challenge in
court. The notification to the other party is important as it enables the other party to not
only know that there may be a delay in the enforcement of the award, but to also prepare
for the challenge of the award. The notification of the application for challenge of the
award to the tribunal enables it to be aware that it may only becomefunctus officio after
its award withstands the challenge or appeal before a court.
Time within which a party may seek recourse from a court under Section 67 is of the
essence and so is the need to exhaust all the available recourse as provided by the
arbitration agreement. In so doing, the requirements of Section 73 as read together with
Section 70 of the English Act must be taken into consideration. In the case ofLafarge
848
(Aggregates) Ltd v. London Borough ofNewham the court held that the arbitrator had
no jurisdiction in the dispute because the reference to him was not made in time in
accordance with the provisions of the contract.
In the case of (1) People's Insurance Company ofChina, Hebei Branch (2) China
National Feeding StuffImport/export Corporation v. Vysanthi Shipping Company
846 Section 70 of the English Act: "(2) An application or appeal may not be brought if the applicant or
appellant has not first exhausted- (a) any available arbitral process or appeal or review, and (b) any
available recourse under section 57 (correction of award or additional award). (3) Any application or
appeal must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award or, if there has been any arbitral process of
appeal or review, of the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process."
847 Footnote No. 595
848
[2005] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 577
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Limited (The "Joanna V")^49 the court refused to extend the time for challenging the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator pursuant to Section 67 by holding that 'any challenge to the
arbitrator's award on the question ofjurisdiction had to be made within 28 days of the
publication of the award, failing which the party objecting to the jurisdiction lost that
right.' In the case ofKalmneft v. Glencore InternationalAG and another,850 the
applicant applied to set aside the arbitrator's ruling on the ground that he had no
jurisdiction, as there was no binding arbitration agreement.
Any objections to an arbitral tribunal's substantive jurisdiction must be raised timeously
if the objection is to be sustained. In the case ofRustal Trading Limited v. Gill & Duffus
SA851 the court stated that:
'There is however, a morefundamental objection ofprinciple to aparty's continuing to
takepart in proceedings while at the same time keeping up his sleeve the right to
challenge the award ifhe is dissatisfied with the outcome. The unfairness inherent in
doing so is, ofcourse, magnified ifthe defect is one which could have been remedied ifa
proper objection had been made at the time. 'S52
In jurisdictions such as England, a party who makes it clear that his participation is
without prejudice to his subsequent right to challenge the award does not waive that right.
In the case ofHussmann (Europe) Ltd v. Al Ameen Development and Trade Co,853 the
claimant raised an objection that the respondents were not a party to the arbitration as
soon as it became aware that the respondents had become an incorporated company. The
court decided that the claimant had not lost its right to challenge the award pursuant to
Section 73 as it had raised the challenge before the arbitral tribunal immediately it
became aware of the facts.
Section 67 of the English Act is strictly confined to challenges to the substantive
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. In order for a court to entertain an application under
849
(2003) 2 Lloyd's Rep 617
850
Queen's Bench Division (Commercial Court) Hearing date 27 July 2001.
851 Footnote No. 594
852 ibid
853
[2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 83
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this section, two tests must be proved. Under the first test the arbitral award must
expressly show that the objection being raised before the court was already raised before
the arbitral tribunal. Under the second test there must be evidence showing that the
arbitral tribunal considered the objection and made a decision thereto.854 In the LG
Caltex Gas Co. Ltd855 case, one of the challenges that the respondents raised before the
sole arbitrator was that they were not party to the contract and as such could not be bound
by its terms. The court decided that the respondents had lost the right to object as they
failed to protest to the arbitrator's jurisdiction to decide the issue ofwhether the contracts
were binding or not.856
857In the case ofAthletic Union ofConstantinople, Athletic Union challenged the
arbitrator's jurisdiction before the arbitrator who decided that he had jurisdiction. On
appeal before the court, Athletic Union tried to raise a new ground for a jurisdictional
challenge (which had not been raised before the arbitrator), alleging that it had never
agreed to arbitration. The court held that since Athletic Union had not argued the issue
that it had never agreed to arbitration before the arbitrator, it could not make such an
argument before the court. Athletic Union therefore lost the right to challenge the award
before the court by virtue of its failure to abide by Section 73.
I.2(ii) The Ground of Serious Irregularity
This part of the study covers the second ground upon which a party may be permitted to
invoke the court's intervention after the arbitral award is made under the English Act.
The ground of serious irregularity is so wide such that it covers most challenges other
than the excess ofjurisdiction that may be raised in court against an arbitral tribunal after
the arbitral award is made. The Act places the same statutory prerequisites that a party
858
must abide by before invoking Section 68 as those discussed above. The ground is
however not concerned with the correctness of an arbitral tribunal's decision, but in the
854 Footnote No. 43
855 [2001] BLR 235
856 ibid
857 Footnote No. 98
858 Section 68(1) of the English Act
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way that the tribunal has conducted itself and exercised its powers. It is noteworthy
that the ground for serious irregularity is not found under the Model Law. Section 68(2)
of the English Act defines serious irregularity as follows:
"Serious irregularity means an irregularity ofone or more ofthefollowing kinds which
the court considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant-
(a) failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of tribunal);
(b) the tribunal exceeding itspowers (otherwise than by exceeding its substantive
jurisdiction;
(c) failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the
procedure agreed by the parties;
(d) failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that wereput to it;
(e) any arbitral or other institution orperson vested by the parties with powers in
relation to the proceedings or the award exceeding its powers;
(f) uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award;
(g) the award being obtained byfraud or the award or the way in which it was
procured being contrary topublic policy;
(h) failure to comply with the requirements as to theform ofthe award; or
(i) any irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or in the award which is
admitted by the tribunal or by any arbitral or other institution orperson vested by
theparties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award. ' 60
This section therefore makes available wider avenues to a party that wishes to rely on it
to challenge the arbitral tribunal's award. It does not however cover a jurisdictional
challenge. This ground may therefore be used to challenge an arbitral tribunal that is
acting within its jurisdiction, but that has failed to meet the standard required of Section
68(2). In order for this ground to be invoked, a party must prove that an arbitral
tribunal's actions constituted substantial irregularity to the contending party. A mere
error of law that would result in an arbitral tribunal arriving at a wrong decision does not
suffice. In the Lesotho Highlands861 case, the court concluded that the arbitral tribunal's
selection of the wrong exchange rates did not constitute an excess ofjurisdiction under
Section 68(2)(b).
859 Protech Projects v. Al-Kharafi [2005] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 779 at page 784
860
op cit, Section 68(2)
861 Footnote No. 68, page 287
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The case ofMobile Oil Indonesia, Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia), Ltd862 illustrates the
thin line between an arbitrator's excess ofpower and an incorrect decision of an arbitral
tribunal.863 Whilst a court could set aside an arbitral award for an arbitrator's excess of
power, it may take a long haul for the court to set aside864 the award by virtue of the fact
that an arbitrator misinterprets the facts of the case.865 In the Lesotho Highlands866 case,
the court decided that the arbitral tribunal's choice of currency did not constitute an
excess ofpowers but was instead an error of law. The court further held that the arbitral
tribunal's action of applying a wrong exchange rate of interest which was prevailing 42
days before the closing date for submissions of tenders instead of the current rate of
interest amounted to an error of law. The arbitral tribunal's award was left untouched by
the court despite the tribunal having been wrong in law.
When one looks at the interpretation of a tribunal's excess of power, one is inclined to
come to a conclusion that the tribunal's application of a wrong currency and its use of a
wrong interest rate in the Lesotho Highlands867 case both actually amount to a mistake
and excess ofjurisdiction on the part of the tribunal. In that case the question before the
court was whether an alleged error of the arbitral tribunal in interpreting the contract
amounted to an excess ofpower necessitating the court to intervene. The court decided
that it could not intervene in the arbitral tribunal's decision, as the arbitral tribunal's
erroneous exercise of its available powers did not constitute an excess ofpower. Even if
an arbitral tribunal errs in performing its duties, a national court may not intervene to
correct the error, as the arbitral tribunal would have made the error whilst conducting
itself within the confines of its jurisdiction. As the adage goes, to err is human.
862 487 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
863 Park (2006: 498)
864 Footnote No. 737
865 Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp [845 F. 2d 184 (8th Cir. 1988)]
866 Footnote No. 68, page 266: . .An error however gross, in the exercise of his powers does not take an
arbitrator outside his jurisdiction and this is so whether his decision is on a matter of substance or
procedure." "If the tribunal erred in any way, it was an error within its power.""
867 ibid
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In the case ofMargulead Ltd v. Exide Technologies868 the Court held that in order for the
ground of serious irregularity to be established, it had to be shown that the arbitral
tribunal had failed to comply with its general duty under Section 33(1) of the English
Act.869 The failure by an arbitral tribunal therefore to address a claim presented to it by
the parties may, ifproved, amount to a procedural irregularity that is serious.
In the case of Vee Networks Limited v. Econet Wireless International Limited870 the
applicant sought to set aside the partial award made in favour of the respondent under
Section 67. The application contended that the arbitration agreement was ultra vires and
could therefore not give any jurisdiction to the arbitrator to determine the preliminary
issues that led to his making the partial award. The court held that there had been a
serious irregularity on the part of the arbitrator as he relied on irrelevant statute whilst
interpreting the memorandum of association. The arbitrator did not put the points before
the parties for their comments and his action amounted to substantial injustice.
It is not in all situations however that the serious irregularity results from the tribunal's
personal defects. This can be seen from the definition of serious irregularity referred to
above. In the Fidelity Management SA v. Myriad InternationalHoldings BV871 case the
court stated that:
"...clause 68 is really designed as a long stop, only available in extreme cases where the
tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration thatjustice calls outfor it to
be corrected. "872
National systems of law through their court machinery have a responsibility of accepting
applications when permitted for purposes of remedying what may have gone wrong in the
parties' private agreement. In the Tame Shipping case, the court stated that it could
intervene in arbitration proceedings if requested, if there was a purported irregularity
[2005] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 324
869 ibid., at page 330
870 (2005) 1 All ER 303
871
[2005] Lloyd's Law Reports 508 at page 509
872 ibid
873 Footnote No. 380, page 530
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capable of causing substantial injustice. The court in the case of Torch Offshore LLC v.
Cable Shipping874 referred to the test of substantial injustice as one that is:
"... intended to be applied by way ofsupportfor the arbitralprocess, not by way of
interference with that process. "875
l.2(iii) An Appeal based on a Question of Law Arising out of the Award
The third ground that the English Act makes available to a party that wishes to contest the
arbitral tribunal's award is based on the questions of law arising in the arbitral award.876
In order for Section 69 of the English Act to be invoked by a party, he must show to the
court that he has abided by its statutory standards. Firstly, the award upon which the
challenge is based must contain reasons. Secondly, all parties to the arbitration
agreement must agree to the appeal. Further, the court must permit this course of action
by granting the leave to appeal to the contesting party.877 The court may only grant the
leave if the applicant satisfies the prerequisites contained in Section 69(3).878 The
English Act places these statutory standards as a precautionary measure against the
misuse of the ground. An application under this ground falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts at the seat of the arbitration.
Like the Model Law, the English Act does not permit the challenge of an arbitral
tribunal's award based on questions of fact. The fact that a court cannot entertain a
challenge relating to how an arbitral tribunal dealt with the facts of the case was stated in
the Taylor Woodrow Holdings879 case. Although an arbitral tribunal's conclusions
874 Footnote No. 382, page 370
875 ibid
876 Footnote No. 187
877 Section 69(2) of the English Act
878 ibid, Section 69(3): "Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied- (a) that the
determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties, (b) that the
question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine, (c) that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the
award- (i) the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, or (ii) the question is one of
general public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and (d) that,
despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the
circumstances for the court to determine the question."
879 Footnote No. 17, page 747: "Whereas the arbitrator is the parties' chosen tribunal for all questions of
fact, this court is the parties' chosen tribunal for any question of law arising."
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drawn from its findings of fact cannot be the subject of an appeal, a court may intervene
if the tribunal arrives at a wrong conclusion by virtue of it having misinterpreted the
880 • • • • 881law. This was the position taken in the Kershaw Mechanical Services case. In order
for a court to be able to intervene however, there must be evidence to show that the
arbitral tribunal did not interpret or apply the law correctly in its award. An arbitral
tribunal owes the parties to an arbitration agreement the duty to interpret the governing
882laws correctly in its arbitral award.
It must be stated however that the parties in the Lesotho Highlands case chose by
agreement to opt out of challenging an arbitral award based on a point of law arising out
of the award.883 As such none of the parties could invoke Section 69 of the English Act.
As much as the parties may exercise their right to opt out of any statutory remedy, it may
be to a party's detriment if an arbitral tribunal's award is wrong in law. The House of
Lords in the Lesotho Highlands884 case recognized that there was an error of law but it
decided that the error did not amount to an excess ofpower. The court stated in the
KershawMechanical Services885 case that "the consequence in the Lesotho Highlands
case was that the House ofLords refused to set aside or remit an arbitral decision, which
was wrong in law. "886 The position that the House of Lords took in the Lesotho
Highlands case in relation to the erroneous application of the law had also been accepted
in earlier decisions in other jurisdictions. For instance, in the case of Chromalloy
Aeroservices, Inc, v. The Arab Republic ofEgypt,887 the court held that the arbitral
tribunal had made a procedural decision that led to the misapplication of the substantive
o o o
law. Also in the case of BakerMarina v. Danos the court stated inter alia that:
881 Footnote No. 19, page 82
882 Footnote No. 425
883 Footnote No. 668: "The right to contract out under s. 69 thus presented an optional and consensual
facility directed at reinforcing these two key principles....of finality and party autonomy"
884
op cit
885 Footnote No. 19, page 93
886 ibid
887 939 F. Supp. 907 [1996]
888 Footnote No. 62
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"An award cannot be set aside for misconduct simply because the arbitrators have made
rr . 7 ,,889
an error offact or law.
Once a court is satisfied that a party has proved his case under this ground of appeal, it
may grant an appellant any relief permitted by Section 69(7) of the English Act, which
provides as follows:
"On appeal under this section the court may by order-
(a) confirm the award,
(b) vary the award,
(c) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration in the
light of the court's determination, or
(d) set aside the award in whole or in part.
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside an award, in whole or in part, unless it
is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal
for reconsideration. "89°
The option of remitting the case to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration is also
available under the Model Law as discussed earlier in this chapter. The idea of remitting
the case to the tribunal enables the tribunal to resolve the parties' dispute in finality and
in accordance to the parties' chosen method of dispute resolution thereby reinforcing the
main objectives of the process of international commercial arbitration.
II COURT INTERVENTION IN THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF AN ARBITRAL AWARD
An arbitral award once made takes effect the minute it is served on the parties to the
arbitration agreement. Once served the arbitral award binds the parties to their
obligations in the arbitration agreement. The successful party may invoke the jurisdiction
of a court for purposes of having the arbitral award confirmed in the country where the
other party has assets. The jurisdiction of the court at the enforcement stage of the
arbitration is therefore non-territorial.891 The discussion hereunder shows how a party
890 Section 69(7) of the English Act
891 Footnote No. 543
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may seek the court's intervention so that his award is confirmed and he is in a position to
have it enforced. The study will also look at the grounds that a court requires a party to
prove in order for it to have the arbitral award recognized and enforced.
The study will begin by discussing the position as it pertains under the New York
Convention, the Model Law and under the English Act. This study takes cognizance of
the fact that the New York Convention is the major treaty that governs the recognition
892
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Consequently, whilst a party may abide by
the terms provided by either the Model Law or the English Act, it is also bound by the
standards for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards set by the New York Convention.
This is applicable to the extent that the country in which the recognition and enforcement
of the arbitral award has acceded to the New York Convention.893
11.1 Under the New York Convention
The New York Convention permits a court in a country in which a party wishes to rely on
the arbitral award to recognize and enforce the award when requested to do so by a party.
This permission may however only be granted to a party that fulfills the requirements
provided in Article IV of the New York Convention.894 The New York Convention lays
down five defences that a party may use to object the enforcement or recognition of the
arbitral award by a court.895 In addition to these defences, a court may at its own instance
refuse to confirm the arbitral award if it finds that the arbitral award deals with a dispute
that is not arbitrable under the country in which it is to be relied upon or if confirming it
892 Footnote No. 542
893 Article X(l) of the New York Convention: "Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or
accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international
relations of which it is responsible. Such declaration shall take effect when the Convention enters into
force for the State concerned."
894 ibid, Article IV: "1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the
party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply: (a) The duly
authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; (b) The original agreement referred to in
article II or a duly certified copy thereof. 2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official
language of the country in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and
enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language. The
translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent."
895 ibid, Article V(l)
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would be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing country. The defences may be
summed up as relating to the personal defect of the arbitral tribunal, questions touching
on its substantive jurisdiction, the fundamental integrity of the process, and the public
policy considerations at the place where enforcement of the arbitral award may be sought.
Refusal of recognition of an arbitral award is therefore restricted to these defences under
the New York Convention. These defences are reflected in the Model Law and in the
English Act. If any of these defences are proved before the court, the arbitral award may
not be confirmed in that country. This does not however prevent the successful party
from seeking enforcement in another country where the other party has assets. In ICC
arbitrations, a court may be requested by a party to make an order for post award
attachments, which provide a guarantee for enforcement.
Article V(l)(c) of the New York Convention gives power to a competent court to refuse
recognition and enforcement of an award if it is established that the arbitral award deals
with a subject matter that is out with an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. Under this clause,
a court may confirm part of the award that deals with issues fall within the jurisdiction of
the tribunal. The New York Convention does not expressly state whether there is a
sequence to follow in relation to the setting aside of an arbitral award and the refusal of
its recognition and enforcement. What is clear however is that once the jurisdiction of an
arbitral tribunal is successfully challenged and the arbitral award set aside, the essence of
it being recognized and enforced will depend upon the approach that the enforcing
country may have. Some countries may not want to be bound by the decision of the
country in which the application for setting aside an award may have been made. If for
instance, the country in which the application for setting aside the arbitral award and the
country where enforcement is sought are both Model Law countries, their approach on
issues may be the same.
896 ibid, Article V(2)
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There have been rare occasions when Article VII(l) of the New York Convention897 has
been used to override Article V(l)(e) and consequently permit the recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award that has been annulled in the country in which it was
made. A case in point is the Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic ofEgypt,898
where the court allowed the enforcement of an award that was made in Egypt when the
Egyptian Court ofAppeal had annulled it. The court relied on Article VII of the New
York Convention when enforcing the award instead ofArticle V(l)(e).
The case ofPaklito Investment Ltd v. Klockner (East Asia) Ltd899 is an example of a
court's reliance on Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention. The court showed that a
losing party could not seek to challenge the recognition and enforcement of an award
after it had unsuccessfully sought to challenge the award before another court. It stated
that:
"...apartyfaced with a Convention award against him has two options. Firstly, he can
apply to the courts of the country where the award was made to seek the setting aside of
the award. Ifthe award is set aside then this becomes a ground in itselffor opposing
enforcement under the Convention. Secondly, the unsuccessfulparty can decide to take
no steps to set aside the award but wait until enforcement is sought and attempt to
establish a Convention ground ofopposition. "900
The ground for refusal of enforcement in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention
has been considered by some case law to be too narrow in the sense that it may only be
satisfied in situations where there is a fundamental infringement ofmorality and
justice.901 Public policy considerations are interpreted on a case-by-case basis. As such
an arbitral award that is not enforced in one country as a result of the country's public
policy considerations may be confirmed in another country as long as the arbitral award
is capable of being relied upon there.
897 Article VII (1) of the New York Convention: "The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect
the validity ofmultilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards entered into by the Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to
avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the
country where such award is sought to be relied upon."
898 Footnote No. 887
899 [1992] 2 HKLR 39
900 ibid
901 Footnote No. 571
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11.2 Under the Model Law
A final arbitral award is binding on the parties, but may only be enforced by a court.902 A
party wishing to have the arbitral award confirmed for purposes of recognition and
enforcement needs to seek court recourse in the country where such enforcement is
sought. From the way that Articles 34, 35, and 36 of the Model Law are drafted, it is
clear that the draftsmen wanted to permit court intervention only after the arbitral tribunal
had been accorded an opportunity ofmaking its award, hence confirming the restrictive
nature of the intervention permitted at this stage of the arbitration.
Article 35 provides for the universal recognition of an arbitral award irrespective of the
country where it may have been made.903 This exhibits its non-territorial nature. The
remedy of enforcement of the arbitral award may be sought from a court in the country
where a successful party believes the respondent to have assets, or a court in any country
where he wishes to have the arbitral award enforced. In permitting court intervention at
this stage of the arbitration, the Model Law is silent on the time frame within which a
party may seek enforcement of the arbitral award after it is made. In the same vein, there
is no provision of the time within which a party may object to the enforcement. The
silence therefore gives the enforcing country power to apply its own rules on time within
which an objection may be lodged once an application for the recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award is made.
The party against whom enforcement may be sought is permitted very limited defences by
the Model Law.904 The defences are almost identical to those provided by the New York
902 Article 35 of the Model Law: "(1) An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made,
shall be recognised as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court, shall be enforced
subject to the provisions of this article and of article 36. (2) The party relying on an award or applying for
its enforcement shall supply the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof, and the
original arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 or a duly certified copy thereof. If the award or
agreement is not made in an official language of this State, the party shall supply a duly certified translation
thereof into such language."
903 Footnote No. 206
904 Article 36 of the Model Law: "(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the
country in which it was made, may be refused only: (a) at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof
that: (i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
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Convention discussed above. Article 36(1 )(a) of the Model Law lays down the permitted
grounds upon which a party refusing enforcement may rely on. Article 36(l)(b) on the
other hand contains grounds that a court may on its own accord apply to refuse to grant
the application for the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. Article 36
restricts court intervention by only dealing with the enforcement of arbitral awards and
not orders made by the arbitral tribunal. The permitted grounds for refusing the
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award are limited to procedural issues and not
to the substantive issues in dispute.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the few exceptional countries that re-modeled the
Model Law to such an extent that it has in essence changed the objectives of the Model
Law. Iran did this by omitting Articles 1(2) and 36(1) of the Model Law.905 By so doing,
the Republic of Iran does not recognize the restriction on territory in the application of
the Model Law. It does not also place any restriction on the grounds upon which a party
may rely on when objecting to an application for the recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award. The Republic of Iran has further not acceded to the New York
Convention. It thus applies different standards to foreign arbitral awards, thus defeating
the objective ofharmonization that the Model Law and the New York Convention were
designed to achieve.
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (ii) the party against whom the award
is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or
was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can
be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be recognised and enforced; or (iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or (v) the award has not
yet become binding on the parties or as been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or
under the law ofwhich, that award was made; or (b) if the court finds that: (i) the subject matter of the
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this State; or (ii) the recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of this State. (2) If an application for
setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to a court referred to in paragraph (l)(a)(v) of this
article, the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its
decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award,
order the other party to provide appropriate security."
905 1 997 Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Law 87
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This has consequently affected the way in which foreign arbitral awards are viewed in
Iran. In spite of it having watered down the standards that are set by the Model Law and
the New York Convention, the Islamic Republic of Iran may still be regarded as being
capable of accepting foreign arbitral awards as it has adopted Article 35 of the Model
Law. This is however open to challenge as the Model Law applies to international
commercial arbitration within the meaning ofArticle 1 of the Model Law. But the
Iranian law on arbitration has not adopted Article 1(2) of the Model Law hence leaving
much doubt on its capability to accommodate foreign arbitral awards. Iran requires that
foreign arbitral awards be declared enforceable by the courts at the seat of arbitration,
before enforcement may be obtained there.906 Such an award may be enforced as a
foreign judgment.907
The adoption of the Model Law by the Republic of Iran may be regarded as having
departed somewhat from the language of the Model Law. A question may be raised here
whether the Republic of Iran's stance fits into the notion advocated by the Dervaird
Scottish Advisory Committee that took the position that any departure from the Model
Law be done only to the extent that it fits into a country's legal system.908
11.3 Under the English Act
The enforcement and recognition of an arbitral award under the English Act is restricted
by a mandatory provision demanding leave from a court before the application may be
entertained.909 The need for leave of court is an essential prerequisite that extends to all
arbitral awards in international commercial arbitration that are to be confirmed under the
English Act.910 Leave may be refused if:
906 Section 1295 of the Iranian Civil Code
907 Article 169 of the Civil Judgments Act
908 Footnote No. 6
909 Section 66(1) of the English Act
910 ibid, Section 101(2): "A New York Convention award may, by leave of the court, be enforced in the
same manner as a judgment or order of the court to the same effect."
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"...theperson against whom it is sought to be enforced shows that the tribunal lacked
substantive jurisdiction to make the award.... "9U
Apart from the requirement for leave of the court, a party seeking to have his arbitral
award enforced under the English Act must also abide by the terms and conditions set by
Q19 Q 1 -J
Section 102 amongst others. The validity of the award at the seat must be
ascertained.914 Where these terms are met, a court may confirm an arbitral award in the
form of a judgment.915 A court reserves the right to refuse to recognize or enforce an
arbitral award if a party against whom enforcement is sought proves any of the six
grounds provided by Section 103(2).916 A proofof any of the procedural and
jurisdictional defects may suffice to have the recognition or enforcement sought refused.
In the case ofNorthrop Corporation v. Triad InternationalMarketing, S.A9'7 the court
held that absent manifest disregard of the law, "mere error in interpretation of...law'''
would not be enough to justify refusal to enforce the arbitrator's decision."918
Exceptional circumstances may sometimes cause a court to exercise discretion and refuse
to confirm an award as was the case in Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Pic. 19 It is
open to debate whether a court should refuse to confirm an arbitral award based on
reasons raised by the court at the seat of the arbitration which reasons the court in the
enforcing country does not recognize as necessitating the refusal to confirm an arbitral
award. By doing so however, the court may be viewed as exercising its discretion in
contradiction to Section 103(f) of the English Act.
911 ibid, Section 66(3)
912 Section 102 of the English Act: "(1) A party seeking the recognition or enforcement of a New York
Convention award must produce- (a) the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy of it,
and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy of it. (2) If the award or agreement is in a
foreign language, the party must also produce a translation of it certified by an official or sworn translator
or by a diplomatic or consular agent."
913 ibid, Section 103(3), (4) and (5)
914 ibid., Section 103(2)(f)
915 ibid, Section 101(3)
916 ibid, Section 103(2)
917 811 F. 2d 1265 (9th Cir), cert. Denied, 108 S. Ct. 261 (1987)
918 ibid, at 1269
919 [1990] Chancery Division 573
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In the Westacre 9~° case, the court stated that the allegation ofbribery had been addressed
and rejected by the arbitral tribunal and as such there was there was no need for the issue
to be decided by the court at enforcement. The case ofSoleimany v. Soleimany92'
decided amongst other things, the non-enforceability of illegal contracts due to public
interest considerations. Some countries may view such issues relating to transfer of
firearms or chemical weapons as being in the public interest and therefore too politically
922 • • 923sensitive for an arbitral tribunal to deal with. In such a case, a court may exercise
discretion and refuse to enforce the arbitral award on that ground.
CONCLUSION
Although the level of court intervention in arbitration has sometimes received
criticism,924 the discussion in Part Two of this Thesis, has shown that the level of
intervention is only permitted to the extent necessary by the Model Law, the English Act
and the New York Convention. It is permitted in a systematic way to ensure that the
work of the arbitral tribunal and the exercise of its powers is not disrupted.925 For
instance, a party is able to use the court to raise an alarm when an arbitral tribunal
oversteps its authority. Although the role of the court is described as an intervention in
the arbitration process, it is really there to support and ensure the workability of the
arbitration procedure. As has been discussed in this chapter, the supervisory role that the
court assumes after an arbitral award is made is only accessible on request and again
under strict terms
Once the court is permitted to review the work of an arbitral tribunal, the extent to which
a party may access the court to seek remedies is heavily restricted under the Model Law.
920 Footnote No. 565: This case may be distinguished from the case of Soleimany v. Soleimany which had
an element of corruption or illicit practice which was not the case with the Westacre case.
921 Footnote No. 577
922 Footnote No. 487
923
op cit., at page 800 - The court refused to enforce the Beth Din award giving effect to a smuggling
operation by family carpets business.
924 Lew (2003: 358): "Supervisory court intervention has the potential of seriously disrupting the arbitration
process and impeding the parties' quest for a speedy dispute resolution."
25 Footnote No. 667
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This is however not the case with the English Act. Having said that one finds that the
English Act still controls the extent to which a party may continue to access the court
process for remedies by demanding that leave to appeal be sought before court process
may be accessed further. This is a mandatory requirement from which a party may not
derogate.
The applications that a party may make in court after an arbitral award is made, enables a
court to examine and test the work of the arbitral tribunal. This act acts as a check and
balance to ensure that the arbitral tribunal works with the confines of its jurisdiction
under the terms and conditions that are set for it by the parties in their arbitration
agreement. This helps to ensure that party autonomy is upheld to the extent necessary.
Further, the court also works to the benefit of its system of law by ensuring that its laws
are respected and followed by the parties in their private dispute resolution arrangements.
By virtue of the New York Convention, a number of countries in the world are able to
pay allegiance to the principles that international commercial arbitration seeks to
promote. Most countries therefore recognize international commercial arbitration as one
of the leading methods of dispute resolution, which gives parties the autonomy to make
important decisions affecting the way in which their disputes may be resolved as they
arise. It eases the difficulties of international businessmen that have to deal with more
than one system of law. The system of international commercial arbitration is in
countries like England recognized to be at par with the court system. This may be
evidenced from the way that the English Act enforces arbitral awards. Once enforced, an
arbitral award is given the same status as a court judgment.
The intervention that national courts exercise in applications for jurisdictional challenges
take cognizance of the fact that an arbitral tribunal has dealt with the matter already; that
is in relation to applications that are made before the arbitral tribunal in the first instance.
Such applications are therefore in the form of a re-hearing and not dealt with as a fresh
application. In cases where a party chooses to go straight to court and not permit an
arbitral tribunal to determine his jurisdictional challenge, this enables a court to deal with
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the application as a fresh one. This is aimed at ensuring that national courts do not
perform the function of an appellate court, but should just be there to assist the arbitral
process by ensuring that the arbitral tribunal performs to the parties' expectations and
agreement. This encourages a lot of transparency in the settlement of disputes. The fact
that parties are able to challenge an arbitral tribunal in relation to its jurisdiction gives the
parties confidence in the system and it also assures them of fair play at the end of the day.
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FINAL CONCLUSION
This study has shown that an arbitral tribunal's powers emanate from the agreement of
the parties. The powers are exercised in the way that the parties want them to be
exercised subject to the limitations that the governing legal system provides. In
conducting the arbitration proceedings and making the award, an arbitral tribunal may
exercise any powers that the parties may avail it. The extent to which this may happen is
determined by the agreement of the parties, the procedural law and the rules of arbitration
that the parties choose. The agreement of the parties and the rules of arbitration give
power to an arbitral tribunal by virtue of the fact that they guide the tribunal as to the
duties that it may perform. The procedural law is there to ensure that the procedures are
conducted in accordance with the law. Therefore, where the parties do not state how a
particular aspect of the arbitration is to be performed, the tribunal may obtain guidance
from the arbitration law at the seat of the arbitration as well as the power to perform the
act.
An arbitration agreement is a deliberate policy of the parties to have their disputes
resolved using the process of arbitration. A discussion of the essential attributes of an
arbitration agreement at the outset of this thesis was vital as the validity of the arbitration
is measured by these elements. An arbitral tribunal is only able to exercise powers
emanating from a valid arbitration agreement, which is recognized as such by the
applicable law. The parties may by consent choose to have their arbitration proceedings
governed by rules of arbitration in which case they adopt the procedure provided by the
rules and may in some cases have their arbitration administered by the institution under
which the rules fall. This does not however prevent the parties from agreeing on
procedures contrary to what is provided in their chosen rules. This is because the parties'
choice to be bound by the rules is voluntary and as such they may depart from them
depending on the circumstances of each case. It is important that the parties to an
arbitration agreement agree on an arbitral tribunal that is to deal with their disputes or the
means by which it may be appointed.
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The study has shown that the extent of the parties' freedom and independence to choose
the procedure by which their disputes are to be resolved is hampered by statutory
restriction in the laws that they choose to govern their arbitration. In order to be legal an
international commercial arbitration must adhere and conform to the chosen systems of
law. The arbitration agreement, the way in which the arbitral tribunal conducts the
arbitration proceedings and the ensuing award must all conform to the governing systems
of law. This is necessary as it acts as a check on the way in which the parties exercise
their power of choosing their dispute resolution procedures. This check is essential if the
ensuing final award is to be recognized and enforced at law.
The consent of the parties on how the arbitration is to be conducted forms the basis upon
which the whole process of arbitration is founded. The parties must agree on every
aspect of the arbitration including what should happen in the event of them failing to
agree. In instances where the parties remain silent on how an aspect of the arbitration
procedure is to be handled and the governing rules of arbitration are also silent, an
arbitral tribunal may refer to the arbitration procedure as it is provided at the seat of the
arbitration. The procedure at the seat of the arbitration therefore functions as a
mechanism available for use by the tribunal when none is provided. An arbitral tribunal
may, when permitted by the parties, exercise discretion and draw guidance from the
members of the tribunal and additional rules of arbitration on how it is to function
effectively. The parties therefore take care of all aspects of their arbitration through the
way in which they choose to exercise their independent controlling power of the
arbitration.
The power of the parties to have the arbitration conducted by consent only extends up to
the end of an arbitral tribunal's mandate. Thereafter, the parties are not obliged to agree
on where the award may be enforced for instance or whether to challenge the award or
not. The need to enforce the award is a unilateral decision that is made by the successful
party, whose choice is inter alia determined by the location of the losing party's assets.
In the same vein, a party may have his own independent reason for wanting to challenge
an award. This study also showed that there is also an absence of consensus between the
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parties when objecting to an aspect of the arbitration before the appointment of the
arbitral tribunal or during the course of the arbitration process.
The English Act and now the Model Law as revised have a broad description of a written
arbitration agreement that in essence includes an oral arbitration agreement as well. Any
reference in writing to an oral arbitration agreement whose existence is not denied by the
other parties qualifies that oral arbitration agreement as a written one. It remains for
steps to be taken to revise Article 11(2) of the New York Convention so that it may
conform to the wide interpretation of a written arbitration agreement now pertaining. An
arbitration agreement may be recognized as having complied with the writing
requirement under the English Act and under the Model Law when made by a telephone
call as long as there is a reference to it in either the parties' contract or in the pleadings
which reference is not objected to by the other party. If Article 11(2) of the New York
Convention remains as it stands today, a question that needs to be answered is whether
the qualification of an oral agreement as a written one referred to above is capable of
satisfying and complying with Article IV(l)(b) of the New York Convention. There is a
need to iron out the writing requirement as it affects the validity of an arbitration
agreement and consequently the powers of a tribunal.
By virtue of their autonomy, the parties have got the prerogative of selecting their own
team of arbitrators to resolve their disputes. In the event of their failure to agree, they
must choose the mechanism that may be adopted. If this is not done, then the procedure
provided by the arbitration law at the seat of the arbitration may be followed. The
arbitrator's involvement in the process of selecting other arbitrators is minimal as this is
in essence the job of the parties. Once appointed however, an arbitral tribunal is in
charge of the arbitration and conducts the proceedings and makes decisions in accordance
with the wishes of the parties.
Although the parties have got the prerogative to select any number of arbitrators, this
study found that the general trend is for an arbitral tribunal to be composed of an uneven
number of arbitrators, with one or three being the most favored. This position assists
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with the finality of the arbitration process, as the presiding arbitrator is able to have a
casting vote where there is no consensus on an issue or decision that is put to a vote. The
ICC Court exercises control over the arbitration by confirming the appointment of an
arbitral tribunal. This gives assurance to the parties of the suitability of their tribunal.
Where the parties fail to make a decision on the appointment of an arbitral tribunal,
reference may be made to the procedural law. The system of law at the seat of the
arbitration may through the use of its court machinery appoint an arbitral tribunal. When
a court decides on such a matter, the Model Law does not permit an appeal of the
decision to a higher court. This promotes finality of an issue. The English Act on the
other hand however tends to be more relaxed and as such permits appeals, but with the
leave of the court. These in-built restrictions prevent applications relating to the
appointment of an arbitral tribunal from dragging unduly before courts and thus delaying
the arbitration process.
The process of arbitration begins from a private set up to a publicly recognized one by
virtue of the parties' agreeing to have a defined legal contract. The parties' rights and
obligations are interpreted using the procedural law that is chosen by the parties. A
defined legal relationship between the parties gives the arbitration its legality and
efficacy. A privately arranged arbitration may be enforced using a public medium of
courts. A legal system may only enforce an arbitration agreement that is valid by its own
standards and that has satisfied the requirements of a valid arbitration agreement.
However Article V of the New York Convention in dealing with awards may be
considered as departing from this position. This is so because it prevents an enforcing
country from recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award that is not recognized as
binding or been set aside at the seat of the arbitration. Article V therefore requires an
enforcing country to take on board the standards pertaining to the validity of the award
that are set by the law at the seat of the arbitration. However, the fact that Article V uses
'may' and not 'must' means that the position should not be considered as absolute. It is
for this reason that some courts tend to rely on Article VII of the Convention instead.
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Article VII of the New York Convention permits an enforcing country to consider
whether to enforce an award or not by its own benchmarks. There is therefore no reason
why an award that is not recognized as binding at the seat of the arbitration or been set
aside there may not be enforced in the enforcing country if that country recognizes it as
valid. The Model Law and the English Act may be considered as showing compliance
with Article V and not Article VII of the New York Convention, by adopting Article V in
verbatim in their provisions. As such a party may be unable to enforce an arbitral award
in England or in a Model Law country by relying on Article VII of the New York
Convention.
It is clear that the enforcement and recognition of foreign arbitral awards is based on the
New York Convention as well as on local laws. But the extent to which the New York
Convention may be applicable in a member country in contravention of the country's
sovereign laws is arguable. A proposition therefore that Article VII of the New York
Convention be revisited in order for it to have a uniform application in its member
countries would not be far fetched. It is easier as things stand to find Article V to be
superior to Article VII when considering the harmonization of the process of arbitration
and the need to recognize the binding nature of the process of arbitration, which is an
essential attribute of an arbitration agreement.
The validity of an arbitration agreement should be gauged in accordance with the law to
which the parties wish to subject their arbitration agreement in order for consensus and
harmonization to prevail in international commercial arbitration. The law to which the
arbitration is to be subjected must recognize it as an enforceable instrument. An
arbitration agreement, like a final award, must conform to the public policy, social,
political and economic interests of the legal system at the seat of the arbitration. This
confirms the need for the parties to make choices that conform to their chosen regulatory
laws. It is therefore evident that the powers of an arbitral tribunal lie in the agreement of
the parties as read together with the law at the seat of the arbitration under which the
tribunal functions. The lex arbitri to which the parties wish to subject their arbitration to,
must recognize the issues in dispute between the parties as capable of being subjected to
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the process of arbitration. In addition to that, the issues in dispute must fall within the
scope of the arbitration agreement and must relate to the parties to the agreement. The
correct identification of the issues in dispute between the parties is fundamental as it
prevents challenges and helps speed up the arbitration.
By virtue of its separate nature from the parties' contract, an arbitration agreement's
validity is gauged differently from the contract. Whereas the failure by an arbitration
agreement to meet the essential attributes of an arbitration agreement under the law to
which the agreement is subjected to, may lead to its invalidity, the failure to meet the
terms required in a contract may lead to a breach of contract. The rules of arbitration
assist in determining the extent of an arbitral tribunal's powers under that arbitration by
providing a procedural outline of the arbitration. In so doing the rules of arbitration must
conform to the applicable law.
An arbitration agreement may come about in an indirect way through a treaty by a
foreign investor's exercise of his autonomy and his accepting a standing offer to arbitrate
from the country in which he has investments. The offer to arbitrate may result from a
treaty to which his country and the country ofhis investment are members. Countries
that enter into treaties may, where a treaty provides for arbitration, make a standing offer
to arbitrate to foreign investors ofmember countries of a treaty. It is only when the offer
is accepted that an arbitration agreement may come into being. It is from the provisions
of the arbitration agreement that the extent of an arbitral tribunal's powers may be
ascertained.
Each arbitrator is under an obligation to conduct himself in a manner befitting of a person
called to conduct juridical duties. Fair play is fundamental. This may be achieved by an
arbitrator committing himself to abide by the requirements of disclosure, impartiality,
independence and the upholding of confidentiality to the extent required by the parties.
This is a threshold that arbitrators must strive to attain. The parties in a Model Law
country may not confer power on a tribunal that breaches Article 18 of the Model Law,
which is a mandatory provision. The failure to abide by these set standards of behaviour
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may lead to a personal attack of an arbitrator by a party who feels aggrieved by the
arbitrator's conduct. The New York Convention limits the grounds for raising a
challenge against the enforcement of an arbitral award to procedural unfairness. But it is
possible for an arbitrator to be biased or partial without being procedurally wrong. In
such a case, a party may be left with no remedy at the enforcement stage of the award
under the Convention. However, remedies may be available under local laws.
In an effort to enable the tribunal to complete its work as scheduled, the Model Law uses
time as a safeguard when an arbitrator is personally challenged. The application may
only be entertained when raised within the permitted time limits. The English Act offers
protection to an arbitral tribunal that errs by granting it immunity from liability for acts
committed whilst conducting the arbitration so long as such conduct is not in bad faith.
An arbitral tribunal has a responsibility of ascertaining the parties' position on
confidentiality as this may fluctuate from one set of arbitration rules to another and from
country to country. The tribunal ought to conduct itself within the parties' agreed
position. The fact that most countries are non-committal on the question of
confidentiality gives the parties an independent control of this position. The rules of
arbitration however provide guidance on the extent to which confidentiality may be
maintained during the arbitration proceedings.
This study also showed how the parties give ultimate authority and power to an arbitral
tribunal to resolve the issues in dispute between them and make a final award. This is a
duty that is entrusted by the parties to the tribunal exclusively. The way in which a
tribunal handles this duty is reflected in the credibility of the final award. The tribunal is
obliged to exercise the powers that the parties avail to it in ironing out the differences
between the parties and giving the remedies as prayed. The tribunal is required to adhere
to the orders for directions subject to the procedural law. In the event of any conflict
between the parties' orders for directions and the procedural law, the procedural law
should prevail. The tribunal must also consider any public policy considerations at the
seat of the arbitration. As most arbitration proceedings relate to facts in dispute, in the
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normal course of the arbitration process, a tribunal is able to conduct arbitration
proceedings and make a final award without any reference to the system of law governing
the arbitration proceedings. The tribunal must however acknowledge the provisions of
the law within which it is working by abiding by to its terms. The power that the tribunal
obtains from the arbitration agreement is designed to enable it resolve the parties' dispute
conclusively. The study therefore in essence shows that the powers of an arbitral tribunal
to deal with a dispute conclusively are usually sufficient although further powers may
assist in reducing the court intervention that currently exists.
The parties have an independent right to choose an arbitration procedure that is embraced
by the law at the seat of the arbitration and its chosen rules of arbitration. The parties
may in certain circumstances permit an arbitral tribunal to exercise limited powers in
procedural issues in a default manner. The procedural boundaries that the parties set
ought to be strictly adhered to by an arbitral tribunal unless the parties agree to permit it
to exercise discretion. The parties' choice of arbitration rules to govern its procedures is
done on a voluntary basis and as such the parties may agree to depart from some
provisions and be partially bound by the rules. In circumstances where the tribunal
exercises discretionary powers, there must be evidence of reasonably compelling reasons
to support its decisions.
Where the exercise of discretionary powers is concerned, the ICC Rules when compared
to the UNCITRAL Rules tend to give a lot of leeway to the tribunal to make decisions on
procedural aspects when the rules are silent, thus promoting flexibility. For instance, the
tribunal is permitted to choose any rules ofprocedure to govern the arbitration
proceedings if the ICC Rules are silent on this issue. The tribunal may also decide its
own procedural timetable by virtue of it drawing the Terms of Reference. The tribunal
may also be able to block the parties' additional applications such as those relating to
new claims that are filed late. The UNCITRAL Rules on the other hand permit a tribunal
to conduct proceedings in a manner it considers appropriate, but subject to the rules.
Whilst this procedure is less daunting, it is restrictive in the sense that it does not give the
tribunal much flexibility.
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The arbitral tribunal's exercise of the procedural power to hold preliminary meetings
forms the foundation of how the arbitration is to progress. By virtue of a preliminary
meeting, the tribunal is able to design its own case management style, which must receive
the approval of the parties. Through the preliminary meeting, a tribunal may be able to
find common grounds between the parties that may lead to a possible amicable settlement
of the case in some instances, thus saving the parties costs. Even where the amicable
settlement is not achieved, the tribunal may still be able to iron out some procedural
issues in a preliminary meeting. The holding ofpreliminary meetings is a management
tool that is favored by the ICC Rules and which may also be used in an arbitration
conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules as the parties permit the tribunal to conduct the
proceedings in a manner it considers appropriate.
As the holding of a preliminarymeeting is an exercise of a procedural power, it requires
the input of the parties. Through a preliminary meeting, a tribunal may be able to find
common grounds on issues relating to the language of the arbitration, the seat and venue
of the arbitration. Some mles of arbitration such as the ICC Rules for instance do not
give any default power to an arbitral tribunal to select the seat of the arbitration whilst the
UNCITRAL Rules do. Whilst an arbitral tribunal may, when permitted only select one
seat of arbitration, it may select more than one venue depending on the convenience of
the locations to the parties and the tribunal as well as the situation of the witnesses. As
the home of the arbitration, the tribunal is bound by the lex arbitri whilst it must respect
the laws at the venue of the arbitration proceedings. Where parties choose not to transfer
any procedural powers to the tribunal, it is obliged to conduct itself in accordance with
the parties' choice of procedure.
Unless unforeseen circumstances arise such as the non-attendance of a party or an
arbitrator, the procedure agreed to in the preliminary meeting ought to be strictly adhered
to. Any change in the set procedure must be recognized at the seat of the arbitration and
be with the parties' consent. In the absence of the agreement of the parties, a party may
be justified in objecting to such an act. There are however some changes in the venue for
instance that the parties may agree to in an effort to ensure that the arbitration progresses.
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These include a change in venue due to a change in the chosen country's political
climate, a change made for the convenience of the witnesses, the tribunal or the parties.
An arbitral tribunal owes the parties a responsibility of ensuring that it makes an award
that is binding and final. It must further strive to ensure that its award is capable of
enforcement and can withstand challenge. An arbitral tribunal's exercise of its power to
make an arbitral award must take into consideration the agreement of the parties, the lex
arbitri and the extent of its jurisdiction. It is by virtue of the arbitration agreement that
the parties become bound to the arbitral award and it is by reason of the local laws that it
becomes enforceable. Although it is the duty of an arbitral tribunal to respect and abide
by the parties' chosen procedures, the tribunal ought to see to it that the way in which the
parties wish it to handle the award is acceptable under the local laws. It must therefore
work towards making an arbitral award within the time frame that is set by the parties to
the arbitration agreement. The duty to abide by the procedural mechanism that is set by
the parties does not however prevent each arbitrator from exercising his independence of
judgment and refusing to sign an arbitral award that he does not agree with.
An arbitral tribunal may only be said to have exhausted its mandate if it produces an
award made within the confines of its jurisdiction. An award made in excess of
jurisdiction or power may be challenged and it does not make an arbitral tribunal functus
officio if it does not completely answer the points in issue. The essential attributes of the
award and the types of awards that it may make must conform to the standards required
by the local laws. The tribunal is under an obligation to address all aspects of the parties'
dispute and answer them completely with an award of an appropriate remedy. An
appropriate remedy is one that aims to put the aggrieved party as close as possible to the
position that he may have been in before the dispute arose. Consequently, where
permitted, if the award of interest or costs would help the tribunal achieve this goal, then
it may award the party interest and costs.
An arbitral tribunal may where the lex arbitri permits make several orders and awards in
the course of the arbitration proceedings in order to clarify issues to the parties as they
arise. A tribunal's address ofprocedural or jurisdictional questions is different from its
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address of the subject matter in dispute between the parties as whilst the resolution of the
former results in an order, the resolution of the latter results in an award. An address of a
question of liability for instance results in an interim award, which may qualify to be a
final award if the question has been dealt with completely and a remedy is granted. Such
an issue cannot be revisited as it becomes res judicata. However, if the question of
liability is addressed and revisited by the tribunal when it is dealing with the question of
damages, then the earlier award may not qualify to be a final award. The final segments
of an award however form the final award after all the issues in dispute have been dealt
with and the remedies are granted. It is only at this time that an arbitral tribunal's
mandate comes to an end.
The subject matters in dispute between the parties that an arbitral tribunal may deal with
and those that may be dealt with by national courts, is a question that is determined by
each legal system. The study has shown that there is a correlation between the
arbitrability of a subject matter in dispute to the question of the jurisdiction of an arbitral
tribunal. Both areas draw a boundary of the extent of a tribunal's power to deal with the
parties' dispute. The power of an arbitral tribunal to deal with the issues in dispute is
dependent upon whether it has jurisdiction to do so and whether the law to which the
parties choose to subject their dispute to, recognizes that dispute as arbitrable. The
questions that have to be answered in the affirmative to confirm this position is whether
the parties to the arbitration agreement have permitted the tribunal to address an issue
before it and whether the system of law in the country where the question of arbitrability
is raised permits such a course of action.
Therefore, as much as the agreement of the parties may draw the boundaries within
which an arbitral tribunal is to function and exercise power, this boundary must be
confirmed by the parties' chosen law and the public policy requirements in that country.
An arbitral tribunal must therefore have the parties' mandate to deal with issues in
dispute between them and it must also be authorized by the local laws to deal with such
issues, as it is not all issues that a legal system may wish to be addressed by the use of the
process of arbitration. As each country has its own benchmarks as to the matters that
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may be dealt with through the use of the process of arbitration and those that may not, it
becomes evident that there is no uniformity on this issue among countries that support the
process of arbitration. An arbitration agreement may therefore only be considered as
valid by a system of law if it deals with a subject matter that is arbitrable in that country.
It is only when this is so that an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction and power to handle the
dispute in a country may be confirmed.
The questions ofwhether an issue in dispute between the parties is arbitrable and whether
an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction though correlated are answered under different
standards. The arbitrability of a subject matter is a question that is determined in
accordance with the standards that are set by the legal system in the country where the
question is raised. The said country must consider the arbitration agreement as valid and
relating to an arbitrable subject matter by its standards. By determining this question in
the affirmative, the court machinery in the country where the question is raised will be
confirming that the mattermay be subjected to the process of arbitration and a tribunal
may prevail over it. It is important that a party raises an objection immediately he
becomes aware of the issue that is the subject of the objection.
When the question is raised before the arbitral tribunal is constituted, it may be non-
territorial if raised in the country in which the respondent is domiciled. The applicant
will basically be requesting the court to compel the respondent to go to arbitration as
agreed, as the issues in dispute are capable of being subjected to the process of
arbitration. If the issues in dispute are arbitrable, the court may send the matter to
arbitration under the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. However, if the issues are not
arbitrable, the court assumes jurisdiction and determines the case.
A question of the arbitrability of a subject matter when raised after an arbitral award is
made is raised in the form of a challenge against the award. The issue is territorial at this
stage as it is raised in a court at the seat of the arbitration, which has jurisdiction to
determine a challenge against an award. A confirmation of the arbitrability of the subject
matter confirms that the tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with it. A losing party may raise
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the question of arbitrability as a defence against the enforcement of an arbitral award. If
the question is raised at the enforcement stage however, it becomes a non-territorial issue
as it is decided in the country where the losing party has assets in accordance with that
country's own legal standards.
It is evident that the question of arbitrability may only be determined by a particular legal
system in accordance with its own benchmarks. In this way, countries control the types
of issues that may be subject to the process of arbitration within their borders. A
country's public policy limitations prevent certain issues from being sent to arbitration.
A country may in general not be inclined to send matters that border on its security or
sovereignty to arbitration. Each country holds its own list of arbitrable issues that may
change depending on a country's mandatory provisions and public policy considerations
pertaining at that point in time. The arbitral tribunal has got a responsibility to inform the
parties if it finds that the issues in dispute are not arbitrable under the parties' chosen law.
This assists the tribunal in ensuring the enforcement of its award.
Whilst the determination of the question of arbitrability of a subject matter in dispute lies
in the domain of a national court, the determination of the question of the jurisdiction of
an arbitral tribunal lies in the domain of an arbitral tribunal at least in the first instance by
virtue of the principle of competence-competence. The principle enables a tribunal to test
its own jurisdiction and confirm the extent of its power whilst acting as a judge in its own
court. An arbitral tribunal determines the question of its jurisdiction during the course of
the arbitration proceedings. This power of an arbitral tribunal is one of the pillars of the
process of arbitration as it promotes party autonomy in the arbitration process by
delaying court intervention until after the tribunal has decided on the matter. A party is
obliged to raise an objection immediately he becomes aware of the tribunal's lack of
jurisdiction. In dealing with this objection, an arbitral tribunal may deal with it in whole
and issue an award thereto, or it may deal with the question in its final award on the
merits.
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The positive aspect of this power of the tribunal is that it cures the excesses of
jurisdiction or any lack of it by granting an objecting party with immediate remedy
thereby saving costs and time. The downside of this power of the arbitral tribunal is that
a party is still permitted under the English Act and the Model Law to revert to court
during the course of the arbitration proceedings if he is not happy with the decision of the
tribunal. However the time within which such an application may be made to court is of
the essence. The English Act in fact goes further under Section 72 to permit a party to an
arbitration agreement that chooses not to participate in the arbitration proceedings to
request a court to determine a jurisdictional question that is not tabled before a tribunal
subject to that party notifying the other of his intentions.
The court's role in the arbitration process is confined to applications relating to attacks on
a tribunal's jurisdiction; procedural issues; questions of law and the enforcement of an
arbitral award. Time limits have been used as a tool to restrict court intervention in the
arbitration process under the Model Law and the English Act at different levels. The
Model Law tends to provide time limits within which the court may intervene which have
closed ends thus ensuring that there is no undue delay in the arbitration process. The
Model Law further permits the arbitration proceedings to continue whilst a party seeks
the protection of a court thus showing the ancillary role that the court plays in the process
of arbitration.
The English Act has a somewhat relaxed approach in terms of time limits within which a
court may intervene. This approach accommodates unforeseen circumstances that may
make a party fail to meet a restrictive deadline. As such the English Act permits, in a
mandatory fashion, a party with a cogent reason that fails to meet set time limits of
seeking court protection to do so. In terms of the extent of court restriction on this score
therefore, the approach taken by the Model Law is more supportive ofparty autonomy
than that of the English Act. However, the fact that there is this difference in approach
between the Model Law and the English Act is healthy as the parties have a choice of the
system of law they want depending on the circumstances of their case.
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As Article 5 of the Model Law and Section 1(c) of the English Act show, court
intervention should be cut to a minimum in recognition of the parties' deliberate choice
of arbitration as a means by which their disputes are to be resolved. Identifying the
reasons that lead parties to seek intervention from the courts in procedural and
jurisdictional matters during the course of the arbitration proceedings may assist in
strengthening the rules of arbitration to provide guidance to the parties in these areas. In
this way court intervention may be minimized. The parties may then only seek court
intervention on points of law and at the enforcement stage of the award.
The powers of an arbitral tribunal may be extended through the strengthening of the rules
to enable the tribunal to deal conclusively with issues that it is able to deal with, and for
the parties to only resort to court in areas where the tribunal does not have the power to
deal with an issue. Possible changes to the rules of arbitration to accommodate this
scenario may, it is hoped, further restrict court intervention. In Scotland for example, a
separate Code ofArbitration exists that provides for court intervention on issues where
the arbitration law does not permit court recourse. Such an arrangement is healthy as it
does not completely close the door to court intervention, but gives the parties a choice
depending on the circumstances of their case. The existence of choice ofprocedure
however is essential as it is one of the attractive features to the process of arbitration.
The power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction for instance may be left to
the arbitral tribunal to decide completely, with a party only being able to seek court
recourse after an arbitral tribunal's mandate comes to an end. As the parties entrust the
tribunal to deal with their dispute in an exhaustive manner, it may also be entrusted to
address an issue pertaining to its jurisdiction or procedure exhaustively as well. This may
increase the powers of an arbitral tribunal but may in the process also increase the
parties' reliance on rules of arbitration. The reviews of the jurisdictional or procedural
decisions of the tribunal may arise when the tribunal's mandate terminates where need
be. In this way, the procedure may be more defined. The downside of this arrangement
however, may be for a party that has reason to believe that the tribunal has got no
jurisdiction continuing with the proceedings and then proven right later by the court.
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This may prove to be more costly in the end. This study however is more inclined to
favor the position of increasing the powers of an arbitral tribunal through possible
changes to the general law regulating the process of arbitration. The strengthening of the
rules of arbitration may be a step in the right direction, although the parties that do not
choose rules may still be left with no alternative but to seek the protection of the court.
Before the appointment of an arbitral tribunal, court intervention acts a vital role in
supporting the process of arbitration, as the tribunal is not yet in control of the arbitration.
The court therefore ensures that the parties that have chosen to have the disputes resolved
using the process of arbitration achieve their wish. The court may also help the parties in
the appointment of their tribunal if they have problems in doing so. The court may
further intervene for purposes of granting interim relief to a party that makes such a
request in order to ensure that the process of arbitration does not become an academic
exercise. It is difficult to restrict court intervention at this stage of the arbitration
proceedings, as the parties may not have anywhere else to turn to. The parties to an
arbitration agreement are not obliged to select a set of rules to govern their arbitration and
therefore they may get guidance from the court when they are unable to agree at this
stage of the proceedings.
The court's review of an arbitral tribunal's actions after its mandate comes to an end,
promotes justice. Under the Model Law, a party may only seek the court to review the
tribunal's conduct of the arbitration proceedings under Article 34 whilst using very
limited grounds. The English Act on the other hand permits court recourse after the
award in three ways under Section 67, 68 and 69, with restricted grounds. The
restrictions are a good way ofpromoting finality in arbitration. In most Model Law
countries, an arbitral tribunal's findings of fact are final although this is not the case with
England that permits appeals on questions of law and a tribunal's findings of fact under
restricted terms under Section 69. The court therefore assumes a supervisory role to
check whether the arbitral tribunal conducted itself in accordance to the standards set by
the parties as read together with the governing laws. As a result of the court's review of
the arbitral tribunal's actions, the court may permit an arbitral tribunal to correct or
236
rectify the errors or issues in contention respectively, thereby ensuring the enforcement of
the award. Generally speaking however, a court may not interfere in the award on the
basis of the fact that the tribunal made an error of fact or law, even if the error was
manifest.
By virtue of the New York Convention, a court in the country where the recognition and
enforcement of the award is sought may grant enforcement to a party that satisfies the
requirements set by Article IV of the Convention. The court may further deal with
applications for challenge pertaining to the enforcement of the award. A party that
refuses to have the award enforced only has very limited defences. This kind of court
intervention is a cornerstone of the process of arbitration, and can therefore not be
avoided. As a party may have to request for enforcement in a country where the losing
party has assets, that jurisdiction must authorize the enforcement subject to its local laws
or Article IV of the Convention. It is encouraging to note that countries that favor the
process of International Commercial Arbitration have ensured that the role of an arbitral
tribunal in the arbitration process is respected and its powers are not interfered with. The
arbitral tribunal is therefore given the independence to conduct the arbitration
proceedings in accordance with the parties' wishes and on condition that it abides by the
regulatory laws.
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